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Justice Powell: 
In getting Maher ready for the Printer last MgX night I thought 
of a possible improvement in the new note that does not change the 
substance at all. The reference to 380 F.Supp. is a recognition 
of Poe's claim by the original District Court which assumed that it 
would be met after of the statute. 
lfp/ss 3/17/77 M?!; R 
.J~ Last Term in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. 
Murgia, U.S. ___ (1976), we stated that: 
" ... equal protection analysis requires 
strict scrutiny of a legislative classifica-
tion only when the classification interferes 
with the exercise of a fundamental right or 
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a 
suspect class." 
There is no claim here of a suspect class; rather, it is 
i 
urged that the Connecticut regulation impinges impermissibly 
upon a fundamental right. This requires, at the outset, 
a precise identification of the right at issue. The 
fundamental right recognized in Roe, as we have shown 
above, was freedom to choose abortion rather thmnor mal 
childbirth without limitations, absolute or unduly 
restri ctive, imposed by the state. In view of the nat re 
of this right, much of our reasoning applicable to ... 
substantive due process applies also to the alleged 
denial of equal protection. Connecticut, by the classifica-
tion here at issue, has not impermissibly restricted or 
1-E 
interfe red with a pregnant woman's freedom of choice. 
No ·one in that state is subject to the types of state 
restrictions on abortions invalidated in our previous 
decisions. 
ii. 
Appellees contend, nevertheless, that their equal 
protection argument is supported by the decisions of this 
Court in Shapiro v. Thompson, supra and Memorial Hospital 
v. Maricopa County, supra, cases which contain elements of 
both substantive due process and equal protection. 
In those cases 
lfp/ss 3/17/77 Rider A, p. 22 (Maher) 
III. 
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation 
can be sustained, against an equal protection challenge, 
under the less demanding rational basis standard of review. 
The regulation classifies, for the purpose of determining 
entitlement to Medcaid benefits, medical expenses incident 
to elective abortions differently from such expenses incident 
to childbirth. It is argued that t:he S::wa.,i.a~ 8' t!he st!l!te 
ei this distinction constitutes an invidious discrimination 
~ violati~ of the equal 
A 
merit of this argument by 
protection clause. We test the 
~ 
asking whether the state's ,.. 
classification rationally furthers a legitimate state 
interest. We think that it does. 
Indeed, as we have indicated, Roe itself explicitly 
~~ 
FQeGSA~med tlie state's ultimate interest in protecting 
A 
the potential life of the fetus. The interest was there 
recognized on a sliding-scale basis, "grow[ing] in 
substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a 
point during pregnancy, [the interest] becomes 'compelling'". 
Roe, supra, at 162. Our decision in that case thus 
2. 
recognized the legitimacy of the state's traditional 
interest, one that exists throughout the pregnancy although 
it becomes compelling only at viability. The fact that the 
pregnant woman "carries an embryo, and, later, a fetus" 
prompted the Court to acknowledge that this "situation is 
inherently different from" the "earlier privacy" cases 
relied on in Roe. Id., at 159 (empahsis added). The 
Court went on to say that the "pregnant woman cannot be 
isolated in her privacy [Her] privacy is no longer 
sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be 
measured accordingly." Id., n. 6. Indeed, in Skinner 
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 ; (1943) the Court emphasized, 
although in a somewhat different context, the importance 
of marriage and procreation "to the very existence and 
survival of the race." 
*Note to Tyler: Revise and summarize fn. 1-E. 
3. 
(Taler: I would think we could emphasize further the nature 
an importance of the state's interest by reference to what 
has been said in some of our cases with respect to marriage, 
procreation and the like. It would be well, I think, not 
to rely soley on Roe because - in truth - Roe gave scant 
attention to the state interest until the stage of viability 
is reached.) 
Nor can there be any question as to the rational 
relationship of this classification - of the means employed 
by the state - to its interest in encouraging normal child-
birth and ther eby assuring "survival of the [human] race" 
in our country. The medical costs associated with childbirth 
are substantial, and ·have increased significantly in recent 
years. As recognized by the District Court in this case, 
such costs - including the attendant hospitalization charges -
are s:ia@l'1 E is Mct)y greater than those normally associated 
with non-therapeutic abortions during the first trimester. 
The subsidizing of costs incident to childbirth, therefore, 
rationally may be deemed an incentive to a woman to carry 
a fetus to term. We do not understand appellees to argue 
to the contrary. 
4.' 
Although unnecessary to our analysis, we observe that 
the means chosen by the state to encourage its policy choice 
is the dispensation of welfare benefits. Our cases HHfxx 
uniformly have recognized a wider latitude in the fteee~~a~y 
"line drawing" process where the state must make choices 
among competing demands for limited public funds. In 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), despite recognition 
that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds involve 
"the most basic HERSMX economic needs of impoverished human 
beings", we held that classifications survive equal protection 
challenge when justified by a "reasonable basis". As the 
preceding discussion makes clear, the state interest in 
encouraging normal childbirth far exceeds this minimal 
level. ·k 
*Tyler: What do you think about our adding, at this point 
a note somewhat along the following lines: "Although there 
is no occasion to go so far in this case, it is at least 
possible to argue - with reason - that in the context of 
a classification such as that involved in this case, the 
state interest may be viewed as 'compelling' when balanced 
against the comparable interest of the woman who desires 
an abortion. In some circumstances (e.g., in countries 
with excessive birth rates), there may oe a strong state 
interest in encouraging abortions and discouraging 
childbirth. Connecticut, not irrationally, wishes to~ 
~dt~ childbirth. So long as it can do this without~ 
infringing upon a fundamental right, perhaps its interest 
can be characterized as ' 'compelling"' compared with that of 
a woman to have the price of her abortion paid for by the 
state. n...c..., 6..;(.. ... .o&4 <.. j.._~ ....._.. d....f1 t~.~c.J ~
J-4,.;t-~ ~~ ~ ~ ~/--4~'1-t>-f ~ 
~~ ..... 1-o~~.J-a~~ ry A--1-XC-~ ~~' 
75-554-0PJNJON 
Beal 
RICer B, p. 8 (new footnote 15) 
15. Our dissenting Brothers, in this case and in 
Maher v. Roe, posjt, at ____ , express in vivid terms 
their anguish~ over the perceived impact of today's 
decisions on indigent preg~ant women who prefer ) 
abortion to carrying the fetus to childbirth. We 
think our Brothers misconceive the issues before us, 
as well as the role of the judiciary. 
In these cases we have held merely that (i) the 
provisions of the Social Security Act do not require 
a State, as a condition of participation, to include 
the funding of elective abortions in its medicaid 
program; and (ii) the Equal Protection Clause 8Ls88& 
does not require a State that elects to fund expenses 
incident to childbirth also to provide funding for 
w 
elective abortions. But we leave entirely free both I 
the Federal Government and the States, through the 
normal processes of democracy, to provide the desired 
funding. The issues present policy decisions of the 
widest concern. They should be resolved by the 




8 BEAL v. DOE 
mit-participating States to fund nontherapeutic abortions 
requires far more convincing proof than respondents have of-
fered. Second, the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, the agency charged with the administration of this 
comp 1ca e statute, takes the position that Title XIX al-
lows-but does not manda.te-funding for such abortions. 
"[\V'] e must be mindful that 'the construction of a statute 
by those charged with its execution should be followed un-
less there are compelling indications that it is wrong .... ' " 
New York Department of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U. S. 
405, 421 ( 1973), quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 
395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969). Here, such indications are com-
pletely absent. 
We therefore hold that Pennsylvania's refusal to extend 
medicaid covera e to nontherapeutic abortions is not incon-
sistent with Title XIX. \Ve make clear, however, that the 
federal statute leaves a State free to provide such coverage if 
it so desires.4j: 
13 -="Federal funds are made available only to those States w110se ·medicaid 
plans have· been a roved· by the Secretary of 'HEW. 42 U. S.C. § 1396. 
~The Court of Appeals cone u e t at ennsylvania's regulations a so 
violated {he equality provisions of Title XIX requiring that an individual's 
medical assistance "shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope than 
the medical assistance made available to any other such individual." 42 
U.S. C. ·§1396!1(10)(b). See id ., §1396a(10)(c). According to the 
Court of Appeals, the Pennsylvru1ia regulation "forces pregnant women to 
use- the least volunt-a.ry method of treatment, while not imposing a similar 
requirement on other persons who qualify for aid." - F. 2d, at -. 
We find the Pennsylvania regulation to be entirely consist-ent with the 
equality provisions of Title XIX. Pennsylvania has simply decided that 
there is reasonable justification for excluding from medicaid coverage a 
· articular medically unnecessa procedure--nontherapeutic abortions. 
14 Congress by statute bas expressly proh1 1te t e use uring sea 
year · 1977 of federal medicaid funds for abortions except when the life 
of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term. 
D ::!p:ntments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation 
Act, 1977, § 209, Pub. L. No. 94-439 (1976). 










Much of the rhetoric of the three dissenting 
opinions would be equally applicable if Connecticut 
had elected not to fund either abortions or childbirth. 
Yet none of the dissents goes so far as to argue that 
the Constitution requires such assistance for all indigent 
pregnant women. 
T' 5-1440---C>PINION 
MAHER v. ROE 1~ 
weighing of its wisdom or social desirability, for this Court 
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise, 
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of 
thought." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488 
(1955), quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 484. In~ 
deed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as 
those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abor-
tions, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democ-
racy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legisla-
tures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of 
the people ill quite as great a degree as the courts." Missouri, 
"'-.) Kansas and Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904) 
(Holmes, J.). l'lf 
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does not 
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It 
is open to Congress to require provision of medicaid benefits 
for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the 
medicaid program. Also, under Title XIX as construed in 
Beal v. Doe, ante, Connecticut is free- through normal demoL 
cratic processes- to decide that such benefits should be 
provided. We hold only that the Constitution does not re-
quire a judicially irpposed resolution of these difficult issues. 
IV 
The District Court also invalidated Connecticut's require~ 
ments of prior written request by the pregnant woman and 
prior authorization by the Department of Social Services. 
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted 
invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not un-
reasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of 
medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only 
for authorized purposes. The simple answer to the argument 
that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical 
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termi~ 
uatiQn Qf a potential human life. In Planned Parenthood of 
\ 
lfp/ss 4/5/77 Rider A, p. 7 (Maher) 
Applying this analysis here, we think the District Court 
erred in subjecting the Connecticut regulation to strict 
judicial scrutiny. 
A 
The regulation does not discriminate against a 
suspect class. There isRa no claim that an indigent 
woman desiring an abortion falls within the fairly limited 
category of disadvantaged classes recognized by our 
cases. Appellees emphasize, rather, that the impact of 
the regulation falls upon the indigent. In a sense, 
every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth 
classification as compared to nonindigents who are able 
te pay for the desired goods or services. But this Court 
has never held that indigency alone identifies a suspect 
class for purposes of constitutional consideration. 
See Rodriguez, 411 u.s., at 
397 u.s. 471 (1970). 




lfp/ss 4/5/77 Rider A, p. 6 (Maher) 
Thus, if the state had refrained from paying any of such 
expenses - whether for childbirth or abortion - appellees 
would have asserted no infringement of a constitutional 
right. Nor is there any suggestion that the traditional 
freedom - indeed the normal expectation - of a woman to 
carry her fetus to childbirth is any less entitled to 
state funding than a woman's freedom during the first 
5 
trimester, recognized in~' to choose an abortion. 
Rather, appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord 
equal treatment to both, and may not validly evidence a 
policy preference by funding only the medical expenses 
incident to childbirth. This is a challenge ¢D the 
classification by the Connecticut regulation of abortions 
in a different category from childbirth. The basic frame-
work of analysis under the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is well settled: 
lfp/ss 4/5/77 Rider A, p. 19 (Maher) 
We also have emphasized that where the equal protection 
challenge is to the allocation of public funds that the 
(Tyler: Here pick up at the top of page 21 and incorporate 
the remainder of that paragraph. Then we move to the 
paragraph on page 19 beginning with "The decision •.• " .... 
~fp/ss 4/25/77 
Putting it differently, so long as a classification is 
rational in this respect and not invidious, the judgment 
of legislative bodies is accorded wide respect. See 
Lindsey v . Normet, ___ U. S. ___ , ___ , (1971); Jefferson 
v . Hackney , 406 u.s. 535; 3ag, Antaniw School District 
v . Rodriguez, 411 u.s. ___ , ___ (1973) . We think the 
Connecticut regulation satisfies this familiar standard . 
lfp/ss 4/25/77 Rider A, p. 12 (Maher) 
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation 
can be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality~ 
that applies in the absence of a suspect~ 
impingement of a fundamental right. This test requires 
that the distinction drawn between childbirth and 
nontherapeutic abortion by the regulation be "rationally 
related" to a "constitutionally permissible" purpose. 
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 u.s. 56, 74 (1972). We hold that 





Putting it differently, so long as ~ classification,(rs 
rational in this respect and not invidious, the judgmen~ S 
~ 
of legislative bodies ~accorded wide respect. See 
Lindsey v. Normet, ___ U.S. ___ , ___ , (1971); Jefferson 
v. Hackney, 406 U.S . 535; San Antonio School District 
v . Rodriguez, 411 UoS. ___ , ___ (1973). We think the 
a..l>~ _.f<· ~ ~ ~ J-4 1' ~ ~ 
Connecticut regulation~ satisfies this i familiarAstandard. 
/ 
/ 
LFP/lab 5/5/77 Rider A, pg. 4 Maher 
Add as a note on page 4. 
~ 6L. The District Court's judgment and order, 
entered on January 16, 1976, stayed. Accordingly , 
on January 26, 1976 , ~apparently for the purpose of com-
I • 
plying with t he 
1 
jud~ment, the Department of Social Services,. 
~ I 
revised ~ 275 of the Connecticut regulation. See 
1\ r -I 
n . 2 , supra . The revised regulation was made r etroactive 
-to June 16, 1976, the date of the judgment. Despite this 
revision , w-Aich allows reimbursement ·fe-r---ftonther:-apentie 
abortions, no suggestion of mootness has been made by any 
of the parties, and this appeal was taken and submitted on 
the theory that Connecticut desires to reinstate the invali-
dated regulation. Moreover, there would remain in any event 
the denial of reimbursement to Mary Poe, and similarly 
situated members of the class, under the pre-revision 
regulation. The State has asserted no Eleventh Amendment 
defense to this relief sought by Poe and those whom she 
represents. 
tb/lab 6/15/77 Maher (Substitute for Old FN-10) 
In his dissenting opinion, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN 
rejects the distinction between direct state interference 
with a protected activity and state encouragement of an 
alternative activity and argues that our previous abortion 
decisions are inconsistent with today's decision. But as 
stated above, all of those decisions involved laws that 
placed substantial state-created obstacles in the pregnant 
woman's path to an abortion. Our recent decision in Carey 
v. Population Services International, u.s. (1977) 
differs only in that it involved state-created 
restrictions on access to contraceptives, rather than 
abortions. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN simply asserts that the 
Connecticut regulation "is an obvious impairment of the 
fundamental right established in Roe." Post, at 
The only suggested source for this purportedly "obvious" 
conclusion is a quotation from Singleton v. Wulff, 428 
U.S. 106 (1976). Yet, as MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN was careful 
to note at the beginning of his opinion in Singleton, that 
case presented "issues [of standing] not going to the 
merits of this dispute." 428 u.s., at 108. 
Significantly, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN makes no effort to 
distinguish or explain the much more analogous authority 
of Norwood v. Harrison, supra. 
lfp/ss 6/13/77 Footnote - Maher v . Roe 
__ ! Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion relies 
heavily on t he Court's recent decision in Carey v. Population 
\ 
Services International , _ u.s . _ (197'1,). The statute 
in that case \ilmposed serious restrictions on the sale and 
\ 
advertising of contraceptives , some of which were .absolute' 
in critical respects. Central provisions of New York's 
badly drawn law also bore no rational relationship to the 
state's professed objectives . We find Carey wholly inapposite 
for the purpose :relied upon . 
'· 
lfp/ss 6/13/77 Footnote - Maher v. Roe 
__ I ~k. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion views 
Connecticut's decision in substantive due process terms 
as an "obvious impairment of the fundamental right established 
by~", _P.ost, at 4, requiring asjjustification a compelling 
state interest. The dissent perceives no distinction between 
state interference with the exercise of a protected activity 
and state encouragement of an alternative activity. Moreover, 
much of the rhetoric of the three dissenting opintons would 
be equally applicable if Connecticut had elected not to 
fund either abortions or childbirth. The "millions of 
people" thought by Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent to be 
disadvantaged by the Court's opinion (post, at ___ ) would be 
no less affected if financial assistance for both were 
simply discontinued by federal and state governments. Yet 
none of the dissenting opinion goes so far as to argue that 
the Constitution requires such assistance for all indigent 
pregnant women. 
lfp/ss 6/13/77 Footnote - Maher v. Roe 
__ I Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting 
Connecticut's ·sion in 
I 
as bvious impairment of the fundamental ri ht e tablished 
by 
tate interest. The dissent perceives no distinction between 
state interference with the exercise of a protected activity ; 
and state encouragement of an alternative activi 
~<fla;;l ­
A~ch of the rhetoric of the three dissenting opinions would 
be equally applicable if Connecticut had elected not to 
fund either abortions or childb~th. J e "millions of 
eople" thought by Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent to be 
isadvantaged by the Court's opinion (post, at ___ ) would 
o less affected if financial assistance for both were 
simply discontinued by federal and state government . 
~~--!;;_ . . ~ 
none of th disseneia~ op goes so far as to argue that 
,I 




Mr. Justice Brennan rejects the distinction between 
A 
direct state interference with a protected activity and 
state encouragement of an alternative activity. His 
opinion ~that our previous abortion decisions 
are inconsistent with ~~sion .., Nut as w~:ilate stated 
1\ 
above, all of those cases involved laws that placed 
"obstacles--absolute or otherwise--in the pregnant woman's 
~ 
path to an abortion." In J:i4.s effort to bridge this gap, 
~~~ ~¥--
Mr-. Justice~ ~ly asserts that 
A 
the Connecticut 
regulation "is an obvious impairment of the fundamental 
right established in Roe." Post, at ;!pparenrty, 
~{~~Y t~it'h~ ttE languagE! ta. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.s. 106 (1976). 
fft.tr f.o:t~l t A 
obVIO~ • Yet, as Mr. Justice Blackmun was careful to note at the 
( o 'r'\ c...J cA.. ~ ·, OY\. I~ 
().. ~lA fc1vb'oV\ beginning of his opinion in Singleton, the case presented 
r fv\ 
"issues [of standing] not going to the merits of this 
dispute." 428 U.S., at 108. Significantly, Mr. Justice 
Brennan makes no effort to distinguish the much more 
analogous authority of Norwood v. Harrison, supra. 
lfp/ss 6/13/77 Footnote - Maher v. Roe 
___ / Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion relies 
heavily on the Court's recent decision in Carey v. Population 
Services International, ___ U.S. ___ (1977). The statute 
in that case imposed serious restrictions on the sale and 
advertising of contraceptives, some of which were absolute 
in critical respects. Central provisions of New York's 
badly drawn law also bore no rational relationship to the 
state's professed objectives. We find Carey wholly inapposite 
for the purpose relied upon. 
Re: Carey footnote 
I would include a reference to Carey in my 
main footnote. Other than pointing out that this case 
falls in the same general category as the »HX other 
previous abortion decisions, I do not think the case 
deserves special attention. The point for which Brennan 
uses the case--knocking down the distinction between 
absolute and non-absolute obstacles--is a ~ non-issue. 
•. 
No. 75-1440 
Edward W. Maher, Commissioner 
of Social Services of Connecticut, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Susan Roe et al. 
On Appeal from the 
United States District 
Court for the District 
of Connecticut. 
[April -, 1977] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Beal v. Doe, ante, at-, we hold today that Title XIX 
of the Social Security Act does not require the funding of 
nontheraputic abortions as a condition of participation in the 
joint federal-state medicaid program established by that 
statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in Beal, we 
must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating 
State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for 
childbirth. 
I 
A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits 
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions 1 to those 
,that are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psy-
chiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare Department, Public 
Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275.2 Connecti-
1 The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not 
challenged here. 
2 Section 275 provides in relevant part: 
"The Department makes payment for abortion services under the 
Mediral Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions 
a.rb met: 
''1. In the opinion of the attending physician the abortion is medi-
15-1440-0PINI ON 
MAHER v. ROE 
cut enforces this limitation through a system of prior au. 
thorization from its Department of Social Services. Iu 
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion, 
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed 
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the pa-
tient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medi-
ca.lly necessary. 
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation 
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of 
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent 
women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of 
medical necessity.3 In a complaint filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged 
the regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements of 
''11ly necessary. The term " Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric 
lf'CPSSit~•. 
''2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or 
l icensed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy .. .. 
"3. The written request for the abortion is submitted by the patient, 
<~lld in the case of a. minor, from the parent or guardian. 
'In the case of a committed child, a written consent for the abortion is 
... ecurrd from the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Youth 
:-;prvireR as guardian. 
'4. Prior authorization for tl1e abortion is secured from the Chief of 
.\fedJCal Servte<:'S, Division of Health Services, Department of Social 
Serv1cee " 
~ At the time tlu~ action was filed, Linda Poe, a 16-year-old high school 
.lttnior, had already obtained an abortion at a Connecticut hospital. 
\pp:trPntly becam::e of Par's inability to obtain a certificate of medical 
uece~o;ity, thr hosp1tal was denied reimbur::;ement by the Department of 
1:loc'1al Srrvtee~ . A~ a result, Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital 
lnll of $244. Susan Roe, an unwed mother of three children, was unable 
ro obtam an abortion because of her physician's refusal to certify that the 
procedure was medtrally nrcessary. By consent, a temporary restraining 
n·der was rntrred by the D1~tnrt Court enjoining the Connecticut officials 
rom rrfm;'ng to pay for Hne '~ abort ion. After the retnand from the Court 
., t Apprals, tll<' Dtstrtct Court 1s~ued temporary restraining orders covermg 
•hrr(• addtttonnl women 40R F Supp. 660, 663 (Conn. 1975) . 
75-1440-CPINION 
MAHER v. ROE 3 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1396 et seq., 
and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal 
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation 
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act pro-
hibited the funding of abortions that were not medically 
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain 
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation, 
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only 
allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also re-
quired it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the 
Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding 
of such abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 (CA2 1975). Upon re-
mand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in 
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened. 
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F. 
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975). 
Although it found no independent constitutional right to 
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the 
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeu-
tic abortions from a state welfare program that generally sub-
sidizes the medical expenses incident to pregnancy and child-
birth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 
113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the view 
that "abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive 
moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are 
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with preg-
nancy .... " 408 F. Supp., at 663 n. 3. Relying also on 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the court 
held that the Connecticut program "weights the choice of the 
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitu-
twna.Ily protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion and 
·'thus infringes upon a fundamental interest." 408 F. Supp., 
'15-l440-0PINION 
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at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this 
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be 
"wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive 
medical response to pregnancy." Id., at 664 (footnote 
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed 
t•onstitutionally irrelevant: 
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type 
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it 
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To 
sanction such a justification would be to permit dis-
crimination against those seeking to exercise a constitu-
tional right on the basis that the state simply does not 
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid. 
The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the 
:oertificate of medical necessity for medicaid-funded abortions. 
The court also struck down the related requirements of prior 
written request by the pregnant woman and prior authoriza-
tion by the Department of Social Services, holding that the 
State could not impose any requirements on medicaid pay-
ments for abortions that are not "equally applicable to medic~ 
aid payments for childbirth , if such conditions or require~ 
ments tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion 
that she has asked her physician to perform." I d., at 665. 
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider the constitutional-
ity of the Connecticut regulation. 428 U. S. 908 (1976) . 
II 
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to 
pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent wo-
men, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indi-
gents! But when a State decides to alleviate some of the 
4 Boddie v Connerticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), cited by appellees, is 
JOt to the contrary Th!lre thP Court invalidated under the Pue Proce6S 
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hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner 
in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limi-
tations. Appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord 
equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and may not 
evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical 
expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classi-
fications established by the Connecticut regulation presents a 
question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysis 
of such a claim is we11-settled ~ 
"We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] oper-
ates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or im-
pinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly 
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict 
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme 
must still be examined to determine whether it rationally 
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and 
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimina-
tion .... " San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 u. s. 1, 17 (1973). 
Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
'F. S. 307, 312, 314 ( 1976); Applying this analysis here, 
C'lause "certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, in-
cluding requirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of 
process" restricting the ability of indigent persons to bring an action for 
divorce !d., at 372. 
"Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage rela-
t,ionship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state 
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due 
process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of inability to 
pay, access to its courts to ini1ividuals who seek judicial dissolution of their 
marriages:'' !d., at 374. 
Because Connecticut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for 
; ('rminating pregnancies through abortion the present case is easily dis-
tinguished from Boddte See abo United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 1 
\197:n Ort'wein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656 (1973). 
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we think the District Court erred in holding that the Con .. I 
uecticut regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A 
This case involves 110 discrimination against a suspect clas~. 
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within I 
the limited category of disadvantaged Classes so recognized:by 
our cases. Nor does the fact that ,the impact of the reg,u~ 
tion falls upon those who cannot pay ·· s 1 y; -s rf~t:"'s~tiny. 
In a sense, every denial of welfare t an mdigent creates a 
wealth classification as compared to nonindigents who are able 
to pay for the desired goods or services . . . But this Court has 
· never held that financiaJ need alone identifies a suspect class 
for purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez, 
supra, at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). 5 
Accordingly, the ~1 question· in this case is whether the 
regulation "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or 
implicitly protected by the Constitution:" · The District Court 
read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, supra, and the subsequent 
cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental right to 
abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less than a 
compelling state interest would justify Connecticut's different 
· treatment of abortion and childbirth. We thihk the District 
' Court misconceived the nature arid scope of the fundamental 
right recognized in Roe. 
' B 
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a: Texas' law 
5 In cases such as Griffin v. Illinois , 351 U. S. 12 (1956) and Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the Court held that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause requires State~ that allow appellate review of criminal convic-
tions to provide indigent defendants 'with trial transcripts aJ1d appellate 
coun~el. ThP~<> case,; are grounded in · the criminal justice system, a. gov-
ernmental monopoly in winch participation. is compelled. Cf. n . 4, supra. 
Our ~ubsequent decJ~wns have made it clear that the principles underlying 
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making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abor ... 
tion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the 
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases 
restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and 
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that 
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty 
affords constitutional protection against state interference 
with certain aspects of an individual's personal 11privacy,H 
including a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy/) 
410 U. S., at 153. 
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on 
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed 
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety 
of the desired service. As MR. JusTICE STEWART observed~ 
1'it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of a 
constitutional freedom . .. . " ld., at 170 (STEWART, J. , con-
curring) . We held that only a compelling state interest would 
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally pro ... 
tected interest, and we found no such state interest during 
the first trimester. Even when judged against this demand ... 
ing standard, however, the State's dual interests in the health 
of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were 
deemed sufficient to justify substantial regula.tion of abor-
tions in the second and third trimesters. uThese interests 
are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantia1ity as 
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, 
each becomes 'compelling.'" !d., at 162-163. In the second 
trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant 
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that 
concern. ld., at 163. At viability, usually in the third td-
6 A woman hal:' at least an equal right to choose to carry her fetus to 
term as to choose to abort 1t. Indeed, the right of procreation without 
state interference has long been Fecognized as "one of the ·basic Civil rights 
of man ... fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race!1' 
l5,ki'f!.:(l.!!r 'lt. Qklqhorrtq,_ 316 u,·s, 53'1>~ Ml (1942), 
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mester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus 
!ustifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the 
life or health of the mother is threatened. ld., at 164. 
The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible 
interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate 
her pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated 
other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in 
effect, on the woman's freedom of choice. 'Thus, in Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 
70 n. 11 ( 1976), we held that Missouri's requirement of spousal 
consent was unconstitutional because it "granted [the hus-
band] the right to prevent uni1aterally, and for whatever 
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's de-
cision to terminate her pregnancy." Missouri had interposed 
an "absolute obstaCle to a woman's decision that Roe held 
to be constitutiona1ly protected from such interference." 
(Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need 
not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra, 
we have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion "is 
not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek 
an abortion." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976). 
We recognized in Bellotti that "not all distinction between 
abortion and other procedures is forbidden" and that "[t]he 
constitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its 
degree and the justification for it." !d., at 149-150. We 
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massa-
chusetts statute regu1ating a minor's access to an abortion 
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine 
whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the 
minor's decision or the less burdensome requirement of 
parental consultation. 
These cases recognize a constitutionally protected interest 
' u1 making certain kinds of important decisions" free from 
governmental compulsion. Whalen v. Roe, - U. S. --
aud 11n. 24 and 26 (1977). As Whalen makes clear, the 
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right in Roe V. Wade can be understood only by considering r 
both the woman's interest and the nature of the State's inter-
ference with it. Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitu-
tiOnal right to an abortion,' ' as the District Court seemed to 
think. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly 
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether 
to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the 
authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring child-
birth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the 
.allocation of public funds. 
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind 
f'rom the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions. 
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or 
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. 
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no dis.. 
1dvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund 
ehildbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private 
funds for the service she desires. The State may have 
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby in-
fluencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no re-
striction on access to abortions that was not already there. 
The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases, 
perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abortions is 
neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut /111. * (jJ 
r·~Iude that the Connecticut regulation does not y"" 11 
impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe.1 ~ 
1 Appellee" rrly on Shap~ro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) , and 
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974). In 
tho~e cases durahonal residence requirements for tl1e receipt of pub1ie 
benefits were found to be unconstitutional because they "penalized" the 
r<xerclt::<' of tbl" constitutional rigllt to travel interstate. 
Appellees' relianrr on the penalty analysis of Shapiro and Maricop11 
1 ·owity is mi:-;placed In our view there is only a semantic difference 
hetween appe1lt>es' a:;:;ertJOn that the Connecticut law unduly inter. 
~~>Ut.:." wi.th a wornnn'~ nght to terminate her pregnancy and their ruli-
75-1440-0PINION 
MAHER v. ROE 
c 
Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases 
applying it. There is a basic difference between direct state 
interference with a protected activity and state encouragement 
of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.8 
asertion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most 
familiar to the criminal law, where criminal sanctions are imposed as a 
consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recog-
nized that denial of welfare to one who had recently exercised the right to 
travel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to 
justify strict judicial scrutiny. 
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women who had 
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we 
would have a close ana.Iogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny 
might be appropriate under either the penalty an.alysis or the analysis we 
have applied in our previous abortion decisions. But the claim here is 
that the State "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by 
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that 
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay 
the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no suppol't in the right 
to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a compelling inter-
f'St for its decision not to fund elective abortions, 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (19!'S3), similarly is inapplicable here. 
In addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of 
a constitutionally imposed "governmental obligation of neutrality" origi-
nating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment. Id., at 409. 
s rn Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), we drew this distinction in 
sustaining the public financing of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to 
others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party 
of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on 
access to the electoral process: 
"These cases, however, dealt primarily with state laws requiring a 
candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear 
on the ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the 
eandidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice 
preferences regarding repre~entative government and contemporary issues. 
In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates 
·s not :restrictive of voters' right and less restnctive of candidates', 
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Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempt& 
to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to en~ 
courage actions deemed to be in the public interest is neces. 
13arily far broader. 
This distinction is implicit in two cases cited in Roe in sup-
port -of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), 
involved a Nebraska law making it criminal to teach 
foreign languages to children who had not passed the 
eighth grade. !d., at 396-397. Nebraska's imposition of 
a criminal sanction on the providers of desired services 
inakes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the 
constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted under 
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to 
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct 
their children" were "within the liberty of the Amendment." 
id., at 400. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 
(1925), the Court relied on Meyer to invalidate an Oregon 
criminal law requiring the patent or guardian of a child to 
send him to a public school, thus precluding the choice of a 
private school. Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendmerit's 
concept of liberty "excludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction 
from public teachers only," the Court held that the law "un· 
reasonably interfere[ d) with the liberty of parents and guard-
Ians to direct the upbringing and education of children undet 
their control." !d., at 534-535. 
Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot of" 
any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice; the inability, 
if any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaigns wilt 
aerive not from lack of public funding but from their inability to raise 
private contributions. Any di:sadvantages suffered by operation of the 
dig1bility formUlae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denia1 
of the enhancement of opportui'lity to communicate with the electol'at& 
hat the formulae afford eligible candidates." ld ., at 94-95 (emphasis. 
A tl.Pd.} (footnote omitted}. 
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Both cases invalidated substantial restrictions on con .. 
stitutionally protected liberty interests: in Meyer, the parent's 
right to have his child taught a particular foreign language; 
in Pierce, the parent's right to choose private rather than 
public school education. But neither case denied to a State 
the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action. 
Indeed, in Meyer the Court was careful to state that the 
power of the State "to prescribe a curriculum" in its free 
public schools that included English and excluded German "is 
not questioned." 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts 
no shadow over a State's power to favor public education 
by funding it-a policy choice pursued in some Sta.tes for 
more than a century. See Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U. S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954). Indeed, in Norwood v. Har-
rison, 413 U. S. 455, 462 ( 1973), we explicitly rejected the 
argument that Pierce established a "right of priva.te or paro-
chial schools to share with public schools in state largesse,'~ 
noting that "[i] t is one thing to say that a State may not pro-
hibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to 
8ay that such schools must, as a matter of equal protection, 
receive state aid." Yet, were we to accept appellees ' argu-
ment, an indigent parent could challenge the state policy of 
favoring public rather than private schools, or of preferring 
instruction in English rather than German, on grounds identi-
cal in principle to those advanced here. We think it abundantly 
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest 
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more than 
a Sta.te must so justify its election to fund public but not 
private eciucation, 
D 
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation 
can be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality 
-that applies in the absence of a suspect classification or the 
Impingement of a fundamental right. This test requires that 
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a.bortion by the regulation be "rationally related" to a "con .. \ 
stitutionally permissible" purpose. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 
F S. 56, 74 (1972). We hold that the Connecticut funding 
scheme satisfies this standard. 
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong inter .. 
Pst in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest 
exists throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality 
as the woman approaches term.'' Roe, supra, at 162-163. Be-
cause the pregnant woman carries a potential human being, 
she "cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . . [Her] privacy 
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must 
be measured accordingly." /d., at 159. The State unques-
tionably has a strong and legitimate interest in encouraging 
normal childbirth, an interest honored over the centuries.& 
1 r or can there be any question that the Connecticut regula• 
tion rationally furthers that interest. The medical costs as· 
sociated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased 
significantly in recent years. As recognized by the District 
C'ourt in this case, such costs are significantly greater than 
those normally associated with elective abortions during the· 
first trimester. The subsidizing of costs incident to child-
birth is a rational means of encouraging childbirth. 
We recognize that the impact of the Connecticut regulation 
on an indigent woman may be great, but "the Constitution 
does not provide judicial remedies for every social and eco-· 
nomic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 4Q6 U. 8. 81, 74 (1972). Our· 
cases uniformly have accorded the States a wider latitude in I 
~hoosing among competing demands for limited public funds.10 ' 
u In add1hon to tlw dirPrt. interest in protecting the fetus, a State may· 
have lrgitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth .. 
uch concern;; are ba<>ic to the future o! th~ State and in some circum-
,;tanres rould constitutr a substantial reason for departure from a position· 
of neut ralhy betwern abortion and childbirth. 
10 See gen!:'rally Wilkm~on The Supreme Court , The Equal Protection· 
Clausr, and The Three Faces of Constitutional Equa.lity, 61 Va. L. Rev. 
'.14~~. 998-1017 ( H.l75)., 
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In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970). despite recog: 
nition that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds in., 
volve "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human 
beings," we held that classifications survive equal protection 
challenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is 
shown. As the preceding discussion makes· clear, the state 
interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this mini .. 
mal level. 
The decision whether to expend state funds for nonthera .. 
peutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value 
over which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that 
the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a 
weighing of its wisdom of social desirability, for this Court 
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise, 
improvident, or out of harmony with a particulal' school of 
'thought." Williamson v. tee Optical Co., 34S U. S. 483, 488 
(1955), quoted in DandridOe v. ·williams, suprn, at 484. 1~ 
deed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as 
those implicated by public funding of nonthetapeutic abor .. 
tions, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democ- ...,~ __ .._/ kJA.-
racy is the legislature. ~ should ~1\ forget that "legisla- ~ 
tures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of 
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.'·' Missouri, 
Kansas and Texas R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267-270 (1904) 
(Holmes, J.). 
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does not 
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It 
-is open to Congress to require ptovision of trtedicaid benefits 
for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the 
medicaid program. Also, under present federal law, Con-
necticut is free-through normal democrat"ic processes-to 
decide that such benefits should be provided. Beal v. Doe, 
ante, at -. We hold only that the Constitution does not 
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IV 
1~ 
The District Court also invalid~tted Connecticut's require. 
ments of prior written reque~t by the pregnant woman and 
prior authorization by the Department of Social Services. 
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted 
invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not un~ 
reasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of 
medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only 
for authorized purposes. The simpie answer to the argument 
that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical 
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termi~ 
nation of a potential human iife. In Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, we held that the woman's 
written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible bur~ 
den under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the 
similar issue here. 
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the 
case is rerriantled for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion~ 
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of Social Services of Connecticut, 
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Susan Roe et al. 
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of Connecticut. 
[April -, 1977] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Beal v. Doe, ante, at -, we hold today that Title XIX 
of the Social Security Act does not require the funding of 
nonthe'raputic abortions as a condition of participation in the 
joint federal-state medicaid program established by that 
statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in Beal, we 
must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating 
State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for 
childbirth. 
I 
A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits 
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions~ to those 
that are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psy-
chiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare Department, Public 
Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275.2 Connecti-
1 The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not 
challenged here. 
2 Section 275 provides in relevant part: 
''The Department makes payment for abortion services under the 
Mediral Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions 
un. met: 
l. ln the opmion of the attending physician the abortion is medi-
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cut enforces this limitation through a system of prior au-
thorization from its Department of Social Services. In 
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion, 
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed 
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the pa-
tient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medi-
cally necessary. 
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation 
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of 
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent 
women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of 
medical necessity.3 In a complaint filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged 
the regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements of 
•·ally necessary. The term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric 
necessity. 
"2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or 
licensed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy .. .. 
"3. The written request for the abortion is submitted by the patient, 
and in the case of a minor, from the parent or guardian. 
"In the case of a committed child, a written consent for the abortion is 
:,;ecured from the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Youth 
Srrvices as guardian. 
'4. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of 
:\-IedJCal Services, Division of Health Services, Department of Social 
Services." 
~ At the time this action was filed, Linda Poe, a 16-year-old high school 
junior, had already obtained an abortion at a. Connecticut hospital. 
Appa.rE'ntly because of Poe's inability to obtain a. certificate of medical 
neeessity, the hospital was denied reimbursement by the Department of 
:::locia.l Services. As a. result, Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital 
bill of $244. Susan Roe, an unwed mother of thrre children, was unable 
to obtnin an abortion because of her physician's refusnl to certify that the 
procedure was medically necessary. By consent, a temporary restraining 
•1rder was entered by the District Court enjoining the Connecticut officials 
!l'om refus;ng to pn,y for Roe's abort ion. After the reroand from the Comt 
of AppPa!s, thf' District Court issued temporary restraining orders covering 
; hrr.<> aqditional women 408 F Supp. 660, 663 (Conn. 1975) , 
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Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq., 
and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal 
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation 
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act pro-
hibited the funding of abortions that were not medically 
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain 
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation, 
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only 
allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also re-
quired it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the 
Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding 
of such abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 ( CA2 197 5) . Upon re-
mand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in 
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened. 
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F . 
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975). 
Although it found no independent constitutional right to 
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the 
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeu-
tic abortions from a state welfare program that generally sub-
sidizes the medical expem;es incident to pregnancy and child-
birth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 
113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the view 
that 11abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive 
moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are 
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with preg-
nancy . .. . " 408 F. Supp .. at 663 n. 3. Relying also on 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the court 
held that the Connecticut program 11weights the choice of the 
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitu-
tionally protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion and 
4 'thus infringes upon a fundamental interest." 408 F . .Supp., 
r ' 
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at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this 
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be 
"wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive 
medical response to pregnancy." Id., at 664 (footnote 
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed 
constitutionally irrelevant : 
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type 
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it 
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To 
sanction such a justification would be to permit dis-
crimination against those seeking to exercise a constitu-
tional right on the basis that the state simply does not 
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid. 
The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the 
certificate of medical necessity for medicaid-funded abortions. 
The court also struck down the related requirements of prior 
written request by the pregnant woman and prior authoriza-
tion by the Department of Social Services, holding that the 
State could not impose any requirements on medicaid pay-
ments for abortions that are not "equally applicable to medic~ 
aid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or require~ 
ments tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion 
that she has asked her physician to perform." I d., at 665. 
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider the constitutional-
Ity of the Connecticut regulation. 428 U. S. 908 (1976). 
II 
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to 
pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent wo-
men, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indi-
gents.4 But when a State decides to alleviate some of the 
4 Boddie v. Conuecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), cited by appellees, is 
•ot to the contrary Then' the Court invalidated under the Pue Proce~ 
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hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner 
m which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutionallimi~ 
tations. Appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord 
equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and may not 
evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical 
expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classi~ 
fications established by the Connecticut regulation presents a 
question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysis 
of such a claim is well-settled ~ 
"We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] oper-
ates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or im-
pinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly 
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict 
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme 
must still be examined to determine whether it rationally 
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and 
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimina-
tion .... " San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 u. s. 1, 17 (1973). 
Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); Applying this analysis here, 
C'lause "certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, in-
cluding requirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of 
process" restricting the ability of indigent persons to bring an action for 
divorce, !d., at 372. 
''Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage rela-
tionship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state 
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due 
process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of imibility to 
pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of thei-r 
marriages/' Id., at 374. 
Bec~tuse Connecticut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for 
· Prminating pregnanCies through abortion the present case is easily dis-
tinguished from Bodd~e . See abo United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 f 
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we think the District Court erred in holding that the Con., 
Jlecticut regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A 
This case involves no discrimination against a suspect cl~. 
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within 1 
the limited category of disadvantaged classes so recognized ·by 
our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of the regula-
tion falls upon those who cannot pay justify strict scrutiny.! 
ln a sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a 
wealth classification as compared to nonindigents who are able 
to pay for the desired goods or services. But this Court has 
never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class 1 
for purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez, 
supra, at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). 5 
Accordingly, the central question in this case is whether the 
tegulation "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or 
Implicitly protected by the Constitution:" · The District Court 
read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, supra, and the subsequent 
cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental right to 
abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less than a 
comp.elling state interest would justify Connecticut's different 
treatment of abortion and childbirth. We think the District 
' Court misconceived the nature and scope of the fundamental 
right recognized in Roe. 
' B 
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a Texas' law 
5 In ca;;es such as Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956) and Douglas v. 
C'ahfornia, :372 U. S. 35:3 ( 1963), the Court held that the Equal Protec-
tion Clau~e requires State~ that allow appellate review of criminal convic-
tions to proVIde indigent drfendants with trial transcripts and appellate 
roun>'<•l Tlw~e ca:-;es are grounded in the criminal justice system, a gov-
t>rnmrntal monoJJoly 111 winch participatiOn is compelled. Cf. n. 4, supra. 
Our ,.;ub~Pq\lt'nt dPrt~1on~ hav<· made it clear that the principles underlying 
tfJI·iffw and Douglas do not PXtPml to legislative clas~ificatiom; generally, 
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making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abor~ 
tion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the 
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases 
restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and 
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that 
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty 
affords constitutional protection against state interference 
with certain aspects of an individual's personal 11privacy,H 
Including a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy/1 
410 U. S., at 153. 
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on 
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed 
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety 
of the desired service. As MR. JusTICE STEWART observed,. 
*'it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of a 
constitutional freedom ... . " ld., at 170 (STEWART, J. , con-
curring). We held that only a compelling state interest would 
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally pro--
tected interest, and we found no such state interest during 
the first trimester. Even when judged against this demand-.. 
ing standard, however, the State,s dual interests in the health 
of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were 
deemed sufficient to justify substantial regulation of abor-
tions in the second and third trimesters. ''1'hese interests 
are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiaiity as 
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, 
each becomes 'compelling.'" !d., at 162-163. In the second 
trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant 
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that 
concern. ld., at 163. At viability, usually in the third tri-
o A woman ha:s at lea!:>t an f'qual right to choose to carry her fetus to 
term as to choose to abort 1t. Indeed, the right of procreation without 
state interference has long been recognized as "one of the basic Civil rights 
of man ... fundamental to the very existence and survival of the rac.e:>1' 
$ifdt!-.:n..er 'I(, Qklti)wrrto,,_ 316 u,·s, 53t~ Ml (1942)., 
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mester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus 
justifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the 
life or health of the mother is threatened. I d., at 164. 
The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible 
interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate 
her pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated 
other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in 
effect, on the woman's freedom of choice. 'Thus, in Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 
70 n. 11 ( 1976), we held that Missouri's·requirement of spousal 
consent was unconstitutional because it "granted [the hus-
band] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever 
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's de-
cision to terminate her pregnancy." Missouri had interposed 
an "absolute obstaCle to a woman's decision that Roe held 
to be constitutionally protected from such interference." 
(Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need 
not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra, 
we have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion "is 
not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek 
an abortion." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976) . 
We recognized in Bellotti that "not all distinction between 
abortion and other procedures is forbidden" and that "[t]he 
constitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its 
degree and the justification for it." !d., at 149-150. We 
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massa-
eh usetts statute regulating a minor's access to an abortion 
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine 
\\'hether the statute authorized a parental veto over the 
minor's decision or the less burdensome requirement of 
parental consultation. 
These cases recognize a constitutionally protected interest ( 
' 'm making certain kinds of important decisions" free from 
governmental compulsion. Whalen v. Roe, - U. S. --
--. aud 1m 24 and 26 (1977). As Whalen makes clear, the 
75-1440-0PINION 
MAHER v. ROE 9 
right in Roe v. Wade can be understood only by considering f 
both the woman's interest and the nature of the State's inter-
ference with it. Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitu-
tional right to an abortion,' ' as the District Court seemed to 
think. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly 
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether 
to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the 
authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring child-
birth over abortion , and to implement that judgment by the 
.allocation of public funds. 
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind 
fr·om the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions. 
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or 
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. 
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no dis-
l dvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund 
ehildbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private 
funds for the service she desires. The State may have 
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby in-
fl uencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no re-
striction on access to abortions that was not already there. 
The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases, 
perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abortions is 
neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut 
regulation. 1\,..1 ~ 
e conclude that the Connecticut regulation does not 
impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe.1  
' Appellees rely on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) , and 
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974) . In 
t ho~e cases durational re:;idence requirements for tbe receipt of pub1ie 
l>enefits werE> found to be unconstitutional because they "penalized" the 
,.,,erc1~c of tlm constitutional right to travel interstate. 
A pprllees' rrliancr on t lw penalty analysis of Shapiro and M aricop11 
( owity is mi~placed . f n our view there is only a semantic difference 
hetwren appellee:; ' a::>l:iertwn that the Connecticut law unduly inter. 
t.i~ti<'J:> wi.th n womnn '>1 nght to terminate her pregnm1Cy and their R$oo 
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Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases f ~ 
applying it. There is a basic difference between direct state 
interference with a protected activity and state encouragement 
of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.8 
asertion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most 
familiar to the criminal law, where criminal sanctions are imposed as a 
consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recog~ 
nized that denial of welfare to one who had recently exercised the right to 
travel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to 
justify strict judicial scrutiny. 
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women who had 
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we 
would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny 
might be appropriate under either the penalty a11.alysis or the analysis we 
have applied in our previous abortion decisions. But the claim here is 
that the State "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by 
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that 
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay 
the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no support in the right 
to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a eompelling inter-
est for its decision not to fund elective abortions. 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), similarly is inapplicable here, 
In addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of 
a constitutionally imposed "governmental obligation of neutrality" origi-
nating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment. /d., at 409. 
8 In Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1 (1976) , we drew this distinction in 
sustaining the public financing of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to 
others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party 
of TexaJJ v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on 
access to the electoral process: 
"These cases, however, dealt primarily with state laws requiring a 
candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear 
on the ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the 
eandidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice 
preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues. 
In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates 
~~ not restrictive of voters' right and less restrictive of ca.ndidateil', 
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Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempt& 
to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to en~ 
courage actions deemed to be in the public interest is neces-
13arily far broader. 
This distinction is implicit in two cases cited in Roe in sup-
port of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), 
involved a Nebraska law making it criminal to teach 
foreign languages to children who had not passed the 
eighth grade. /d., at 396-397. Nebraska's imposition of 
a criminal sanction on the providers of desired services 
inakes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the 
constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted undet 
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to 
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct 
their children" were "within the liberty of the Amendment." 
ld., at 400. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 
(1925), the Court relied on Meyer to invalidate an Oregon 
criminal law requiring the parent or guardian of a child to 
send him to a public school, thus precluding the choice of a 
private school. Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment's 
concept of liberty "excludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction 
from public teachers only," the Court held that the law "un-
reasonably interfere[ d) with the liberty of parents and guard-
Ians to direct the upbringing and education of children under 
their control." Id., at 534-535. 
Subtitle H does not prevent 'any candidate from getting on the ballot of' 
any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice ; the inability, 
if any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaigns will 
~erive not from lack of public funding but from their inability to raise 
private contributions. Any disadvantages suffered by operation of the 
eligibility form\llae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denial 
of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electo~ate 
that the formulae afford eligible candidates." !d. , at 94-95 (emphasis 
;-J.t d.Pd) (footno~e omitted). 
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Both cases invalidated substantial restrictions on con .. 
stitutionally protected liberty interests: in Meyer, the parent's 
right to have his child taught a particular foreign language; 
in Pierce, the parent's right to choose private rather than 
public school education. But neither case denied to a State 
the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action. 
Indeed, in Meyer the Court was careful to state that the 
power of the State "to prescribe a curriculum" in its free 
public schools that included English a.nd excluded German "is 
not questioned." 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts 
no shadow over a State's power to favor public education 
by funding it-a policy choice pursued in some States for 
more than a century. See Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U. S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954). Indeed, in Norwood v. Har-
rison, 413 U. S. 455, 462 (1973), we explicitly rejected the 
argument that Pierce established a "right of priva.te or paro-
chial schools to share with public schools in state largesse," 
noting that "[i]t is one thing to say that a State may not pro-
hibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to 
say that such schools must, as a matter of equal protection, 
receive state aid." Yet, were we to accept appellees' argu-
ment, an indigent parent could challenge the state policy of 
favoring public rather than private schools, or of preferring 
instruction in English rather than German, on grounds identi-
cal in principle to those advanced here. We think it abundantly 
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest 
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more than 
a State must so justify its election to fund public but not 
private education, 
D 
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation 
can be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality 
-that applies in the absence of a suspect classification or the 
Impingement of a fundamental right. This test requires that 
the di~tinction dl..'awn between <;hildbirth and nontherapeutic, 
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tLbortion by the regulation be "rationally related" to a "con .. \ 
t~titutionally permissible" purpose. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 
TT. S. 56, 74 (1972) . We hold that the Connecticut funding 
scheme satisfies this standard. 
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong inter .. 
est in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest 
exists throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality 
as the woman approaches term.'' Roe, supra, at 162-163. Be-
cause the pregnant woman carries a potential human being, 
she 11cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . . [Her] privacy 
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must 
be measured accordingly." !d., at 159. The State unques-
tionably has a strong and legitimate interest in encouraging 
hormal childbirth, an interest honored over the centuries.9 
Nor can there be any question that the Connecticut regula• 
tion rationally furthers that interest. The medical costs as• 
sociated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased 
significantly in recent years. As recognized by the District 
Court in this case, such costs ate significantly greater than 
those normally associated with elective abortions during the 
first trimester. The subsidizing of costs incident to child· 
birth is a rational means of encouraging childbirth. 
We recognize that the impact of the Connecticut regulation 
on an indigent woman may be great, but "the Constitution 
does not provide judicial retnedies for every social and eco-· 
ttomic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 74 (1972). Our· 
cases uniformly have accorded the States a wider latitude in 
~hoosing among competing demands for limited public funds/ 0' 
o In add1tlon to tht' direct interest in j)rotecting the fetus, a State may· 
have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth. 
~uch concerns are basic to the future ot th~ State and in some circum-
,;tances could constitute a substantial reason for departure from a position 
of neutraltiy between abortion and childbirth. 
10 See genf' rallv WJ!kmson The Supreme Court , The Equal Protection· 
Clause, and The Three Faces of CO.nstitutional EquaHty, 61 Va .. L. Rev. 
?45·,: 998-1.017 (1975),, 
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In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). despite reco~ 
nition that laws and regulations al1ocating welfare funds in., 
volve "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human 
beings," we held that classifications survive equal protection 
challenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is 
shown. As the preceding discussion makes clear, the state 
interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this mini .. 
mal level. 
The decision whether to expend state funds for nonthera .. 
peutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value 
ever which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that 
the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a 
weighing of its wisdom of social desirability, for this Court 
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise, 
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of 
'thought." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 34S U. S. 483, 488 
(1955), quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, suprn, at 484. 1~ 
deed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as 
those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abor-
tions, the appropriate forum for tbeir resolution in a democ-
racy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legisla-
tures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of 
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.'·' Missouri, 
Kansas and Texas R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267-270 (1904) 
(Holmes, J.). 
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does not 
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It 
·is open to Congress to require provision of medicaid benefits 
for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the 
medicaid program. Also, under present federal law, Con-
necticut is free-through normal democrat.ic processes-to 
decide that such benefits should be provided. Beal v. Doe, 
ante, at -. We hold only that the Constitution does not 
'requi~ a .judicially imposed refJolution of the~ ~ifficult i$8\le!, 
J 
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IV 
The District Court also invalid~ted Connecticut's require. 
ments of prior written reque~t by the pregnant woman and 
prior authorization by the Department of Social Services. 
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted 
invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not un~ 
reasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of 
medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only 
for authorized purposes. The simpie answer to the argument 
that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical 
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termi~ 
nation of a potential human iife. In Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, we held that the woman's 
written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible bur-
den under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the 
~imilar issue here. 
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opiniOn1 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Beal v. Doe, ante, at -, we hold today that Title XIX 
of the Social Security Act does not require the funding of 
nontheraputic abortions as a condition of participation in the 
joint federal-state medicaid program established by that 
statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in Beal, we 
must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating 
State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for 
childbirth. 
I 
A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits 
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions 1 to those 
,that are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psy-
chiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare Department, Public ~ 
Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275.2 Connecti-~ 
1 The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not 
challenged here. 
2 Section 275 provides in relevant part: 
The Department makes payment for abortion services under the 
MPd1ral Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions 
m·~ met: 
'' 1. In the opinion of the attending physician the abortion is m~ 
~ 
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cut enforces this limitation through a system of prior au. 
thorization from its Department of Social Services. Iu 
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion, 
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed 
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the pa-
tient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medi-
cally necessary. 
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation 
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of 
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent 
women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of 
medical necessity.3 In a complaint filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenge~ / 
the regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements o/ 
,·ally necessary. The term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric 
tleCeSSity. 
"2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or 
lic·ensed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy .. .. 
"3. The written request for the abortion is submitted by the patient, 
atld in the c..'lse of a. minor, from the parent or guardian. 
" In the case of a committed child, a written consent for the abortion is 
,.;ecurcd from the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Youth 
Services as guardian. 
'4. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of 
:\Ied1cal Services, Division of Health Services, Department of Social 
ServJcc~ ." 
:. At the time tim; action was filed, ~ Poe, a 16-year-old high schoo 
,turuor, had already obtained an abortio at a Connecticut hospital. 
\pparc'ntly becaust> of Poe's inability to obtain a cert.ificate of medical 
nece:;sity, thr hospital was denied reimbursement by the Department of 
8owtl ServiCe~. A:; a result, Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital 
b!ll of $244. Susan Roe, an unwed mother of thrC:'e children, was unable 
to obtam an abortion bC:'cause of her physician 's refusal to certify that the 
procedure was mcdH·ally necessary. By consent, a temporary restraining 
order was C:'ntered by the Di~tnrt Court enjoining the Connecticut officials 
1rom rC:'fus;ng to pa~· for Roe's abort ion. After the remand from the Court 
-1f Ayprnls, tllf' DlstrJCt, Court 1~sucd temporary restraining orders covering 
;hfC(' aqdttional women 408 F Supp. 660, 663 (Conn. 1975), 
75-1440-0PINION 
MAHER v. ROE 3 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1396 et seq., 
aud as violative of their constitutional rights, including the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal 
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation 
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act pro-
hibited the funding of abortions that were not medically 
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain 
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation, 
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only 
allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also re-
quired it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the 
Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding 
of such abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 (CA2 1975). Upon re-
mand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in 
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened. 
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F . 
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975). 
Although it found no independent constitutional right to 
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the 
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeu-
tic abortions from a state welfare program that generally sub-
sidizes the medical expenRes incident to pregnancy and child-
birth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 
113 (1973) . and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) , the view 
that "abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive 
moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are 
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with preg-
nancy .... " 408 F. Supp .. at 663 n. 3. Relying also on 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the court 
held that the Connecticut program "weights the choice of the 
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitu-
tionally protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion and 
1'thus infringes upon a fundamental interest." 408 F. Supp., 
l' 4 
The District Court's judgment and order, entered on January 
~ A~' 1976, were not stayed. On January 26, 1976, the Department of 
Social Services revised §275 to allow reimbursement for nonthera-
peutic abortions without prior authorization or consent. The fact 
\.th ,·~ 
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mootness has been made by any of the parties, and this appeal was 
taken and submitted on the theory that Connecticut desires to reinstate 
the invalidated regulation. Under these circumstances, the revision 
of the regulation does not render the case moot. In any event, there 
would remain the denial of reimbursement to Mary Poe, and similarly 
SE.c 3~0 F. S~ 
situated members of the class, under the pre-revision 
t30 y)~ 
regulation. A 
The State has asserted no Eleventh Amendment defense to this relief 
sought by Poe and those whom she represents. 
s. 
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at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this 
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be 
"wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive 
medical response to pregnancy." Id., at 664 (footnote 
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed 
constitutionally irrelevant: 
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type 
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it 
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To 
sanction such a justification would be to permit dis, 
crimination against those seeking to exercise a constitu-
tional right on the basis that the state simply does not _ ~ 
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid. ~ { ~ Lj 
The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the :J 
··ertificate of medical necessity for medicaid-funded abortions~ 
The court also struck down the related requirements of priot · 
written request by the pregnant woman and prior authoriza-
tion by the Department of Social Services, holding that the 
State could not impose any requirements on medicaid pay-
ments for abortions that are not "equally applicable to medic~ ~ 
aid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or require~/" 
ments tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion 
that she has asked her physician to perform." I d., at 665. 
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider the constitutional~ 
ity of the Connecticut regulation. 428 U. S. 908 (1976) . 
II 
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to 
pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent wo-
men, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indi-
gents:- But when a State decides to alleviate some of the 
.------;H.Boddie v Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), cited by appellees, is r '" tho'""'"'" Thon' '"' C-outt involidated undor tho Puo P<oo.,. 
( 
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hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner 
in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limi-
tations. Appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord 
equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and may not 
evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical 
expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classi-
fications established by the Connecticut regulation presents a 
question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysi/~ 
of such a cla:im is well-settled: 
"We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] oper-
ates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or im-
pinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly 
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict 
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme 
must still be examined to determine whether it rational1y 
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and 
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimina-
tion .. . . " San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 u. s. 1, 17 (1973). 
Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); Applying this analysis here, 
C'lause "certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, in-
cluding requirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of 
process" restricting the ability of indigent persons to bring an action for 
divorce. !d., at 372. 
"Our conclusion is that, given the 'basic position of the marriage rela-
t ionship ln this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state 
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due 
process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of inability to 
pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek 'judicial dissolution of thei-r 
marriages." Id., at 374. 
HPeause Connecticut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for 
i<'rminating pregnancies through abortion the present case is easily dis-
t inguished from Boddle See al~;o United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 ' 
,_1 97:{), Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656 (1973). 
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we think the District Court erred in holding that the Con .. I 
pecticut regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A 
This case involves no discrimination against a suspect cl~. 
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within 
/e.al fo A-
tii ·~Je_y uJ· 
(..on(.fttSI,OY\. 
the limited category of disadvantaged Classes so recognized :by 
our cases. Nor does the fact that ,the im act of the regula-
tion falls upon those who cannot pay Jtistify stFiet ssrYtiAy, 
In a sense, every denial of welfare t an indigent creates a 
wealth classification as compared to nonindigents who are able 
to pay for the desired goods or services . ... But this Court has 
never held that financiitl need alone identifies a suspect class ) 
for purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez, ;:-
supra, at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 4~0) .~ 'P 
Accordingly, the central question in this case is;whether the 
regulation "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or 
implicitly protected by the Constitution:'' ·· The District Court 
read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, supra, and the subsequent 
cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental right to 
abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less than a 
compelling state interest would justify Connecticut's different 
\ 
treatment of abortion and childbirth. We thihk the District 
· Court misconceived the nature arid scope of the fundamental 
right recognized in Roe. 
-- B 
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a: Texas· law 
(o __..,..In cast'S such as Griffin v. Illinois , 351 U. S. 12 (1956) and Douglas v. 
California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963) , the Court held that the Equal Protec-
tion Clau;;e requires States that allow appellate review of criminal convic-
tiOns to provide indigent defendants with trial transcripts and appellate 
coun~rl. Thei'ie caoe:< are grounded in the criminal justice system, a gov-
ernmental monopoly in wluch participatiOn is compelred. Cf. n. 4, supra. 
Our Kttb:;equent decisions have made it clear that the principles underlying 
Oriffiu and Douglas do not f'Xl end to legislative clasiiifications generally. 
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making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abor ... 
tion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the 
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases 
restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and 
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that 
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty 
~tffords constitutional protection against state interference 
with certain aspects of an individual's personal "privacy," '1-
lncluding a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.~ 
410 U. S., at 153. 
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on 
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed 
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety 
of the desired service. As MR. JusTICE STEWART observed, 
''it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of a 
constitutional freedom ... . " /d., at 170 (STEWART, J., con-v 
curring). We held that only a compelling state interest would 
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally pro .. 
tected interest, and we found no such state interest during 
the first trimester. Even when judged against this demand-... 
ing standard, however, the State's dual interests in the health 
of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were 
deemed sufficient to justify substantial regulation of abor-
tions in the second and third trimesters. "These interests 
are separate and distinct. Each grows in suhstantiaiity as 
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, 
each becomes 'compelling.'" ld., at 162-163. In the second 
trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant 
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that 
concern. !d., at 163. At viability, usually in the third tii-
'} ~A woman ha~:> at least an Pqual right to choose to carry her fetus to 
term as to choose to abort 1t. Indeed, the right of procreation without 
state interference has long been I'ecognized as "one of the ·basic civil rights 
of man ... fundamental to the very existence and survlvai. of the race!1' 
,cy.,i'f!,n..er ~- Qklu,homq,,_ 311:1 u,·s, 53'0~ '541 (1942)., 
I 
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mester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus 
lustifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the 
life or health of the mother is threatened. !d., at 164. 
The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible 
interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate 
her pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated 
other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in 
effect, on the woman's freedom of choice. 'Thus, in Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 
70 n. 11 ( 1976), we held that Missouri's·requirement of spousal 
consent was unconstitutional because it "granted [the hus-
band] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever 
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's de-
cision to terminate her pregnancy." Missouri had interposed 
an "absolute obstaCle to a woman's decision that Roe held 
to be constitutiona1ly protected from such interference." 
(Emphasis addecl.) Although a state-created obstacle need 
not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra, 
we have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion "is 
not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek 
an abortion." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976). 
We recognized in Bellotti that "not all distinction between 
abortion and other procedures is forbidden" and that " [ t] he 
constitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its 
degree and the justification for it." !d., at 149-150. We 
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massa-
chusetts statute regu1ating a minor's access to an abortion 
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine 
whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the 
minor's decision or the less burdensome requirement of 
parental consultation. 
These cases recognize a constitutionally protected interest I 
''m making certain kinds of important decisions" free from 
governmental compulsion. Whalen v. Roe, - U. S. - ~ 
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,right in Roe v. Wade can be understood only by considering 
both the woman's interest and the nature of the State's inter-
ference with it. Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitu-
tional right to an abortion,'' as the District Court seemed to 
think. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly 
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether 
t.o terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the 
authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring child-
birth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the 
allocation of public funds. 
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind 
from the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions. 
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or 
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. 
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no dis.-
Jdvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund 
t"hilclbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private 
funds for the service she desires. The State may have 
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby in-
fluencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no re-
striction on access to abortions that was not already there/ 
The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases, 
perhaps, impossible- for some women to have abortions is 
neither. created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut 1'1~ _ di' 
D
e ulatiOn. yy- n 
We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does not 
mpiuge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe. I · 
~ AppPliP<'s rrly on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and 
Memorial Ilospitol v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974). In 
tho~e cases durational residence requirements for tbe receipt of publie 
uenefits were found to be unconstitutional because they "penalized" th~ 
, xE>rcl~<' of tbe constitutional right to travel interstate. 
Appdle<>H' reliancr on tlw penalty analysis of Shapiro and M aricoptJ 
( 'ounty 1:s mi)oiplacrd In our viE-w there is only a semantic difference 
between appellee~>' a::;;;prtJon that the Connecticut law unduly inter· 
1:. ·J4t,;..'> with a woman'.; rtght to terminate her pregnancy and their a\lio-
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Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases 
applying it. There is a basic difference between direct state 
interference with a protected activity and state encouragemen~ 
of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy. 
asertion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most 
familiar to the criminal law, where criminal sanctions are imposed as a 
consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recog-
nized that denial of welfare to one who had recently exercised the right to 
t ravel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to 
justify strict judicial scrutiny. 
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women who had 
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we 
would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny 
might be appropriate under either the penalty an.alysis or the analysis we 
have applied in our previous abortion decisions . But the claim here is 
that the State "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by 
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that 
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay 
the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no support in the right 
to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a compelling inter-
est for its decision not to fund elective abortions. 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), similarly is inapplicable here. 
In addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of 
a constitutionally imposed "governmental obligation of neutrality" origi-
nating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment. !d., at 409. 
----e-~Jn Buckley v. V aleo, 424 U. S. 1 ( 1976) , we drew this distinction in 
sustaining t11e public financing of t11e Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to 
others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party 
of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on 
access to the electoral process: 
"These cases, however, dealt primarily with state laws requiring a 
candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear 
on the ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the 
eandidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice 
preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues. 
ln contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates 
~~ nQt restrictive of voters' right and less restrictive of candidates', 
~·· 
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Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempt& 
to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to en· 
courage actions deemed to be in the public interest is neces-
sarily far broader. 
This distinction is implicit in two cases cited in Roe in sup .. 
port of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), 
involved a Nebraska law making it criminal to teach 
foreign languages to children who had not passed the 
eighth grade. Id., at 396-397. Nebraska's imposition of 
a criminal sanction on the providers of desired services 
inakes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustain in~ the 
constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted under 
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to 
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruc 
their children" were "within the liberty of the Amendment." 
ld., at 400. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 
(1925) , the Court relied on Meyer to invalidate an Oregon 
criminal law requiring the parent or guardian of a child to 
send him to a public school, thus precluding the choice of a 
private school. Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment's 
concept of liberty "excludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction 
from public teachers only," the Court held that the law "un-
reasonably interfere[ d) with the liberty of parents and guard. 
ians to direct the upbringing and education of children undet 
their control." Id., at 534- 535. 
Subtitle H does not prevent 'any candidate from getting on the ballot ot 
any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice ; the inability, 
i/ any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaigns will 
l:ierive not from lack of public funding but from their inability to raise 
private contributions. Any disadvantages suffered by operation of the 
eligibility formUlae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denia1 
bf the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electoi'ate 
that the formulae afford eligible candidates." l d., at 94-95 (emphasis 
;~dd.Pd) (footnote omitted}. 
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Both cases invalidated substantial restrictions on con .. 
stitutionally protected liberty interests: in Meyer, the parent's 
right to have his child taught a particular foreign language; 
in Pierce, the parent's right to choose private rather than 
public school education. But neither case denied to a State 
the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action. 
Indeed, in Meyer the Court was careful to state that the 
power of the State "to prescribe a curriculum" in its free 
public schools that included English and excluded German "is 
not questioned." 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts 
no shadow over a State's power to favor public education 
by funding it-a policy choice pursued in some States for 
more than a century. See Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U. S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954). Indeed, in Norwood v. Har-
rison, 413 U. S. 455, 462 ( 1973), we explicitly rejected the 
argument that Pierce established a "right of private or paro-
chial schools to share with public schools in state largesse,', 
noting that "[i]t is one thing to say that a State may not pro-
hibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to 
say that such · schools must, as a matter of equal protection. 
receive state aid." Yet, were we to accept appellees' argu-
ment, an indigent parent could challenge the state policy of 
favoring public rather than private schools, or of preferrin 
instruction in English rather than German, on grounds identi-
cal in principle to those advanced here. We think it abundantly 
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest 
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more than 
a State must so justify its election to fund public but not 
private education. 
D 
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation 
can be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality 
that applies in the absence of a suspect classification or the 
Impingement of a fundamental right. This test requires that 
the di~tinction dtawn between childbirth :;tnd nQntherapeutic, 
1,, • 
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abortion by the regulation be "rationally related" to a "con .. 
l:ltitutionally permissible" purpose. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 
F S. 56, 74 (1972) . We hold that the Connecticut funding 
scheme satisfies this standard. 
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong inter~ 
est in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest 
exists throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality 
as the woman approaches term.'' Roe, supra, at 162-163. Be-
cause the pregnant woman carries a potential human being, 
she "cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . . [Her] privacy 
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must 
be measured accordingly." !d., at 159. The State unques-
tionably has a strong and legitimate interest in encouraging 
i1ormal childbirth , an interest honored over the centuries.~ 
Nor can there be any question that the Connecticut regula· 
tion rationally furthers that interest. The medical costs as• 
sociated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased 
significantly in recent years. As recognized by the District 
Court in this case, such costs are significantly greater than 
those normally associated with elective abortions during the 
first trimester. The subsidizing of costs incident to child· 
birth is a rational means of encouraging child_birth. . ~ 
9 H- -aR-~ut u~ ~ be gcea.t, but "the ConstitutioT!...J 
does not provide judicial retnedies for every social and eco-· 
homic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 74 (1972) . Our-
cases uniformly have accorded the States a wider latitude in \ 
~hoosing among competing demands for limited public funds.1---
tO ---t- ----In add1tion to tht' direct. interest in protecting the fetus, a Sta.te mitY' 
have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth. 
Such concern:; are basic to the fut.ure of th~ State and in some circum-
,;tances could constitute a substantial reason for departure from a position 




__..--see genE>rally Wilkm~on, The ~upr;.lne. Court , Th: Equal Protect~'on 
Clause, and The Three Faces of Cons.t1tut10nal Equality, 61 Va .. L. Rev. 
'?45\ 998-1017 (1975),, 
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In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). despite reco~ 
nition that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds in-: 
volve "the most basic economic ·needs of impoverished human 
beings," we held that cla..o;sifications survive equal protection 
challenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is 
shown. As the preceding discussion makes clear, the state 
interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this mini .. 
mal level. 
The decision whether to expend state funds for nonthera .. 
peutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value 
over which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that 
the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a 
weighing of its wisdom of social desirability, ior this Court 
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise, 
improvident, or out oi harmony with a pa-rticula'r school of 
'thought." Wiiliamson v. Lee Optical Co., 34S U. S. 483, 488 
(1955), quoted in DandridrJe v. Williams, supr~, at 484. In .. 
deed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as 
those implicated by public funding of nonthetapeutic abor-
t ions, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democ-
racy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legisla-
tures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare o 
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.'., Missouri, 
Kansas and Texas R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267-270 (1904) 
(Holmes, J.). 
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does not 
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It 
-is open to Congress to require provision of medicaid benefits 
for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the 
medicaid program. Also, under present federal law, Con-
necticut is free-through normal democrat'ic processes-to 
decide that such benefits should be provided. Beal v. Doe, 
ante, at - . We hold only that the Constitution does not 
requi~ a .judicially imposed re~olution of these ~ifficul't i$8\le'$, 
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IV 
1~ 
The District Court also inva}id!lted Connecticut's require. 
ments of prior written reque~t b;y the pregnant woman and 
prior authorization by the Department of Social Services. 
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted 
invalidation of ~hese procedural requirements. It is not un~ 
reasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of 
medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only 
for authorized purposes. The simple answer to the argument 
that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical 
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termi~ 
nation of a potential human iife. In Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, we held that the woman's 
written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible bur~ 
den under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the 
l:limilar issue here. 
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the 
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Mn. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court: 
In Beal v. Doe, ante, at-, we hold today that Title XIX 
of the Social Security Act does not require the funding of 
elective abortions as a condition of participation in the Medic-
aid Program. In this case, as a result of our decision in 
Beal, we must decide whether the Constitution nevertheless 
requires a participating State to pay for elective abortions 
as long as it pays for childbirth. 
I 
A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits 
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions 1. to those 
that are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psy-
chiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare Department, Public 
Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275. 2 Connecti-
1 The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not 
challenged here. 
2 Section 275 provides in relevant part: 
"The Department makes payment for abortion services under the 
Medical Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions 
are met: 
"1. In the opinion of the attending hysician the abortion is medi-
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cut enforces this limitation through a system of priabortion V 
authorization from its Department of Social ServiCes. In 
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion, 
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed 
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the pa-
tient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medi-
cally necessary. 
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation 
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of 
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent 
women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of 
medical necessity.3 In a complaint filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged __ s, 
the regulation both as inconsistent with the requiremen\ of 
cally necessary. The term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric 
necessity. 
, . "2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or 
licensed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy .... 
"3. The written request for the abortion is submitted by the patient, 
and in the case of a minor, from the parent or guardian. 
"In the case of a committed child, a written consent for the abortion is 
secured from the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Youth 
"services as guardian. 
"4. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of 
, Medical Services, Division of Health Services, Department of Social 
Services." 
3 At the time this action was filed, Linda Poe, a 16-year-old high school 
junior, had already obtained an abortion at a Connecticut hospital. 
Apparently because of Poe's inability to obtain a certificate of medical 
·· necessity, the hospital was denied reimbursement by the Department of 
. Social Services. As a. result, Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital 
bill of $244. Susan Roe, an unwed mother of three children, was unable 
to obtain an abortion because of her physician's refusal to certify that. the 
procedure was medically necessary. By consent, a temporary restraining 
order was entered by the District Court enjoining the Connecticut officials 
from refusing to pay for her abortion. After the remand from the Court 
of Appeals, the District Court issued temporary restraining orders covering 
three additional women. 408 F. Supp. 660, 663 (Conn. 1975). 
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Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1396 et seq., 
and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal 
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation 
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act pro-
hibited the funding of abortions that were not medically 
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain 
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation, 
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only 
allowed state funding of elective abortions but also required 
it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the 
Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding 
of elective abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 (CA2 1975). Upon re-
mand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in 
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened. 
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F. 
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975). 
Although it found no independent constitutional right to 
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the 
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of elective 
abortions from a state welfare program that generally sub-
sidizes the medical expenses incident to pregnancy and child-
birth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 
113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the view 
that "abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive 
moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are 
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with preg-
nancy .... " 408 F. Supp., at 663 n. 3. Relying also on 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) , the court 
held that the Connecticut program "weights the choice of the 
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitu-
tionally protected right to an elective abortion" and "thus 
infringes upon a fundamental interest." 408 F. Supp., at 
'1~1440-0PINION 
4 MAHER v. ROE 
663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this 
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be 
"wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive 
medical response to pregnancy." !d., at 664 (footnote 
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed 
constitutionally irrelevant: 
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type 
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it 
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To 
sanction such a justification would be to permit dis, 
crimination against those seeking to exercise a constitu-
tional right on the basis that the state simply does not 
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid. 
The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the 
certifi'cate of medical necesesity for medicaid funded abortions. 
The court also struck down the related requirements of prior 
request and· authorization, holding that the State could not 
impose any requirements on medicaid payments for abortions 
that are not "equally applicable to medicaid payments for 
childbirth, if such conditions or requirements tend to dis-
courage a woman from choosing an abortion or to delay the 
occurrence of an abortion that she has asked her physician 
to perform."· ld:, at 665. We noted probable jurisdiction 
to consider the constitutionality of the Connecticut regulation. 
428 u. s. 908 (1976). 
II 
The District Court did not hold and appellees do not 
contend that Connecticut has a constitutional obligation to 
pay the pregnancy related medical expenses of its indigent 
citizens.4 Thus, if the State had refrained from paying any 
4 Appell€es cite Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), where the 
eourt invalidated under the Due Process Clause "certain state procedures 
for the commencement of litigation, including requirements for payment of 
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of such expenses-whether for childbirth or abortion-appel-
lees would have asserted no infringement of a constitutional 
right. Nor is there any suggestion that the traditional free-
dom-indeed the normal expectation-of a woman to carry 
her fetus to childbirth is any less entitled to state funding 
than a woman's freedom during the first trimester, recognized 
in Roe, to choose an abortion.G Rather, appellees' claim is 
that Connecticut .must accord equal treatment to both, and 
may not validly evidence a policy preference by funding only 
the medical expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge 
to the classifications established by onnec icut regulation 
thus presents a question arising unde:r the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
nel'@ the basic framework of analysis is well settled: .. 
"We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] oper-
ates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or im-
pinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly 
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict 
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme 
must still be examined to determine whether it rationally 
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and 
court fees and costs for service of process" restricting the ability of 
indigent persons to bring an action for divorce. !d., at 372. 
"Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage rela-
tionship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state 
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due 
process does prohibit a State from denying, soLely because of inability to 
pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their 
marriages." Id., at 374. 
The present case is easily distinguished from Boddie in that Connecticut 
has made no attempt to monopolize the means for terminating preg-
nancies through abortions. 
5 The right of procreation without st~te interference has long been 
recognized as "one of the basic civil rights of 114'Ul ... fundamental to 
the very existence and survival of the race." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
u.s. 535, 541 (1942). 
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therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimina-
tion .... " San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 u. s. 1, 17 (1973). 
Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); cf. Craig v. Boren,- U.S.-
(1976) (sex discrimination). Applying this analysis here, 
we think the District Court erred in subjecting the Connecti-
cut regulation to strict judicial scrutiny. 
A 
The regulation does not discriminate against a suspect class. 
There is no claim that an indigent woman desiring an abor-
'tion falls within the limited category of disadvantaged classes 
·recognized by our cases. Appellees emphasize, rather, that 
' the impact of the regulation falls upon the indigent. In a 
sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth 
classification as compared to nonindigents who are able to 
pay for the desired goods or services. But this Court has 
never held that indigency alone identifies a suspect class for 
purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez, supra, 
at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). 
B 
In the absence of a suspect classification, the appropriate 
standard of review unaer 'the Equal Protection Clause must 
,. turn on whether the regulation "impinges upon a fundamen-
tal right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitu-
tion." The District Court 'I'ead our decisions in Roe v. Wade, 
· supra, and the subsequent cases applying it, as establishing 
a fundamental right to abortion. It therefore concluded that 
nothing less 'than a compelling state interest would justify 
any difference in treatment of abortion and childbirth. This 
reading of Roe misconceives the nature and scope of the 




.MAHER v. ROE 7 
1 
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a Texas law 
making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abor-
tion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the 
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases 
restricting governmental intrusion,' physical coercion, and 
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that 
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty 
affords constitutional protection against state interference 
with certain aspects of an individual's personal "privacy," 
including a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. 
410 U. S., at 153. 
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on 
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed 
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety 
of the desired service. As MR. JusTICE STEWART observed, 
11it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of a 
constitutional freedom .... '1 !d., at 170 (STEWART, .'f., con-
curring). We held that only a compelling state interest would 
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally pro-
tected interest, and we found no such state interest during 
the first trimester. Even when judged against this demand-
ing standard, however, the State's dual interests in the health 
of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were 
deemed sufficient to justify substantial regulation of abor-
tions in the second and third trimesters. "These interests 
are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as 
the woman approaches te,rm and, at a point during pregnancy, 
each becomes 'compelling.' " I d., at 162. In the second tri-
mester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant 
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that 
concern. ld., at 163. At viability, usually in the third tri-
mester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus 
justifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the 
life or health of the mother is threatened. Id., at 164. 
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The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible 
interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate 
her pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated 
other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in 
effect, on the woman's freedom of choice. Thus, in Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 
70 n. 11 ( 1976), we held that Missouri's requirement of spousal 
consent was unconstitutional because it 11granted [the hus-
band] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever 
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's de• 
cision to terminate her pregnancy." Missouri had interposed 
an "absolute obstacle to a woman's decision that Roe held 
to be constitutionally protected from such interference." 
(Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need 
not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra, 
we have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion "is 
not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek 
an abortion." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 ( 1976). 
We recognized in B ellotti that "not all distinction between 
abortion and other procedures is forbidden" and that "[t]he 
constitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its 
degree and the justification for it." !d., at 149-150. We 
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massa-
chusetts statute regulating a minor's access to an abortion 
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine 
whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the 
minor's decision or the less burdensome requirement of 
parental consultation. 
We recently summa.rized these cases as establishing a fun-
damental right of "independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions," a right akin to the right to be free "in 
action, thought. experience, and belief from governmental 
compulsion." Whalen v. Roe, - U. S.-- - , and nn. 24 
·and 26, quoting Kurland, The Private I, The University of 
Chicago Magazine 7, 8 (Autumn, 1976). As this statement 
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makes clear, the right in Roe can be understood only by 
considering both the woman's interest and the nature of the 
State's interference with it. Roe did not declare an unquali-
fied "constitutional right to an abortion," as the District 
Court seemed to think. Rather, the right protects the woman 
from unduely burdensome interference with her freedom to 
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no 
'limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judg-
ment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that 
judgment by the allocation of public funds. 
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind 
)rom the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions. ' 
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or 
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. 
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no dis-
advantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund 
childbirth: she continues as before to be dependent on ~ 
private funds for the service she desires. The 
State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, 
thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed 
no restriction on access to abortions that was not already' 
there. The indigency that may make it difficult-and in· 
some cases, perhaps, impossible-for some women to have 
abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the 
Connecticut regulation. 
We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does not 
impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe and 
that the regulation need not be subjected to strict judicial 
scrutiny under the equal protection analysis of Rodriguez or 
Murgia. 
2 
Our conclusion as to the applicable standard of review 
·signals no retreat from Roe or the cases applying it. There 
is a basic difference between direct state interference with a 
protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative 
-
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activity consonant with legislative policy.° Constitutional 
concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its 
will by force of law; its power to encourage actions deemed 
to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader. 
This distinction is implicit in the cases cited in Roe in sup .. 
port of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Among these is Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S, 
390 (1923), which involved a Nebraska law making it crimi-
nal to teach foreign languages to children who had not passed 
the eighth grade. ld., at 396-397. Nebraska's imposition 
of a criminal sanction on the pi'oviders of desired services 
makes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the 
constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted under 
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to 
teach and the right of parent to engage him so to instruct 
0 In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), we drew this distinction in 
sustaining the public financing of the Fedrral Election Campaign Act of 
1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to 
others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party 
of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on 
access to the electoral process: 
1'These cases, however, dealt primarily with state laws requiring a 
candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear 
on the ballot. These were of course direct burdens not only on the 
candidates ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice 
preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues. 
In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Pl'esidential candidates 
is- not restrictive of voters; right and less restrictive of candidates'. 
Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot or 
any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his cl10ice; the inability, 
if any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaigns will 
derive not from laclc of public funding but from their inability to raise 
private contributions. Any disadvantages suffered by operation of the 
eligibility form11lae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denial 
of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electorate 
that the formulae affords eligible candidates." !d., at 94-95 (emphasis 
nd.ded). 
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their children" were "within the liberty of the Amendment." 
ld., at 400. 
Meyer was applied subsequently in Pierce v; Society o} 
Sisters, 268 U. S. 51b (1925), another case relied tin in Roe.1 
In Pierce the Court invaiidated an Oregon criminal law re~ 
quiring the parent or guardian of a child to send him to a 
public schooi, thus precluding the choice of a private schdoi. 
Reasoning that the Fou~tenth Amendment's coiicept of liberty 
"excludes any generai power of the State to stahdardize its 
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public 
teachers oniy," the Court heid that the law . "unreasonably 
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to 
(:Iirect the upbringing and education bf chiidren under their 
control." j d., at 534-535. 
Both cases thus invalidated substantial restrictions on con• 
~titutionaily protected liberty intei;ests: in Meyer, the parent's 
right to have his child taught a particular foreign ianguage; 
1n Pierce, the parentis right to choose private rather than 
public school education. But neither case denied to a State 
the policy choice of encouraging the preferred comse of action. 
indeed, in Meyer the Court was careful to state that the 
power of the State "to prescribe a curricuium" in its free 
public schools that include English and excluded German "is 
not questioned." 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts 
~o shadow over a State's power to favor public education 
by funding it-a policy choice pursued in some States for 
more than a century. See generally Brown v. Board of Edu~ 
cation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Vet, the indigent parent could 
challenge the state policy of favoring public over private 
schools, or of preferring instruction in English rather than 
German, on grounds identical in principle to those advanced 
by appellees in the present case. We think it abundantly 
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest 
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth anymore than 
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a State must so justify its election to fund public but not 
private education.7 
III 
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation can 
be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality. 
This test requires that the distinction drawn between child-
.birth and elective abortion by the Connecticut regulation be 
7 Appellees~ on Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. 618 (1969), 
and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974). In 
tho e cases durational residence requirements for the receipt of public 
'benefits were found to be unconstitut'ional because they "penalized') the 
exercise of the constitutional right to travel intersta.te. 
1> 
In attcmptin~ to- inoor~at& the penalty analysis of Shap'iro and 
Maricopa County , appellees ignore the basic question as to the natti're of 
the right recognized in Roe. ln our view there is only a semantic 
difference between appellees' assertion that the Connecticut law unduly 
·interferes with a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy and their 
assertion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most 
familiar to the criminal law, where criminal sanctions are imposed as a 
consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recog-
nized that denial of welfare to on€ who had recently exercised the right to 
.travel across state lines was sufiiciently analogous to a criminal fine to 
justify strict judicial scrutiny. 
If Connecticut denied general wrlfare benents to all women who had 
obtained abortions when they were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we 
would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and st rict scrutiny 
.might be appropriate under either the penalty ~or tl1e analysis 
ha-ve applied in our previous abortion decisions. But the claim here jg 
a quito different one in that the State penalizes the woman's decision to 
have an abortion by refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County 
did not hold that States would penalize the right to travel interstate by 
refusing to pay for the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no 
support in the right to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must 
show a compelling interest for its decision not to fund elective abortions. 
The penalty analysis of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), is 
similarly inapplicable here. In addition, that case was decided in the 
significantly different context of a constitutionally imposed "governmental 
obligation of neutrality" originating in the Establishment and Freedom of 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. I d., at 409. 
l 
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('rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest." 
Mu.rgia, supra, at 312. We hold that the Connecticut fund-
i'n.g scheme satisfies this test. 
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong inter-
<tst in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest 
~ists throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality 
~s the woman approaches term." Roe, supra., at 162. Be-
Gause the pregnant woman carries a potential human being, 
~e "cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . . [Her] privacy 
is no lQnger sole and any right of privacy she possesses must 
he measured accordingly." !d., at 159. The State unques-
tionably has a strong and legitimate interest in encouraging 
normal childbirth, an interest honored over the centuries.8 
Nor can there be any question that the Connecticut regula-
tion rationally furthers that interest. The medical costs as-
sociated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased 
significantly in recent yea.rs. As recognized by the District 
Court in this case, such costs-including the attendant hospi-
talization charges-are significantly greater than those nor-
mally associated with elective abortions during the first tri-
mester. The subsidizing of costs incident to childbirth,..,ther~. / 
fore, rationally may be deemed an incentive to a woman to 
qarry a fetus to term. 
We also have emphasized that where the equal protection 
challenge is to the allocation of public funds "the Constitu-
tion does not provide judicial remedies for every social and 
8 In addition to the direct interest in protecting the fetus, a State may 
have legitimate policy concerns as to the demographic implications of its 
rate of population growth. Such concerns are basic to the future of the 
State and in some circumstances could constitute a compelling reason for 
qeparture from a position of neutrality between abortion and childbirth. 
I-ndeed, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, the Court emphasized in a dif-
ferent context the importance of marriage and procreation, not only to the 
individual but "to the very existence and survival of the race." 316 U.S., 
.!'tt 541. 
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economic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 74 (1972),9 
and our cases uniformly have recognized a wider latitude in 
the "line drawing" process wh('re the State must make choices 
among competing demands for limited public funds. In 
Dandridge v. Wmiams, 397 U. 8. 471 (1970) , despite recogni-
tion that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds in-
volve "the most basic economic needs of impoverishf'd human 
beings," we held that classifications survive equal protection 
challenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is 
shown. As the preceding discussion makes clear. the state 
interest in encouraging normal childbirth far exceeds this 
minimal level. 
The decision whether to expend state funds for elective 
abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value over 
which opinions arf' sharply divided. Our conclusion that the 
Connecticut rPgulation is constitutional is not based on a 
weighing of its wisdom or social desirability, for this Court 
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise; 
improvident, or out of harmonv with a particular school of 
thought." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. , 348 U. S. 483, 488 
(1955), quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 484. In_. 
deed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as 
those implicated by public funding of elective abortions, the 
appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the 
legislature. Nor should we forget that "legislatures are ul .. 
timate guardians of the libertif's and welfare of the people in; 
quite as great a degree as the courts." Missouri, Kansas 
and Texas R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267-270 (1904) 
(Holmes, J.). 
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does 
proscribe government funding of elective abortions. It is 
open to Congress to require provision of medicaid benefits for· 
9 See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection 
Clause, and The Three Faces or' Constitutional Equa.lity, 61 Va. L. Rev. 
945, 998-1017 (1975). 
,I I I 
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such abortions as a condition of state participation in the 
medicaid program. Also, under present federal law, Con-
necticut is free-thr,ough noxrmal democratic processes-to 
decide that such benefits should be provided. Beal v. Doe, 
ante, at -. We hold only that the Constitution does not 
require a particular resolution of these issues. 
lV 
The District Court also invalidated Connecticut's require-
ments of prior a~thorization ~nd prior written request by 
the pregnant woman. Our analysis above :vejects the basic 
premise that p~ompted invalidation of these procedural re .. 
quirements. It is not unreasonable for a State to insist upon 
a prior showing of medical necessity to insu~e that its money 
is being spent only for authorized purposes. The simple 
·answer to the argument that similar requirements are not 
imposed for other medical procedures is that such procedures 
·do not involve the termination of a potential human life. 
In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 
supra, we held that the \voman's written consent to an abor-
tion was not an impermissible burden under Roe. We think 
that decision is controlling on the similar issue here. 
The decision of the District Court is reversed and remanded 




Edward W. Maher, Commissioner 
of Social Services of Connecticut, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Susan Roe et al. 
On Appeal from the 
United States District 
Court for the District 
of Connecticut. 
[April -, 1977] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.. 
In Beal v. Doe, ante, at-, we hold today that Title XIX 
of the Social Security Act does not require the funding of 
nontheraputic abortions as a condition of participation in the 
joint federal-state medicaid program established by that 
statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in Beal, we 
must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating 
State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for 
childbirth. 
I 
A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits 
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions~ to those 
that are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psy-
chiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare Department, Public 
Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275.2 Connecti-
1 The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not 
challenged here. 
2 Section 275 provides in relevant part: 
"The Department makes payment for abortion services under the 
Medical Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions 
are met: 
"1. In the opinion of the attending physician the abortion is medi-
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cut enforces this limitation through a system of prior au-
thorization from its Department of Social Services. In 
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion, 
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed 
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the pa-
tient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medi-
cally necessary. 
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation 
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of 
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent 
women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of 
medical necessity.3 In a complaint filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged 
the · regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements of 
cally necessary. The term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric 
necessity. 
"2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or 
licensed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy .... 
"3. The written request for the abortion is submitted by the patient, 
and in the case of a minor, from the parent or guardian. 
"In the case of a committed child, a written consent for the abortion is 
secured from the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Youth 
Services as guardian. 
"4. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of 
Medical Services, bivision of Health Services, Department of Social 
Services." 
3 At the time this action was filed, Linda Poe, a 16-year-old high school 
junior, had already obtained an abortion at a Connecticut hospital. 
Apparently because of Poe's inability to obtain a certificate of medical 
necessity, the hospital was denied reimbursement by the Department of 
Social Services. As a result, Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital 
bill of $244. Susan Roe, an unwed mother of three children, was unable 
to obtain an abortion because of her physician's refusal to certify that the 
procedure was medically necessary. By consent, a temporary restraining 
order was entered by the District Court enjoining the Connecticut officials 
from refusing to pav for R<"e's abortion. After the remand from the Court 
of Appeals, the District Court issued temporary restraining orders covering 
three additional women. 408 F. Supp. 660, 663 (Conn. 1975). 
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Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1396 et seq., 
and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal 
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation 
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act pro-
hibited the funding of abortions that were not medically 
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain 
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation, 
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only 
allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also re· 
quired it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the 
Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding 
of such abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 ( CA2 197 5). Upon re-
mand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in 
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened. 
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F. 
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975). 
Although it found no independent constitutional right to 
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the 
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeu· 
tic abortions from a state welfare program that generally sub-
sidizes the medical expenses incident to pregnancy and child-
birth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 
113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the view 
that "abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive 
moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are 
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with preg-
nancy .... " 408 F. Supp., at 663 n. 3. Relying also on 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the court 
held that the Connecticut program "weights the choice of the 
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitu-
tionally protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion and 
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at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this 
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be 
"wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive 
medical response to pregnancy." /d., at 664 (footnote 
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed 
constitutionally irrelevant: 
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type 
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it 
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To 
sanction such a justification would be to permit dis~ 
crimination against those seeking to exercise a constitu-
tional right on the basis that the state simply does not 
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid. 
·The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the 
certificate of medical necessity for medicaid-funded abortions. 
·- The court also struck down the related requirements of prior 
written request by the pregnant woman and prior authoriza-
tion by the Department of Social Services, holding that the 
State could not impose any requirements on medicaid pay-
ments for abortions tha.t are not "equally applicable to medic-
aid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or require-
ments tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion 
that she has asked her physician to perform." I d., at 665. 
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider the constitutional-
ity of the Connecticut regulation. 428 U. S. 908 ( 1976). 
II 
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to 
pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent wo-
men, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indi-
gents.4 But when a State decides to alleviate some of the 
4 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), cited by appellees, is 
not to the contrary. There the Court invalidated under the Due Process 
Clause "certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, in-
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hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner 
in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limi-
tations. Appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord 
equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and may not 
evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical 
expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classi-
fications established by the Connecticut regulation presents a 
question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysis 
of such a claim is well-settled: 
., 
"We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] op~r­
ates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or im-
pinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly 
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict 
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme 
must still be examined to determine whether it rationally 
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and 
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimina-
tion .... " San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 U. S. 1, 17 (1973). 
eluding requirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of 
process" restricting the ability of indigent persons to bring an action for 
divorce. I d., at 372. ' 
"Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage rela-
tionship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state 
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due 
process does prohibit a State from denying, soldy because of inability to 
pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their 
marriages." /d., at 374. 
Because Connecticut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for 
termina.ting pregnancies through abortion the present case is easily dis-
t'nguished from Boddie. 
pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their 
marriages." /d. , at 374. 
Because Co~ecticut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for 
terminating pregnancies through abortions the present case is easily dis-
tinguished from Boddie. 
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Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); Applying this analysis here, 
we think the District Court erred in subjecting the Connecti-
cut regulation to strict judicial scrutiny. 
This case involves no discrimination against a suspect class. 
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not fall within 
the limited category af disadvantaged classes so recognized by 
our cases. Nor docs the fact that the impact of the regula-
tion falls upon the indigent justify strict scrutiny. In a 
·sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth 
classification as compared to nonindigents who are able to 
pay for the desired goods or services. But this Court has 
·never held that indigency alone identifies a suspect class for 
purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez, supra, 
at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970). Accord-
ingly, the central question in this case is whether the regula-
tion "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or im-
plicitly protected by the Constitution." The District Court 
read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, supra, and the subsequent 
cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental right to 
abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less than a 
compelling state interest would justify Connecticut's different 
'treatment of abortion and childbirth. We think the District 
rCourt ·misconceived the nature and scope of the fundamental 
right recognized in Roe. 
A 
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a Texas law 
making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abor-
tion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the 
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases 
restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and 
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that 
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty 
·affords constitutional protection against state interference 
with certain aspects of an individual's personal "privacy," 
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including a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.5 
410 U. S., at 153. 
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on 
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed 
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety 
of the desired service. As MR. JusTICE STEWART observed, 
"it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of a 
constitutional freedom .... " !d., at 170 (STEWART, J., con-
curring). We held that only a compelling state interest would 
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally pro-
tected interest, and we found no such state interest during 
the first trimester. Even when judged against this demand-
ing standard, however, the State's dual interests in the health 
of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were 
deemed sufficient to justify substantial regulation of abor-
tions in the second a.nd third trimesters. "These interests 
are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as 
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, 
each becomes 'compelling.'" !d., at 162-163. In the second 
trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant 
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that 
concern. !d., at 163. At viability, usually in the third tri-
mester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus 
justifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the 
life or health of the mother is threatened. I d., at 164. 
The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible 
interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate 
her pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated 
other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in 
effect, on the woman's freedom of choice. Thus, in Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 
5 A woman has at least an equal right to chose to carry her fetus to 
term as to choose to abort it. Indeed, the right of procreation without 
state interference has long been recognized as "one of the basic civil rights 
of man ... fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
75-144~0PINION 
8 MAHER v. ROE 
70 n. 11 (1976), we held that Missouri's requirement of spousal 
consent was unconstitutional because it "granted [the hus-
band] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever 
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's de-
cision to terminate her pregnancy." Missouri had interposed 
an "absolute obstacle to a woman's decision that Roe held 
to be constitutionally protected from such interference." 
(Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need 
not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra, 
we have held that a requirement for a la,wful abortion "is 
not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek 
an abortion." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976). 
We recognized in Bellotti that "not all distinction between 
abortion and other procedures is forbidden" and that " [ t] he 
constitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its 
degree and the justification for it." !d., at 149-150. w~ 
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massa-
chusetts statute regulating a minor's access to an abor£ion 
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine 
whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the 
minor's decision or the less burdensome requirement of 
parental consultation. 
We recently summa,rized these cases as establishing a fun-
damental right of "independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions," a right akin to the right to be free "in 
action, thought, experience, and belief from governmental 
compulsion." Whalen v. Roe, - U. S.---, and nn. 24 
and 26, quoting Kurland, The Private I, The University of 
Chicago Magazine 7, 8 (Autumn, 1976). As this statement 
makes clear, the right in Roe can be understood only by-
considering both the woman's interest and the nature of the 
State's interference with it. Roe did not declaJ'e an unquali-
fied "constitutional right to an abortion," as the District 
Court seemed to think. Rather, the right protects the woman 
from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to 
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decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no 
limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judg-
ment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that 
judgment by the allocation of public funds. 
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind 
from the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions. 
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or 
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. 
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no dis-
advantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund 
childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private 
funds for the service she desires. The State may have 
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby in-: 
ffuencing the woman's decision , but it has imposed no re-
striction on access to abortions that was not already there. 
The indigency that may make it difficult- and in some cases, 
perhaps, impossible- for some women to have abor-tions is 
neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut 
regulation. 
We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does not 
impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe and 
that the regulation need not be subjected to strict judicial 
scrutiny under the equal protection analysis of Rodriguez or 
Murgia. 6 
6 Appellees rely on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) , and 
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974). In 
those cases durational residence requirements for the receipt of public 
benefits were found to be unconstitutional because they "penalized" the 
exercise of the constitutional right to travel interstate. 
Appellees' reliance on the penalty analysis of Shapiro and Maricopa 
County is misplaced. In our view there is only a semantic diJierence 
between appellees' assertion that the Connecticut law unduly inter-
fen's with a woman's right to terminate her pregnane~' and their as-
ascrtion that it prnalizes the exercise of that right . Penalties are most 
familiar to the criminal law, where criminal sanctions are imposed as a 
consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recog-
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B 
Our conclusion as to the applicable standard of review 
signals no retreat from Roe or the cases applying it. There 
is a basic difference between direct state interference with a 
protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative 
activity consonant with legislative policy.7 Constitutional 
travel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to 
justify strict judicial scrutiny. 
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women who had 
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we 
would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scn1tiny 
might be appropriate under either the penalty analysis or the analysis we 
have applied in our previous abortion decisions. But the claim here is 
that the State "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by 
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that 
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay 
the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no support in the right 
to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a compelling inter-
est for its decision not to fund elective abortions. 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 ( 1963), similarly is inapplicable here. 
ln addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of 
a constitutionally imposed "governmental obligation of neutrality, origi-
nating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment. Id., at 409. 
7 In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), we drew this distinction in 
sustaining the public financing of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
'1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to 
'others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party 
of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on 
"access to the electoral process: 
"These cases, however, dealt primarily with state la.ws requiring a 
candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear 
on the ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the 
candidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice 
preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues. 
In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates 
is not restrictive of voters' right and less restrictive of candidates'. 
'Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot or 
!any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice; the inability, 
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concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its 
will by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions 
deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader. 
This distinction is implicit in two cases cited in Roe in sup-
port of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Meyer v. Nebrasl<;,a, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), 
involved a Nebraska law making it criminal to teach 
foreign languages to children who had not passed the 
eighth grade. !d., at 396--397. Nebraska's imposition of 
a criminal sanction on the providers of desired services 
makes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the 
constitutionar chal1enge brought by a teacher convicted under 
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to 
teach and· the right of parent to engage him so to instruct 
their children" were "within the liberty of the Amendment." 
ld., at 400. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 
( 1925), the Court relied on Meyer to invalidate an Oregon 
criminal law requiring the parent or guardian of a child to 
send him to a public school, thus precluding the choice of a 
private school. Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment's 
concept of liberty "excludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction 
from public teachers only," the Court held that the law "un-
reasonably interferer d] with the liberty of parents and guard-
ians to direct the upbringing and education of children under 
their control." I d., at 534-535. 
Both cases invalidated substantial restrictions on con-
stitutionally protected liberty interests: in Meyer, the parent's 
right to have his child taught a particular foreign language; 
if any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaigns will 
derive not from lack of public funding but from theil' inability to raise 
private contributions. Any disadvantages suffered by operation of the 
eligibility formulae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denial 
of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electorate 
that the formulae afford eligible candidates." I d., at 94-95 (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted). 
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in Pierce, the parent's right to choose private rather than 
public school education. But neither case denied to a State 
the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action. 
Indeed, in Meyer the Court was careful to state that the 
power of the State "to prescribe a curriculum" in its free 
public schools that included English and excluded German "is 
not questioned." 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts 
no shadow over a State's power to favor public education 
by funding it-a policy choice pursued in some States for 
more than a century. See Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954). Yet the indigent parent could 
challenge the state policy of favoring public over private 
schools, or of preferring instruction in English rather than 
German, on grounds identical in principle to those advanced 
by appellees in the present case. We think it abundantly 
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest 
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more than 
a State must so justify its election to fund public but not 
private education. 
III 
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation can 
be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality. 
This test requires that the distinction drawn between child-
birth and nontherapeutic abortion by the Connecticut regula-
tion be "rationally related to furthering a legitimate state 
interest.n Murgia, supra, at 312. We hold that the Con-
necticut funding scheme satisfies this test. 
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong inter-
est in protecting the potential 1ife of the fetus. That interest 
exists throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality 
as the woman approaches term." Roe, supra, at 162-163. Be-
cause the pregnant woman carries a potential human being, 
she "cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . . [Her] privacy 
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must 
be measured accordingly." !d., at 159. The State unques-
.. 
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tionably has a strong and legitimate interest in encouraging 
normal childbirth, an interest honored over the centuries.8 
Nor can there be any question that the Connecticut regula-
tion rationally furthers that interest. The medical costs as-
sociated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased 
significantly in recent years. As recognized by the District 
Court in this case, such costs are significantly greater than 
those normally associated with elective abortions during the 
first trimester. The subsidizing of costs incident to child-
birth is a rational means of encouraging childbirth. 
We recognize that the impact of the Connecticut regulation 
on an indigent woman may be great, but "the Constitution 
does not provide judicial remedies for every social and eco-
nomic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). Our 
cases uniformly have accorded the States a wider attitude in 
choosing among competing demands for limited public funds. 9 
In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970), despite recog-
nition that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds in-
volve "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human 
beings," we held that classifications survive equal protection 
challenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is 
shown. As the preceding discussion makes clear, the state 
interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this mini· 
tnallevel. 
The decision whether to expend state funds for nonthera-
peutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value 
over which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that 
the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a 
8 In addition to the direct interest in protecting the fetus, a State may 
have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth. 
Such concerns are basic to the future of the State and in some circum-
stances could constitute a substantial reason for departure from a position 
of neutraltiy between abortion and childbirth. 
0 See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection 
Clause, and The Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 
945, 998-1017 (1975). 
,. 
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weighing of its wisdom or social desirability, for this Court 
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise, 
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of 
thought." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488 
(1955), quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 484. In-
deed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as 
those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abor-
tions, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democ-
racy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legisla-
tures are u1timate guardians of the liberties and welfare · of 
the peop'le in quite as great a degree as the courts." Missouri, 
'Kansas and Texas R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267-270 (1904) 
· (Holmes, :J.). 
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does 'not 
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It 
is open to Congress to require provision of medicaid bei1efits 
for such abortions as a condition of state ·participation in the 
medicaid program. Also, under present · federal law, Con-
necticut is free-through normal democratic processes-to 
decide that such benefits should be provided. Beal v. Doe, 
ante; at -. We. hold only that the Constitution does not 
require a judicially 'imposed resolution of these difficult issues. 
lV 
The District Court aJso invalidated Connecticut's require-
ments of prior written request by the pregnant woman and 
prior authorization by the Department of Social Services. 
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted 
invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not un-
reasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of 
medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only 
for authorized purposes. The simple answer to the argument 
·that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical 
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termi-
·nation o'f a potential human life. In Planned Parenthood of 
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Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, we held that the woman's 
written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible bur-
den under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the 
similar issue here. 
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Beal v. Doe, ante, at -, we hold today that Title XIX 
of the Social Security Act does not require the funding of 
nontheraputic abortions as a condition of participation in the 
joint federal-state medicaid program established by that 
statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in Beal, we 
must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating 
State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for 
childbirth. 
I 
A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits 
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions 1 to those 
that are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psy-
chiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare Department, Public 
Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275.2 Connecti-
1 The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not 
challenged here. 
2 Section 27 5 provides in relevnnt part : 
"The Department makes payment for abortion services under the 
Medical Assistance (Tit le XIX) .Program when the following conditions 
a.rf' met: 
"1. In the o_pinion of tho attending physician thl! abortion is medi-
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cut enforces this limitation through a system of prior au-
thorization from its Department of Social Services. In 
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion, 
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed 
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the pa-
tient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medi-
ca.Ily necessary. 
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation 
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of 
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent 
women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of 
medical necessity.3 In a complaint filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged 
the regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements of 
rally necessa ry. The term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric 
necessity. 
"2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or 
licensed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy .... 
"3. The written request. for the abortion is submitted by the patient, 
and in the case of a minor, from the parent or guardian. 
"In the cHse of a committed child, a written consent for the abortion is 
secured from the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Youth 
Services as guardian. 
"4. Prior nuthorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of 
-:\fedical Services, Divisio11 of Health Services, Department of Social 
ervices." 
3 At the time this action was filed , Linda Poe, a 16-year-old high school 
junior, had already obtained an abortion at a Connecticut hospitaL 
Appnrentl~· because of Poe's inability to obtain a certificate of medical 
necessity, the hospital was denied reimbursement by the Department. of 
Social Services. A~ a result , Poe was being presHed to pa ~· the hospital 
bill of $244. Susan Roc, an unwed mother of three children, was unable 
to obtnin an · abortion because of her physician 's refusal to certify that the 
procedure was medicnlly necessary. By consent, a temporar~· restraining· 
order was entered by the Di,.trict Court enjoining the Connecticut officials 
from refusing to pay for Hoe's abortion. After the remand from the Court 
of Appeals, the DiHtrict Comt i;;Hued temporary restraining orders covering; 
thn•e addit io11nl women. 408 F. Supp. 660, 663 (Conn. 1975) . 
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Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1396 et seq., 
and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal 
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation 
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act pro-
hibited the funding of abortions that were not medically 
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain 
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation, 
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only 
allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also re-
quired it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On 
appeal. the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the 
Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding 
of such abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 (CA2 1975). Upon re-
mand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in 
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened. 
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F. 
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975). 
Although it found no independent constitutional right to 
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the 
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeu-
tic abortions from a state welfare program that generally sub-
sidizes the medical expem;es incident to pregnancy and child-
birth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 
113 (1973) , and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 ( 1973) , the view 
that "abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive 
mora.! arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are 
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with preg-
nancy . ... " 408 F. Supp .. at 663 n. 3. Relying also on 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) , the court 
held that the Connecticut program "weights the choice of the 
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitu-
tionally protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion and 
" thu& infringes upon a fundamental interest." 408 F . Supp.> 
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at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this 
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be 
"wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive 
medical response to pregnancy." ld., at 664 (footnote 
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed 
constitutionally irrelevant: 
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type 
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it 
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To 
sanction such a justification would be to permit dis, 
crimination against those seeking to exercise a constitu-
tional right on the basis that the state simply does not 
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid. 
The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the 
certificate of medical necessity for medicaid-funded abortions. 
The court also struck down the related requirements of prior 
written request by the pregnant woman and prior authoriza, 
tion by the Department of Social Services, holding that the 
State could not impose any requirements on medicaid pay-
ments for abortions that are not 11equally applicable to medic-
aid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or require, 
ments tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion 
that she has asked her physician to perform." ld. , at 665. 
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider the constitutional, 
ity of the Connecticut regulation. 428 U. S. 908 (1976) . 
II 
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to 
pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent wo-
men, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indi-
gents.4 But when a State decides to alleviate some of the 
4 Boddie v. Connecticut , 401 U. S. 371 (1971), cited by appellees, is 
.not to the <;ontrary. There the Court invalidated undeJ: the Pue ProceSli 
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hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner 
in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutionallimia 
tations. Appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord 
equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and may not 
evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical 
expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classi-
fications established by the Connecticut regulation presents a 
question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysis 
of such a claim is wPil ""ttlerl· 
"'Ve must decide, first, whetnet L•·'-~ -
ates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or u-. 
pinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly 
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict 
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme 
must stili be examined to determine whether it rationally 
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and 
ther~fore does not constitute an invidious discrimina-
tion .... " San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 u. s. 1, 17 (1973). 
Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); Applying this analysis here, 
Clause "certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, in-
cluding rf'quirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of 
process" restricting the ability of indigent persons to bring an action for 
divorce. I d., at 372. 
"Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage rela-
IIOn~hip in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state 
monopolization of the mean:; for legally dissolving this relationship, due 
process does prohibit a State from denying, :;olely because of inability to 
pay, access to its courts to individuals who :;eek judicial dis ·olution of their 
marriages." !d., at 374. 
Because Connecticut hm; made no attempt to monopolize the means for 
tcrmina ting pregnancif'fi through abortion the present case is easily dis-
tingui ·llf'cl from Boddie. 
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we think the District Court erred in subjecting the Connecti. 
cut regulation to strict judicial scrutiny, 
A 
This case involves no discrimination against a suspect class. 
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not fall within 
the limited category of disadvantagerl classes so recognized by 
our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of the regula-
tion falls upon the indigent justify strict scrutiny. In a 
sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth 
classification as compared to nonindigents who are able to 
pay for the desired goods or services. But this Court has 
never held that indigency alone identifies a suspect class for 
purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez, supra, 
at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Accord-
ingly, the central question in this case is whether the regula-
tion "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or im-
plicitly protected by the Constitution." The District Court 
read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, supra, and the subsequent 
cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental right to 
abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less than a 
compelling state interest would justify Connecticut's different 
treatment of abortion and childbirth. We think the District 
Court misconceived the nature and scope of the fundamental 
right recognized in Roe. 
B 
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a Texas law 
making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abor-
tion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the 
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases 
restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and 
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that 
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty 
affords constitutional protection against state interference 
"nth certain aspects of an individual's personal "privacy/1 
75-144{}-()PINION 
MAHER v. ROE 7 
including a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.5 
410 U. S., at 153. 
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on 
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed 
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety 
of the desired service. As MR. JusTICE STEWART observed, 
"it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of a 
constitutional freedom .... " !d., at 170 (STEWART, J. , con-
curring). We held that only a compelling state interest would 
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally pro-
tected interest, and we found no such state interest during 
the first trimester. Even when judged against this demand-
ing standard, however, the State's dual interests in the health 
of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were 
deemed sufficient to justify substantial regulation of abor-· 
tions in the second and third trimesters. "These interests 
are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as 
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, 
each becomes 'compelling.' " !d., at 162- 163. In the second 
trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant 
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that 
concern. !d., at 163. At viability, usually in the third tri-
mester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus 
justifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the 
life or health of the mother is threatened. !d., at 164. 
The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible· 
interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate 
her pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated 
other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in 
effect, on the woman 's freedom of choice. Thus, in Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 
li A woman has at lea::>t an equal right to choose to carry her fetus to 
term as to choo;;e to abort it. Indeed, the right of procreation without 
state interference has long been recognized as "one of the basic civil rights 
of man . . . fundamental to the very existence and survival of the rao.e..!" 
kinner ~., Oklahoma, 316 U. S .. 535,. 541 (1942) .. 
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70 n. 11 ( 1976), we held that Missouri's requirement of spousal 
consent was unconstitutional because it "granted [the hus-
band] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever 
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's de-
cision to terminate her pregnancy." Missouri had interposed 
an "absolute obstacle to a woman's decision that Roe held 
to be constitutionally protected from such interference." 
(Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need 
not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra, 
we have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion "is 
not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek 
an abortion." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 ( 1976). 
We recognized in Bellotti that "not all distinction between 
abortion and other procedures is forbidden" and that "[t]he 
constitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its 
degree and the justification for it." !d., at 149-150. We 
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massa-
chusetts statute regulating a minor's access to an abortion 
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine 
whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the 
minor's decision or the less burdensome requirement of 
parental consultation. 
We recently summarized these cases as establishing a fun-
damental right of "independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions," a right akin to the right to be free "in 
action, thought, experience, and belief from governmental 
compulsion." Whalen v. Roe,- U. S.---, and nn. 24 
and 26 (1977), quoting Kurland, The Private I, The Univer-
sity of Chicago Magazine 7, 8 (Autumn, 1976). As this 
statement makes clear, the right in Roe can be understood only 
by considering both the woman's interest and the nature of the 
State's interference with it. Roe did not declare an unquali-
fied "constitutional right to an abortion," as the District 
Court seemed to think. Rather, the right protects the woman 
from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to 
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decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no 
limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judg-
ment favoring childbirth over abortion , and to implement that 
judgment by the allocation of public funds. 
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind 
from the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions. 
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles- absolute or 
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. 
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no dis-
advantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund 
childbirth ; she continues as before to be dependent on private· 
funds for the service she desires. The State may have 
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby in-
fluencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no re-
striction on access to abortions that was uot already there. 
The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases·,. 
perhaps, impossible- for some women to have abortions is 
neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut 
regulation. 
We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does not 
impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe and 
that the regulation need not be subjected to strict judicial 
scrutiny under the equal protection analysis of Rodriguez or 
Murgia. 0 
0 Appellee:; rely on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) , and 
Memorial Jl ospital v. Maricopa County , 415 U. S. 250 (1974) . In 
tho~c case:; durational residence requirements for the receipt of public 
benefits were found to be unconstitutional because they "penalized" the 
exerci ~>C of the constitutional right to travel interstate. 
Appellees' reliance on the penalt~· analysi:; of Shapiro and Maricopa 
County is misplacrd. In our view there is only a semantic difference 
between appeller:;' as:;ertion that the Connecticut law unduly inter-
l'rrP~ with a woman ':; right to terminate her prrgnancy and their as-
n»rr tion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most 
fa miliar to the criminal law, where criminal sanctions are imposed as a 
ronsequrnce of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recog-
ll14<'d that druial of welfate tu uue who had .recently exe.rcised the right tu 
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Our conclusion as to the applicable standard of review 
signals no retreat from Roe or the cases applying it. There 
is a basic difference between direct state interference with a 
protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative 
activity consonant with legislative policy.7 Constitutional 
travel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to 
justify strict judicial scrutiny. 
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women who had 
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we 
would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny 
might be appropriate under either the penalty analysis or the analysis we 
have applied in our previous abortion decisions. But the claim here is 
that the St.ate "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by 
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that 
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay 
the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no support in the right 
to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a compelling inter-
est for its decision not to fund elective abortions. 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), similarly is inapplicable here, 
In addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of' 
a constitutionally imposed "governmental obligation of neutrality" origi-
nating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment. !d., at 409. 
7 In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), we drew this distinction in 
sustaining the public financing of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to 
others. We rejected an asserted analogy to ca~s such as American Party 
of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on 
access to the electoral process: 
"These cases, however, dealt primarily with state la.ws requiring a 
candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear· 
on the ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the 
candidate's abilit.y to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice 
preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues .. 
In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates 
is not restrictive of voters' right and less restrictive of caJ1didates'. 
Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot or· 
any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice; the inability, 
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concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its 
will by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions 
deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader. 
This distinction is implicit in two cases cited in Roe in sup-
port of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), 
involved a Nebraska law making it criminal to teach 
foreign languages to children who had not passed the 
eighth grade. Id., at 396-397. Nebraska's imposition of 
a criminal sanction on the providers of desired services 
makes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the 
constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted under 
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to 
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct 
their children" were "within the liberty of the Amendment." 
ld., at 400. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 
( 1925), the Court relied on Meyer to invalidate an Oregon 
criminal law requiring the parent or guardian of a child to 
send him to a public school, thus precluding the choice of a 
private school. Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment's 
concept of liberty "excludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction 
from public teachers only," the Court held that the law "un-
reasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guard-
ians to direct the upbringing and education of children under 
their control." Id., at 534-535. 
Both cases invalidated substantial restrictions on con-
stitutionally protected liberty interests: in Meyer, the parent's 
right to have his child taught a particular foreign language; 
if any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaign.s will 
derive not from lack of public funding but from their inability to raise 
private contribution.<~. Any disadvantages suffered by operation of the 
eligibility formulae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denial 
of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electorate 
that the formulae afford eligible candidates." I d., at 94-95 (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted). 
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in Pierce, the parent's right to choose private rather than 
public school education. 'But neither case denied to a State 
the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action. 
Indeed, in Meyer the Court was careful to state that the 
power of the State "to prescribe a curriculum" in its free 
public schools that included English and excluded German "is 
~ot questioned." 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts 
no shadow over a State's power to favor public education 
by funding it-a policy choice pursued in some States for 
more than a century. See Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954). Yet the indigent parent could 
challenge the sta.te policy of favoring public rather than private 
schools, or of preferring instruction in English rather than 
German, on grounds identical in principle to those advanced 
by appellees in the present case. We think it abundantly 
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest 
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more than 
a State must so justify its election to fund public but not 
private education. 
III 
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation can 
be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality. 
This test requires that the distinction drawn between child~ 
birth and nontherapeutic abortion by the Connecticut regula~ 
tion be "rationally related to furthering a legitimate state 
interest." Murgia, supra, at 312. We hold that the Con .. 
necticut funding scheme satisfies this test. 
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong inter~ 
est in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest 
exists throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality 
as the woman approaches term." Roe, supra, at 162-163. Be-
cause the pregnant woman carries a potential human being, 
she "cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . . [Her] privacy 
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must 
be measured accordingly.'' I d., at 159, The State unque~ 
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tionably has a strong and legitimate interest in encouraging 
normal childbirth, an interest honored over the centuries.8 
Nor can there be any question tha.t the Connecticut regula-
tion rationally furthers that interest. The medical costs as-
sociated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased 
significantly in recent years. As recognized by the District 
Court in this case, such costs are significantly greater than 
those normally associated with elective abortions during the 
first trimester. The subsidizing of costs incident to child-
birth is a rational means of encouraging childbirth. 
We recognize that the impact of the Connecticut regulation 
on an indigent woman may be great, but "the Constitution 
does not provide judicial remedies for every social and eco-
nomic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 74 (1972). Our l t •.L J 
cases uniformly have accorded the States a wider a4ieitJ~8eVn fA IT lA C.. 
choosing among competing demands for limited public funas. 9 
In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), despite recog-
nition that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds in-
volve "the most basic economic 1weds of impoverished human 
beings," we held that cla..'lsifications survive equal protection 
challenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is 
shown. As the preceding discussion makes clear, the state 
interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this mini-
mal level. 
The decision whether to expend state funds for nonthera-
peutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value 
over which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that 
the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a 
8 In addition to the direct interest in protecting the fetus, a State may 
have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth. 
Such concerns are basic to the fut.ure of the State and in some circum-
:;tances could constitute a substantial reason for departure from a position 
of neutraltiy between abortion and childbirth. 
9 See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection 
Clause, and The Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 
945, 998-lOJ.7 (1975) . 
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weighing of its wisdom or social desirability, for this Court 
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise, 
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of 
thought." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488 
(1955) , quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 484. In-
deed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as 
those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abor-
tioos, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democ-
racy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legisla-
tures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of 
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." Missouri, 
, Kansas and 1'exas R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267-270 (1904) 
(Holmes, J.). 
In conclusion. we emphasize that our decision today does not 
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It 
is open to Congress to require provision of medicaid benefits 
for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the 
medicaid program. Also, under present federal law, Con-
necticut is free-through normal · democratic processes-to 
decide that such ·benefits should be provided. Beal v. Doe, 
ante, at -. We hold only · that the Constitution does not 
require a judicially imposed resolution of these difficult issues. 
IV 
The District Court also invalidated Connecticut's require-
ments of prior written request by the pregnant woman and 
prior authorization by the Department of Social Services. 
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted 
invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not un-
reasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of 
medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only 
for authorized purposes. · The simple answer ·to the argument 
that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical 
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termi-
nation of a potential human life. In Planned Parenthood of 
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Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, we held that the woman's 
written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible bur-
den under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the 
similar issue here. 
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the 
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MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. 
The Court today, by its decisions in these cases, allows 
the States, and such municipalities as choose to do so, to accomplish 
indirectly what the Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)-- by a substantial majority and 
with some emphasis, I had thought -- said they could not do directly. 
The Court concedes the existence of a constitutional right but denies 
the realization and enjoyment of that right on the ground that existence 
and realization are separate and distinct. For the individual woman 
concerned, indigent and financially helpless, as the Court's opinions 
in the three cases concede her to be, the result is punitive and tragic . 
• 
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Implicit in the Court's holdings is the condescension that she may 
go elsewhere for her abortion. I find that disingenuous and alarming, 
almost reminiscent of "let them eat cake. " 
The result the Court reaches is particularly distressing in 
Poelker v. Doe, where a presumed majority, 1n electing as mayor 
• 
one whom the record shows campaigned on the is sue of closing 
public hospitals to nontherapeutic abortions, punitively impresses 
upon a needy minority its own concepts of the socially desirable, 
the publicly acceptable, and the morally sound, with a touch of 
the devil-take-the-hindmost. This 1s not the kind of thing for which 
our Constitution stands. 
The Court's financial argument, of course, 1s specious. 
To be sure, welfare funds are limited and welfare must be spread 
Nos. 75-554, 75-1440, 75-442 
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perhaps as best meets the community's concept of its needs. But 
the cost of a nontherapeutic abortion is far less than the cost of 
maternity care and delivery, and holds no comparison whatsoever 
with the welfare costs that will burden the State for the new indigents 
and their support in the long, long years ahead • 
• 
Neither is it an acceptable answer, as the Court well knows, 
to say that the Congress and the States are free to authorize the use 
of funds for nontherapeutic abortions . Why should any politician incur 
the demonstrated wrath and noise of the abortion opponents when mere 
silence and nonactivity accomplish the results the opponents want? 
There is another world "out there," the existence of which 
the Court, I suspect, either chooses to ignore or fears to recognize. 
And so the cancer of poverty will continue to grow. This is a sad 
Nos. 75-554, 75-1440, 75-442 
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day for those who regard the Constitution as a force that would 
serve justice to all evenhandedly and, 1n so doing, would better 
the lot of the poorest among us. 
•' · 
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It is all too obvious that the governmental actions in these 
cases, ostensibly taken to "encourage" women to carry pregnancies 
to term .• are in reality intended to impose a moral viewpoint that 
no state may constitutionally enforce. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Since efforts to overturn 
those decisions have been unsuccessful, the opponents of abortion 
have attempted every imaginable means to circumvent the commands 
of the Constitution and impose their moral choices upon the rest of 
society. See, ~, Pln.nned Parenthood or Missouri v. Danfort0-, 
Single ton v. Wulf'f, 428 U.S. 106 (1976);Bellotti v. Bai 
428 U.S. 52 (197 6) ;/428 U.S. 132 (197 G). The present cases involve 
the most vicious attacks yet devised. The impact of the regulations 
here falls tragically upon those among us least able to help or defend 
themselves. As the Court well knows, these regulations inevitably 
~ 
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will have the practical effect of preventing nearly all poor women 
fr om obtaining safe and legal abortions.-!./ 
The enactments challenged here brutally coerce poor women 
to bear children whom society will scorn for every day of their lives. 
Many thousands of unwanted minor lty and mixed race children 
now spend blighted lives in foster homes, orphanages, and 11 reform" 
s chools . Cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families. u.s. ---
(1 977 ). Many children of the poor will sadly attend second- rate 
segregated schools. Cf. Milliken v. Bradley, u.s. --- (1977). 
And opposition remains strong against increasing AFDC benefits for 
impoverished mothers and children, so that there is little chance 
for the children to grow up in a decent environment. Cf. Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). I am appalled at the ethical bankruptcy 
of those who preach a 11 right to llfe 11 that means , under present 
social policies, a bare existence in utter misery for so many poor 
w omen and their children. 
I. 
The Court's insensitivity to the human dimension of these 
decisions is particularly obvious in its cursory discussion of 
respondents' equal protection claim-s in Maher v. Roe. That case 
points up once again the need for this Court to repudiate its outdated 
and intellectually disingenuous 11 two-tier" equal protection analysis. 
'--------------------~------~· 
See generally, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
U. S. 307, 317 (1976) (M~rshall, J., dissenting). As I have suggested 
before, this "model'~ two fixed-~dcs of analysis. strict scrutiny 
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and mere rationality, simply do not describe the inquiry the Court 
has undertaken -- or should undertake -- in equal protection cases. 11 
Id. at 318. In the present case, in its evident desire to avoid strict 
scrutiny -- or indeed any meaningful scrutiny -- of the challenged 
legislation, which would almost surely result in its invalidation, 
see id. at 319, the Court pulls from thin air a distinction between 
laws that absolutely prevent exercise of the fundamental right to 
abortion and those that 11 merely11 make its exercise difficult for some 
people. See Maher v. Roe, ante at ---- --- ------ Mr. Justice Brennan 
demonstrates that our cases support no such distinction, ante at ___ • 
and I have argued above that the challenged regulations are little 
different from a total prohibition from the viewpoint of the poor. 
But the Court's legal legerdemain has produced the desired result: 
a fundamental right is no longer at stake and mere rationality becomes 
the appropriate mode of analysis. To no one's surprise, application 
of that test -- combined with misreading of Roe v. Wade to generate 
a 11 strong11 state interest in 11 potentiallife11 during the first trimester 
of pregnancy, see ante at ____ (Brennan, J., dissenting); post at 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) 11 leaves little doubt about the outcome; 
the challenged legislation is [as] always upheld. 11 Massachuse tts v. 
Murgia, supra, 427 U.S., at 319. And as has happened before, 11 relevant 
factors [are] misapplied or ignored, 11 427 U.S., at 321, and the 
Court 11 forego[ es] all judicial protection against discriminatory 
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legislation bearing upon" a right "vital to the flourishing of a free 
society" and a class "unfairly burdened by invidious discrimination 
unrelated to the individual worth of [its] members." Ji·, at 320. 
As I have argued before, an analysis far more in keeping 
with the actions, rather than the words, of the Court in equal protection 
cases, see Id. at 320-321, takes account of three factors -- "the 
importance of the governmental benefits denied, the character of lhe 
class, and the asserted state interests," Id. at 322. Application of 
this standard would invalidate the challenged regulation. 
As I have noted above, the governmental benefits at issue here, 
while perhaps not representing large amounts of money for any 
i ndividual, are nevertheless of absolutely vital importance in the lives 
of the recipients. The right of every woman to choose whether to bear 
a child is, as Roe v. Wade held, of fundamental importance. An 
unwanted child may be disruptive and destructive of the life of any 
woman, but the impact is felt most by those too poor to ameliorate 
those effects. If funds for an abortion are unavailable, a poor woman 
may feel that she is forced to obtain an illegal abortion that poses a 
serious threat to her health and even her life. See note 1 supra. 
~-
If she refuses to take this risk, and undergoes the pain and danger 
of state-financed pregnancy and childbirth, she may well give up 
all chance of escaping lhe cycle of poverty. Absent day- care facilities, 
she w ill be forced to care for a child for many years to come; she 
will be unable tow ork so that her family can break out of the welfare 
1 
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system or the lowest income brackets. If she already has children, 
another infant to feed and clothe may well stretch the budget past the 
breaking point. All chance to control the direction of her own life 
will have been lost. 
I have already adverted to some of the characteristics of the 
class burdened by these regulations. While poverty alone does not 
entitle a class to claim government benefits, it is surely a relevant 
factor in the present inquiry. See San Antonio School District v. 
(1973) 
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 70, 117-124' (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Indeed, it was in the San Antonio case that Mr. Justice Powell for the 
Court stated a lest for analyzing discrimination on the basis of 
wealth that would, if fairly applied here, strike down the regulations. 
The Court there held that a wealth discrimination claim is made out 
by persons who share "two distinguishing characteristics: because of 
their impecunity they [are] completely unable to pay for some desired 
benefit, and as a consequence they sustain[] an absolute deprivation 
of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit." Id. at 20. Medicaid 
recipients are, almost by definition, "completely unable to pay for': 
abortions, and are thereby completely denied "a meaningful opportunity" 
2/ 
to obtain them.-
It is no less disturbing that the effect of the challenged regulations 
will fall with great disparity upon women of minority races. Non-
3/ 
white women now obtain abortions at nearly twice the rate of whiles,-
and it appears that almost 40 percent of minority women -- more 
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than five times the proportion of whites -- are dependent upon 
medicaid for their health care . 
41 
Even if this strongly disparate 
racial impact does not alone violate the Equal Protection Clause, 
see Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976); Jefferson v. Hackney, 
406 U.S. 535 (1972), "at some point a showing that state action has 
a devastating impact on the lives of minority racial groups must be 
relevant." Id., at 558, 675-576 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Against the brutal effect that the challenged laws will have 
must be weighted the asserted state interest. The Court describes 
this as a "strong interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus." 
Ante at 13. Yet in Doe v. Bolton, supra, the Court expressly held 
that any state interest during the first trimester of pregnancy, when 
88 percent of all abortions occur, CDC Surveillance, at ___ .• was 
wholly insufficient to justify state interference with the right to abortion. 
5/ 
Id., at 192-200. If a state's interest in potential human life before 
the point of viability is insufficient to justify requiting several 
physicians' concurrence for an abortion, Ibid, I cannot comprehend how 
it magically becomes adequate to allow the present infringement on 
rights of disfavored classes. If there is any state interest in potential 
life before the point of viability, it ~certainly does not outweigh the 
deprivation or serious discouragement of a vital constitutional right of 
6/ 
especial importance to poor and minority women.-
Thu s, taking account of all relevant factors under the flexible 
standard of equal protection review, I would hold the Connecticut 
- 7 -
and Pennsylvania medicaid regulations and the St. Louis public 
hospital policy violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
II. 
When this Court decided Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, it 
properly embarked on a course of constitutional adjudication no 
less controversial than that begun by Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954). The abortion decisions are sound law and 
undoubtedly good policy. They have never been questioned by the Court 
and we are told that today' s cases "signal[] no retreat from Roe or the 
cases applying it." Maher v. Roe, ante, at 10. The logic of those 
cases inexorably requires invalidation of the present enactments. 
Yet I fear that the Court's decisions will be an invitation to public 
officials, ~ready under extraordinary pressure from well-financed 
a nd carefully orchestrated lobbying campaigns, to approve more 
such restrictions. The effect will be to relegate millions of people 
I 
to lives of poverty and despair, only to serve the moral vanity of 
------------------------~ 
those who presume to dictate where righteousness lies. When elected - ..... --- ----- ---
l eaders cower before public pressure, this Court, more than ever, 
must not shirk its duty to enforce. tpj; Constitution for the benefit of 
the poor and powerless. 
FOOTNOTES 
1../ Although an abortion performed during the first trimester 
of pregnancy is a relatively inexpensive surgical procedure, usually 
costing under $200, even this modest sum is far beyond the means 
of most medicaid recipients. And "if one does not have it and 
is unable to get it the fee might as well be" one hundred times as 
great. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961). 
Even before today' s decisions, a major reason that perhaps 
as much as one-third of the need for an estimated 1. 8 million 
abortions went unmet was the fact that 8 out of 10 American counties 
did not have a single abortion provider. Sullivan, Tietze & Dryfoos, 
Legal Abortion in the United States, 1975-1976, 9 Family Planning 
Perspectiyes 116, 117, 121, 129 (1977). In 1975, 83,000 women 
had to travel from their home states to obtain abortions (there were 
100 abortions performed in West Virginia and 310 in Mississippi), 
and about 300, 000 more, or a total of nearly 40 percent of abortion 
patients, had to seek help outside their home counties. Id. at 116, 
121, 124. In addition, only 18 percent of the public hospitals in the 
nation performed even a single abortion in 197 5 and in 10 states not 
one public hospital provided abortion services. Id . at 121, 128. 
Given the political realities, it seems inevitable that the number 
and geographical distribution of abortion providers will diminish as a 
result of today ' s decisions. It is regrettable but likely that fewer 
- 2 -
public hospitals will provide the service and if medicaid payments 
are unavailable, other hospitals, clinics and physicians will be 
unable to do so. Since most medicaid and public hospital patients 
probably do not have the money, the time~ or the familiarity with the 
medical delivery system to travel to distant states or cities where 
abortions are available, today' s decisions will put safe and legal 
abortions beyond their reach. The inevitable human tragedy that will 
a 
result is reflected in/government report: 
11 ]F)or some women, non-availability of public funding 
for legal abortion acted as a deterrent to their obtaining 
the safe procedures. The following case history of a 
death which occurred during 1975 exemplifies such a 
situation: 
11 A 41-year-old black married female with 
6 previous pregnancies, 5 living children, and 1 previous 
abortion, sought an illegal abortion from a local 
die~ician . . . • Her stated reason for seeking an 
illegal procedure was financial, since Medicaid in her 
state of residence would not pay for her abortion. The 
illegal procedure cost $30, compared to an estimated 
$150 for a legal procedure . . . . Allegedly, the 
operation was performed by inserting a metal rod to 
dilate the cervix . . • . [The woman died of cardiac 
arrest after two weeks of intensive hospital care and 
twooperations.]" U.S. Dep'tofHEW, Centerfor 
Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance, 1975 (1977). 
(hereafter 11 CDC Surveillance. 11 ). 
21 If public funds and facilities for abortions are sharply 
reduced, private charities, hospitals, clinics, and doctors willing 
to perform abortions for far less than the prevailing fee will, I trust, 
take up some of the need. But since abortion services are inadequateJ y 
- 3 -
available even now. see note 1 supra, such private generosity is 
unlikely to give many poor women "a meaningful opportunity" to 
obtain abortions. 
~/ Blacks and other nonwhite groups are heavily over-
and medicaid recipients. 
represented among both abortion patients I In 1975, about 13. 1 
percent of the population was nonwhite, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 197~ at 25, yet 32.2 percent of women obtaining 
abortions were of minority race. CDC Surveillance at & 
Summary Table, Table 8. Furthermore, nonwhites secured abortions 
at the rate of 47 6 per 1000 live births, while the corresponding 
figure for whites was only 277. Id. at-----· tables 8, 9. 
Abortion is thus a family planning method of considerably more 
significan~e for minority groups than among whites. 
41 
Although complete statistics are unavailable (3 states, 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands having furnished no racial 
breakdown, and 8 states giving incomplete data). nonwhites accounted 
for some 43.4 percent of medicaid recipients during fiscal year 1974 
in jurisdictions reporting. U.S. Dep't of HEW, National Center for 
~-
Social Statistics, Medicaid Recipient Characteristics and Unit s of 
Selected Medical Services, Fiscal Year 1974. Report B-4 (FY 74) 
Supplement, at 19. Extrapolating this percentage to cover the 
entire medicaid caseload of over 17. 6 million, minority racial groups 
- 4 -
would account for 7, 656, 000 recipients. Assuming comparability 
of the HEW and Census figures, this amounts to 27. 4 percent of 
the nation's nonwhite population. See Statistical Abstract, at 2 5. 
Since there are 1. 8 female medicaid recipients for every male, 
see Medicaid Recipient Characteristics, supra, the proportion of 
nonwhite women who must rely upon medicaid is probably far higher, 
about 38. 5 percent. The comparable figure for white women appears 
to be about 7 percent. 
E._/ Requirements that the abortion be performed by a 
physician exercising his best clinical judgment, and in a facility 
meeting narrowly tailored health standards, are allow able. Ibid. 
2._/ Application of the flexible equal protection standard would 
allow the Court to strike down the regulations in these cases without 
necessitating invalidation of laws funding public education or English 
language teaching in public schools. See ante at 12-13. By permitting 
a court to weigh all relevant factors, the flexible standard does not 
logically require acceptance of any equal protection claim that is 
"identical in principle" under the traditional approach to those 
advanced here. See id. at 13. 
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Edward W. Maher, Commissioner 
.of Social Services of Connecticut, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Susan Roe et al. 
On Appeal from the 
United States District 
Court for the D!strict 
of Connecticut. 
'[June -, 197.7] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Beal v. Doe, ante, ·at-, we hold today that Title XIX 
·of the Social Security Act does not · require the funding of 
nontheraputic abortions as a condition of participation in the 
joint federal-state medicaid program established by that 
statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in Beal, we 
must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating 
State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when 'it pays for 
childbirth, 
I 
A regulation of the Connecticut ·Welfare Department·limits 
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions 1 to those 
that are "medically' necessary," a term de'fined to include psy-
chiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare' Department, Public 
Assistance Program Manual, Vol. '3, c. III, '§ 275.2 Connecti-
1 The procedures governing abortions'beyond the first trimester are not 
challenged here. 
l Section 275 provides in·relevant part: 
"The Department makes payment for abortion services under the 
Medical Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditioll8 
ttl't.> met: 
''L In the otlinion of too attending physician the abortion is meiH-
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cut enfot·ces this limitation through a system of prior au-
thorization from its Department of Social Services. In 
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion, 
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed 
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the pa-
tient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medi-
cally necessary. 
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation 
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of 
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent 
women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of 
medical necessity.3 In a complaint filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged 
the regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements of 
cally necessa.ry. The term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric 
nccesi:iity. 
"2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or 
hcenscd clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy . ... 
"3. The written request for the abortion is submitted· by the patient, 
and in the case of a minor, from the parent or guardian. 
"4. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of 
Medwal ServiCes, Division of Health Services, Department of Social 
crviCes " 
Srr n . .f, mfra. 
" At thr hme t im; nrtwn wns filed, Mnry Poe, a 16-yenr-old high school 
,tu mor, hnd already obtamed an abortion at a Connecticut hospita1. 
Appn rrntly bcrnuse of Poe's inability to obtain a. certificate of mediral 
necessity, thP ho:spital was denied reimbursement 'by the Department of 
Socinl Services. As a result , Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital 
bill of $244. Susnn Roe, an unwed mother of three children, was unable 
to obtain an abortiOn because of her physician's refusal to certify that the 
procedure wa, medically necessa ry. By consent, a temporary restraining 
order was entered by the District Court enjoining the Connecticut offirials 
from refu i:i in~?: to pa~· for Roc':- nho rtion . After the remand from the Court 
of Appeals, thr Dtstnct Court ts:sued tempora-ry restraining orders covering 
thn'l' nrldnionnl women. Noe v Norton , 408 F. Supp. 660, 663 (Cor111, 
107.') l 
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Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1396 et seq., 
and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal 
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regula.tion 
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act pro-
hibited the funding of abortions that were not medically 
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain 
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation, 
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only 
allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also re-
quired it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the 
ocial Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding 
of such abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 (CA2 1975). Upon re-
mand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in 
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened. 
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F . 
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975) . 
Although it found no independent constitutional right to 
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held: that the 
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeu-
tic abortions from a state welfare program that generally sub-
sidizes the medical expenses incident to pregnancy and child-
birth . The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 
113 (1973) , and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the view 
that "abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive 
moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are 
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with preg-
nancy. 0 0 ." 408 F . Supp., at 663 n. 3. Relying also on 
Shapiro v. 'Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the court 
held that the Connecticut program "weights the choice of the 
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitu-
tionally protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion and 
'''thu~ 'tnfrrnges upon a. fundamental interest." 408 F. Supp.,, 
"l5-1440--()PIN10N 
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at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this 
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be 
"wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive 
medical response to a pregnancy." ld., at 664 (footnote 
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed 
constitutionally irrelevant : 
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type 
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it 
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To 
sanction such a justification would be to permit di~ 
crimination against those seeking to exercise a constitu-
tional right on the basis that the state simply does not 
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid. 
The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the 
certificate of medical necessity for medicaid-funded abortions.~ 
The court also struck down the related requirements of prior 
written request by the pregnant woman and prior authoriza-
tion by the Department of Social Services, holding that the 
State could not impose any requirements on medicaid pay-
ments for abortions that are not "equally applicable to medic-
aid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or require-
4 The Di~trict Court's judgrrumt and order, entered on January 16, 1976, 
were not ~tayed. On January 26, 1976, the Department of Social Services 
revised § 275 to allow reimbur~emcnt for non therapeutic abortjons without 
prior aut.horization or consent. The fact that t.his revision was made retro-
active to January 16, 1976, sugg~ts that the revision was made only for 
the purpose of int,erim compliance with the District Court's judgment and 
order, which were entered the ~tune date. No suggestion of mootness has 
been made by any of the parties, and this appeal was taken a1~d submitted 
on the theory that Connecticut de~ires to reinsktte the invalidated regula.-
tlon. Under these circum;;tances, the :subsequent revi~ion of the regula.tion 
does not, render thl' case moot.. In any event, there would remain the 
d<'nial of r<'imbur:;ement to Mary Poe, a.nd similarly situated members of 
the class, under the prerevision regulation. See 380 F. Supp., at 730 n. 3. 
The State ha<> a.,;erted no Eleventh Amendment defense to t.his relief 
sought by Poe and thQlSe whom she represents. 
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rnents tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion 
or to delay the occurrence of an ~bortion that she has asked 
her physician to perform." !d., l\-t 665. We noted probable 
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Connecticut 
regulation. 428 U. S. 908 (1976) . 
II 
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to 
pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent wo· 
men, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indi· 
gents.~ But when a State decides to alleviate some of the 
hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner 
in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limi• 
tations. Appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord 
equal treatment. to both abortion and childbirth, and may not 
evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical 
expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classi· 
ncations established by the Connecticut regulation presents a 
question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysis 
of such a claim is well-settled : 
"We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] oper-
5 Boddie v. Connecticut , 401 U . S. 371 (1971), cited by appellees, is 
not to the contrary. T here the Court invalidated under the Due Process 
Clause "certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, in-
cluding rcquiremrnts for payment of court fees and costs for service of 
proces " rest ri cting the ability of indigent persons to bring an action for 
divorce ! d., at 372. The Court held that : 
' 'LG iiven thr bns1e posit ion of the marriage rela tionship in this society 's 
hiera rchy of va lu~ and the concomitan t state monopolization of the 
means for lega lly dissolving t his rela tionship, due process does prohibit a 
Stnte from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to it::; courts 
to ind1viduals who ::;rek judirinl di:;solution of their marriages." !d., at 374. 
Because Connecticut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for 
tc·rminating pregnancies through abortion the present case is easily dis-
tmglllslwd from Boddie. See nlso United States v. K ras, 409 U. S. 434 
(1 97;l) Ortwem v, Schwab, 410 U S, 656 (1973) . 
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ates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or im· 
pinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly 
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict 
judicial scrutiny. • . . If not, the [legislative] scheme 
must still be examined to determine whether it rationally 
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and 
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimina-
tion .•.. " San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 u. s. 1, 17 (1973) . 
Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); Applying this analysis here, 
we think the District Court erred in holding that the Con-
necticut regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause <O'f 
the Fourteen'th Amendment. 
A 
This case involves no discrimination against a suspect class. 
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within 
the limited category of disadvantaged c1asses s(l) rec(l)gnized 'by 
our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of the regula,-
tion falls upon those who cannot pay lead to a different con-
clusion. In a sense, every denia.I of welfare to an indigent 
creates a wealth classification as compared to nonindigents 
who are able to pay for the desired goods or services. But this 
Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a sus-
pect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rod-
riguez, supra, a.t 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 
( 1970) .() Accordingly, the central question in this case is 
6 In cases such UR Griffin v. Ill-inois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956) a.nd Douglas v. 
California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), the Court held that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause requires States that allow appellate review of criminal convic-
t ions to provide indigent defendants with trial transcripts and appellate 
counsel. These cases are grounded in the criminal justice system, a gov-
ernmenta l monopol~· m which pa rticipation is compelled. Cf. n. 5, supra. 
Our ~ubsequent decisions have made it clear that the principles underlying 
Gri!Jin an<i Douglas dQ not extencl to legislative classifications generally. 
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whether the regulation "impinges upon a fundamental right 
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution." The 
District Court read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, supra, and 
the subsequent cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental 
right to abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less 
than a compelling state interest would justify Connecticut's 
different treatment of abortion and childbirth. We think the 
District Court misconceived the nature and scope of the 
fundamental right recognized in Roe. 
B 
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a Texas law 
making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abor-
tion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the 
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases 
restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and 
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that 
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty 
affords constitutional protection against state interference 
with certain aspects of an individual's personal "privacy," 
including a woman's decision to terminate her pregna.ncy.7 
410 U. S., at 153. 
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on 
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed 
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety 
of the desired service. As MR. JusTICE STEWART observed, 
"it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of a 
constitutional freedom . 0 •• " /d., at 170 (STE,WART, J., con-
curring). We held that only a compelling state interest would 
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally pro-
1 A wotrum hal; at least an equal right to cl10ose to carry her fetus to 
term as to choose to abort it. Indeed, the right of procreation without 
state interference has long been recognized as "one of the basic civil rights 
of man .• o fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." 
Skinner v. Oklo.h.oma,. 316 U. S. 535. 541 (1942). 
I '. J I 
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tected interest, and we found no such state interest during 
the first trimester. Even when judged against this demand-
ing standard, however, the State's dual interests in the health 
of the pregnant woman a.nd the potential life of the fetus were 
deemed sufficient to justify, substantial regulation of abor-
tions in the second and third trimesters. · "These interests 
are separate and distiJ;J.Ct. Each grows in substantiality as 
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, 
each becomes 'compelling.'" ld., at .162-163. In the second 
trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant 
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that 
concern. ld., at 163. At viability, usually in the third tri-
mester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus 
justifies prohibition with rriminal penalties, except where the 
life or health of the mother is threatened. /d., at 163-164. 
The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible 
interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate 
her pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated 
other types of restrictions, · different in · form but similar in 
effect, on the woman's freedom of choice. ·Thus, in Planned 
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 70-7r 
n 11 (1976), we held that Missouri's requirement of spous 1 
consent was unconstitutional because it "granted [the hu -
band] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever 
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's de-
cision to terminate her pregnancy." Missouri had interposed 
an "absolute obstaCle to a woman's decision that Roe held 
to be constitutionally protected from such interference." 
(Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need 
not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra~ 
we have held that a requirement for a ·lawful abortion "is 
not unconstitutional mi.lcss it unduly burdens the right to seek 
an abortion." Bellottt v Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976). 
We recognized in Bellotti that "not all distinction· between 
~bortion and Qther procedures is forbidden" and that "~tlhe 
eonstitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its 
degree and the justification for it." Id., at 149-150. We 
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massa-
chusetts statute regulating a minor's access to an abortion 
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine 
whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the 
minor"s decision or the less burdensotne requirement of 
parental consultation. 
These cases recognize a constitutionally protected interest 
11 in making certain kinds of important decisions" free from 
governmental compulsion. Whalen v. Roe, - U. S. --
-,and nn. 24 and 26 (1977). As Whalen makes clear, the 
nght in Roe v. Wade can be understood only by considering 
both the woman's interest and the nature of the State's inter-
ference with it. Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitu-
tional right to an abortion,' 1 as the District Court seemed :to• 
think. Rather, the 'tight protects the woman from unduly 
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether 
to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitdi0n on the 
authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring child'-
birth ovet abortion, and to implement that judgment by the 
aiiocation of public funds. 
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind 
f'rom the laws invalidated in our previous abortitm decisions. 
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles'-absolute or 
otherwise~in the pregnant woman's path tO' an abortion. 
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no dis-
advantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fun·d' 
childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private 
sources for the service she desires. · The State may have· 
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, · thereby in-
fluencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no re--
striction on access to abortions that was not already there. 
The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases,. 
t l:f'th~ps, impossible-fot wlne watoon ·: t.o have abortiQil.S: .-~ 
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neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut 
regula.tion. We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does 
not imping~ upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe.8 
c 
Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases 
applying it. There is a basic difference between direct state 
interference with a protected activity and state encouragement 
8 Appellees rely on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and 
Memorial I/ospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974). In 
those cases clurational residence requirements for the receipt of public 
benefits Wt;lre found to' be unconstitutional because they "penalized" ·the 
exercise of the constitutional right to travel interstaw. 
Appellees' reliance on the penalty analysis of Shapiro and Maricopa 
County is misplaced. In our view there is only a semantic difference 
between appellees' assertion that the Connecticut ·law unduly inter-
feres with a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy and their as-
asertion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most 
familiar to the criminal 'law, where criminal sanctions are imposed as a 
consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recog-
nized that denial of welfa-re to one who had recently exercised the right to 
travel across sta.te lines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine .to 
justify strict judicial scrutiny. 
If Connecticut denied general welfare ·benefits to all women who had 
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we 
would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny 
might be appropriate under either the penalty jlntftysis or. the analysis we 
have applied in our previous abortion decisions. · But -the claim here is 
that the State "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by 
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro al).d Maricopa County did not hold that 
States would penalize the right to. travel interstate by refusing to pay 
the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no support in the right 
to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a compelling inter-
est for its decision not to fund elective abortions. 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), similarly is inapplicable here. 
In addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of 
a constitutionally unposed "governmental obligation of neutrality" origi-
nating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the Fir~t 
Amendment, ld,, at 409, 
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of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.0 
Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts 
to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to en-
courage actions deemed to be in the public interest is neces-
sarily far broader. 
This distinction is implicit in two cases cited in Roe in sup-
port of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), 
involved a Nebraska law ma:king it criminal to teach 
foreign languages to children who had not passed the 
eighth grade. ld., at 396-397. Nebraska's imposition of 
a criminal sanction on the providers of desired services 
makes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the 
constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted under 
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to 
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct 
0 In Buckley v. V aleo, 424 U. S. 1 ( 1976), we drew this distinction in 
sustaining the public financing of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to 
others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party 
of Texa8 v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on 
access t() the electoral process : 
"These cases, however, dealt primarily w1th state laws requiring a 
candidate to satiSfy certam rcqmrements in order to have his name appear 
on thr ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the 
candidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice 
preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues. 
In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Pl'esidential candidates 
is not restrictive of voters' right and less restrictive of candidates'. 
Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate !rom getting on the ballot or 
any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice ; the inability, 
:J any, of minonty party ca11didatu to wage effective campaigru will 
derive not from lack of public fu11ding but from their inability to rai8e 
pn·vate contribution.!. Any disadvantages suffered by operation of the 
~ligibility formulae under Subt1tle H is thus limited to the claimed denial 
of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electorate 
that the formulae afford eligible candidates" /d ., at 94-95 (emphasis 
J.dded) (footnote omitted). 
f r 
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their children" were "within the liberty of the Amendment." 
ld., at 400. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 
(1925), the Court relied on Meyer to invalidate an Oregon 
criminal law requiring the parent or guardian of a child to 
send him to a public school, thus precluding the choice of a 
private school. Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment's 
concept of liberty "excludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction 
from public teachers only," the Court held that the law "un-
reasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guard-
ians to direct the upbringing and education of children under 
' , 
· their control." /d., at 534-535. 
Both cases invalidated substantial restrictions on con-
stitutionally protected liberty interests: in Meyer, the parent's 
right to have his child taught a particular foreign language; 
in Pierce, the parent's right to choose private rather than 
public school education. · But neither case denied to a State 
· the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action. 
'.Indeed, in Meyer the Court was careful to state that the 
power of the State "to prescribe a curriculum" that included 
English and excluded German in its free public schools "is 
not questioned." 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts 
no shadow over a State's power to favor public education 
by funding itr-a policy choice pursued in some States for 
more than a century. See Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U. S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954). Indeed, in Norwood v. Har-
rison, 413 U. S. 455, 462 (1973), we explicitly rejected the 
argument that Pierce established a "right of private or paro-
chial schools to share with public schools in state largesse/' 
noting that" [i] t is one thing to say that a State may not pro-
hibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to 
say that such schools must, as a matter of equal protection, 
receive state aid." Yet, were we to accept appellees' argu-
ment, an indigent parent could challenge the state policy of 
favoring public rather than private schools, or of preferring 
li 
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instruction in English rather than German, on grounds identi-
cal in principle to those advanced here. We think it abundantly 
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest 
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more than 
a State must so justify its election to fund public but not 
private education.10 
D 
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation 
can be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality 
t hat applies in the absence of a suspect classification or the 
impingement of a fundamental right. This test requires that 
the distinction drawn between childbirth and nontherapeutic 
abortion by the regulation be "rationally related" to a "con-
stitutionally permissible" purpose. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 
U. S. 56, 74 (1972); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. 
Murgia, 427 U. S., at 314. We hold that the Connecticut 
fu nding scheme satisfies this standard. 
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong inter-
est in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest 
exists throughout the pregnancy, "gruw[ing] in substantiality 
as the woman approaches term." Roe, supra, at 162-163. Be-
cause the pregnant woman carries a potential human being, 
she "cannot be isolated in her privacy o o 0 o [Her] privacy 
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must 
be measured accordingly." Id., at 159. The State unques-
t ionably has a "strong and legitimate interest in encouraging 
normal childbirth," Beal v. Doe, ante, at - , an interest 
10 MR .. JusTICE BRENNAN's reliance on Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 
106 ( 1976), to refute t h1s conclusion is misplaced. The principal 
question in Singleton was the standing of doctors to assert the rights 
of thei r patient~ m a challenge to a Missouri medicaid statute similar to 
the one at 1ssue here. T lw language quoted by MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, 
post, nt 4-5, hnd not hing to do with the underlying question of the con-
st itutionality of the ::;tatutl.'. As MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN was careful 
to note at the beginning of his opinion in Singleton, the case presented 





honored over the centuries.11 Nor can there be any question 
that the Connecticut regulation rationally furthers that in· 
terest. The medical costs associated with childbirth are sub-
stantial, and have increased significantly in recent years. As 
recognized by the District Court in this case, such costs are 
significantly greater than those normally associated with elec. 
tive abortions during the first trimester. The subsidizing of 
costs incident to childbirth is a rational means of encouraging 
childbirth. 
We certainly are not unsympathetic to the plight of an 
'indigent woman who desires an abortion, but "the Constitution 
does not provide judicial remedies for every social and eco-
nomic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S., at 74. Our cases 
uniformly have accorded the States a wider latitude in choos· 
ing among competing demands for limited public funds. 12 In 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 ( 1970), despite recog-
nition that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds in-
volve "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human 
beings," we held that classifications survive equat protection 
challenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is 
shown. As the preceding discussion makes clear, the state 
interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this mini-
mal level. 
· The decision whether to expend state funds for nonthera-
peutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value 
over which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that 
the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a 
u In addition to the direct interest in protecting the fetus, a State may 
have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth. 
Such concerns are basic to ' the future of the·· State .. and. in some circum-
stances could constitute a substantial reason for. departure from a position 
of ncutraltiy between abortion and childbirth. 
12 See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection 
Clause, and The Three Faces of' Constitutj9nal ·Equality, ·61 Va~· J.dl~v. 
945~· 998-1017 (1975). 
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weighing of its wisdom or social desirability, for this Court 
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise, 
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of 
thought." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488 
(1955), quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 484. In-
deed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as 
those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abor-
tions, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democ-
racy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legisla-
tures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of 
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." Missouri, 
Kansas and Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 270 (1904) 
(Holmes, J.). 
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does not 
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It 
is open to Congress to require provision of medicaid benefits 
for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the 
medicaid program. Also, under Title XIX as col1strued in 
Beal v. Doe, ante, Connecticut is free-through normal demo~ 
cratic processes-to decide that such benefits should be 
provided. We hold only that the Constitution does not re-
quire a judicially imposed resolution of these difficult issues. 
IV 
The District Court also invalidated Connecticut's require-
ments of prior written request by the pregnant woman and 
prior authorization by the Department of Social Services. 
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted 
invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not un-
reasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of 
medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only 
for authorized purposes. The simple answer to the argument 
that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical 
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termi-
n.a.tiQn Qf a potential human life. In Planned Parenthood oi 
I / 
I 
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~Missouri v. Danforth, supra, we held that the woman's 
written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible bur-
den under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the 
similar issue here. 
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
~ (,c,r ~ ·-~-t o ~r!fli.t, ·C!. 
~~4 "" J). f ~ 
:ro: The Chief 1r! ... , 
~~: 1:;1f: l. '~P ~t 
Mr. 1fft."e M rshal 1 
Mr. Juut'0e Bl,~k un 
Mr. Jun~'0o Povsl' 
Hr. :u .. t•ce ~ '·'"'qllst 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: Mr. Justice Brennan 
Srd DRAFT Circulated: _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATI!IIR· 'irculated: ~ 11-).1.1 
No. 7&-1440 
Edward W. Maher, Commissioner 
of Social Services of Connecticut, On Appeal from the 
United States District Appellant, 
Court for the District v. of Connecticut. 
Susan Roe et al. 
[May -, 1977] 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JusTICE MAR~ 
SHALL and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting. 
The District Court held: 
"When Connecticut refuses to fund elective abortions 
while funding therapeutic abortions and prenatal and 
postnatal care, it weights the choice of the pregnant 
mother against choosing to exercise her constitutionally 
protected right to an elective abortion. . . . Her choice 
is affected not simply by the absence of payment for the 
abortion, but by the availability of public funds for child-
birth if she chooses not to have the abortion. When the 
state thus infringes upon a fundamental interest, it must 
assert a compelling state interest." 408 F. Supp. 660, 
663-664 (1975) . 
This Court reverses on the ground that "the District Court 
misconceived the nature and scope of the fundamental right 
recognized in Roe [ v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 ( 1973) ]," ante, at 7, 
and therefore that Connecticut was not required to meet the 
"compelling interest" test to justify its discrimination against 
elective abortion but only "the less demanding test of ration-
ality that applies in the absence of . . . the infringement of a 
fundamental right," ante, at 13. This holding, the Court 
insists, "places no obstacles-absolute or otherwise-in the 
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to finance the abortion from "private sources.". Ante, at 9. 
True, "the state may [by funding childbirth] have made 
childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing 
the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on 
access to abortions that was not already there." Ilnd. True, 
also, indigency "may make it more difficultr-and in some 
cases, perhaps impossible--for some women to have abor-
tions," but that regrettable consequence "is neither created 
nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation." 
Ante, at 9-10. 
But a distressing insensitivity to the plight of impoverished 
pregnant women is inherent in the Court's analysis. The 
stark reality for too many, not just "some," indigent pregnant 
women is that indigency makes access to competent licensed 
physicians not merely "difficult" but "impossible." As a 
practical matter, many indigent women will feel they have 
no choice but to carry their pregnancies to term because the 
State will pay for the associated medical services, even though 
they would have chosen to have abortions if the State had 
also provided funds for that procedure, or indeed if the State 
had provided funds for neither procedure. This disparity 
in funding by the State clearly operates to coerce indigent 
pregnant women to bear children they would not otherwise 
choose to have, and just as clearly, this coercion can only 
operate upon the poor, who are uniquely the victims of this 
form of financial pressure. AeeurdinglYJ, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's words are apt: 
"To sanction such a ruthless consequence, inevitably 
resulting from a money hurdle erected by the State, would 
justify a latter-day Anatole France to add one more item 
to his ironic comments on the 'majestic equality' of the 
law. 'The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich 
as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the 
streets,. and to steal bread' .... " Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U. S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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None can take seriously the Court's assurance that its 11con .. 
clusion signals no retreat from Roe [ v. Wade] or the cases 
applying it," ante, at 10. That statement must occasion great 
surprise among the Courts of Appeals and District Courts 
that, relying upon Roe and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 
( 1973), have held that Sta.tes are constitutionally required 
to fund elective abortions if they fund pregnancies carried to 
term. See Doe v. Rose, 499 F. 2d 1112 (CA10 1974); Wulff 
v. Singleton, 508 F. 2d 1211 (CAS 1974) , rev'd and rem. on 
other grounds sub nom. SingLeton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 
(1976); Doe v. Westby, 383 F. Supp. 1143 (SD 1974), rem. 
in light of Hagans v. Lavine, sub nom. West by v. Doe, 420 
U. S. 968 (1975) , dec. on rem. 402 F. Supp. 140 (SD 1975); 
Doe v. Wohlegmuth, 376 F. Supp. 173 (WD Pa. 1973), aff'd 
on statutory grounds sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523 F. 2d 611 
(CA3 1975) , rev'd- U.S.- (1977) ;Doe v. Rampton, 366 
F. Supp. 189 (Utah 1973); Klein v. Nassau County Medical 
Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (EDNY 1972); rem. in light of 
Wade and Bolton, 412 U. S. 924 (1973) , dec. on rem., 409 
F. Supp. 731 (EDNY 1976). Indeed, it cannot be gainsaid 
that today's decision seriously erodes the principles that Roe 
-¥. H'ut1e and)1e ~·e~eey announced to guide the determina-
tion of what constitutes an unconstitutional infringement of 
the fundamental right of pregnant women to be free to decide 
whether to have an abortion. 
The Court's premise is that only an equal protection claim is 
presented here. Claims of interference with enjoyment of 
fundamental rights have, however, occupied a rather protean 
position in our constitutional jurisprudence. Whether or not 
the Court's analysis may reasonably proceed under the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Court plainly errs in ignoring, as it 
does, the unanswerable argument of appellee, and holding of 
the District Court, that the regulation unconstitutionally im-
pinges upon her claim of privacy derived from the Due 
Process Clause. 
Roe v. Wade and cases following it hold that an area of 
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privacy invulnerable to the State's intrusion surrounds the 
decision of a pregnant woman whether or not to carry her 
pregnancy to term. The Connecticut scheme clearly infringes 
upon that area of privacy by bringing financial pressures on 
indigent women that force them to bear children they would 
not otherwise have. That is an obvious impairment of the 
fundamental right established by Roe. Yet the Court con-
cludes that "the Connecticut regulation does not impinge 
upon [that] fundamental right." Ante, at 10. This conclu-
sion is based on a perceived distinction, on the one hand, be-
tween the imposition of criminal penalties for the procure-
ment of an abortion present in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton 
and the absolute prohibition present in Planned Parenthood 
of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 ( 1976), and, on the 
other, the assertedly lesser inhibition imposed by the Con-
necticut scheme. Ante, at 8-10. 
The last time our Brother PowELL espoused the con-
cept in an abortion case that "there is a basic difference be- f 
tween direct State interference with a protected activity and 
State encouragement of an alternative activity concurrent 
with legisla.tive policy," ante, at 10-11, the Court refused to 
adopt it. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 122 (1976). This 
was made explicit in Part II of our Brother BLACKMUN's 
opinion for four of us and is implicit in our Brother STEVENS' 
essential agreement with the analysis of Part II-B. !d., at 
121-122 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part). Part II-B stated, 
"MR. JusTICE PowELL would so limit Doe and the other 
cases cited, explaining them as cases in which the State 
'directly interfered with the abortion decision' and 
'directly interdicted the normal functioning of the 
physician-patient relationship by criminalizing certain 
procedures' [ 428 U. S.], at 128. There is no support in 
the language of the cited cases for this distinction .... 
Moreover, a 'direct interference' or 'interdiction' test does 
not appear to be supported by precedent . . . . For a 
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doctor who cannot afford to work for nothing, and a 
woman who cannot a.fford to pay him, the state's refusal 
to fund an abortion is as effective an 'interdiction' of it 
as would ever be necessary. Furthermore, since the 
right ... is not simply the right to have abortions non-
discrimina.torily funded, the denial of such funding is as 
complete an 'interdiction' of the exercise of the right as 
could ever exist." /d., at 118 n. 7. 
We have also rejected this approach in other abortion 
cases. Doe v. Bolton, the companion to Roe, in addition to 
striking down the Georgia criminal prohibition against elec-
tive abortions, struck down the procedural requirements of 
certification of hospitals, of approval by a hospital committee, 
and of concurrence in the abortion decision by two doctorp 
other than the woman's own doctor. None of these req~­
ments operated as an absolute bar to elective abortions in 
the manner of the criminal prohibitions present in the other 
aspect of the case or in Roe, but this was not sufficient to 
save them from unconstitutionality. In Planned Parent-
hood, supra, we struck down a requirement for spousal consent 
to an elective abortion which the Court characterizes today 
simply as an "absolute obstacle" to a woman obtaining an 
abortion. Ante, at 8. But the obstacle was "absolute" only 
in the limited sense that a woman who was unable to 
persuade her spouse to agree to an elective abortion was 
prevented from obtaining one. Any woman whose husband 
agreed, or could be persuaded to agree, was free to obtain 
an abortion, and the State never imposed directly any pro-
hibition of its own. This requirement was qualitatively 
ea:,s 8@ E!8Inf5dtaele, et!b 11e M:6;8P~Rsls88 fs~8S it WM8QPiiti 
different from the criminal statutes that the Court 
today says are comparable, but we nevertheless found it 
unconstitutional. 
Most recently, also in a privacy case, the Court squarely 
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that an infringement upon that right must be justified by 
a compelling state interest. Carey v. Population Service3 
International,- U. S.- (1977). That case struck down 
:in its entirety a New York law forbidding the sale of con~ 
traceptives to minors under 16 years old, limiting persons who 
could sell contraceptives to pharmacists, and forbidding ad-
vertisement and display of contraceptives. There was no 
New York law forbidding use of contraceptives by anyone, 
including minors under 16, and therefore no "ab~olute" pro-
hibition against the exercise of the fundamental right. Never-
theless the statute was declared unconstitutional as a burden 
on the right to privacy. In words that apply fully to Con-
necticut's sta,tute, and that could hardly be more explicit, 
Carey stated, "'Compelling' is of course the key word; where 
a decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget 
a child is involved, regula,tions imposing a burden on it may 
be justified only by compelling state interests, and must be 
narrowly drawn to express only those interests." !d., at-. 
Carey relied specifically upon Roe, Doe, and Planned Parent-
hood, and interpreted them in a way flatly inconsistent with 
the Court's interpretation today: "The significance of these 
cases is that they establish that the same test must be applied 
to state regulations that burden an individual's right to 
decide to prevent contraception or terminate pregnancy by 
substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating that 
decision as is applied to state statutes that prohibit the decision 
entirely." !d., at-. 
Finally, cases involving other fundamental rights also make 
clear that the Court's concept of what constitutes an impermis-
sible infringement upon the fundamental right of a pregnant 
woman to choose to have an abortion makes new law. We 
have repeatedly found that infringements of fundamental 
rights are not limited to outright denials of those rights. 
First Amendment decisions have consistently held in a wide 
variety of contexts that the compelling state interest test is 
~~"f tA· ~. G tP 
(rcf,-i). 
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ttpplicable not only to outright denials but also to restraints 
that make exercise of those rights more difficult. See, e. g., 
$herbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963) (free exercise of 
religion), NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 ( 1963) (freedom 
of expression and association), Linmark Associates v. Towr~r 
8hip of Willingboro, - U. S. - ( 1977) (freedom of expres-
sion). The compelling state interest test has been applied 
in voting cases, even where only relatively small infringements 
upon voting power, such as dilution of voting strength caused 
b mala ortionment, have been involved. See, e. g., Reyr~r 
olds v. Sims, , 562, 566 (1964), Chapman v. Meier, 420 
U.S. 1 (1975 , Connor v. Finch,- U.S.- (1977). Sim-
ilarly, cases involving the right to travel have consistently held 
that statutes penalizing the fundamental right to travel must 
pass muster under the compelling state interest test, irrespec-
tive of whether the statutes act.ually deter travel. Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 257-258 (1974), 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-341 (1972), Shapiro v. 
Thompson,J~ And indigents asserting a fundamental 
right of access to the courts have been excused payment of 
entry costs without being required first to show that their in- h J 
digency was an absolute bar to access. Griffin v. Illinois, A 3rl (t(..• • ll.-
Milf'l"lil' Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), Boddie v. C f4J"') 
Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971). 1 
Until today, I had not thought the nature of the funda-
mental right established in Roe was open to question, let 
a.lone susceptible to the interpreta.tion advanced by the Court. 
The fact that the Connecticut scheme may not operate as 
an absolute bar preventing all indigent women from having 
abortions is not critical. What is critical is that the State 
has inhibited their fundamental right to make that choice 
-') .fee from state interference. 
Nor does the manner in which Connecticut has burdened 
the right freely to choose to have an abortion save its Medic-
aid program. The Connecticut scheme cannot be distin• 
f I 
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guished from other grants and withholdings of financial \ 
benefits that we have held unconstitutionally burdened a. 
fundamental right. Sherbert v. Verner, supra, struck down 
a South Carolina statute that denied unemployment com-
pensation to a woman who for religious reasons could not 
work on Saturday, but that would have provided such com- \ 
pensation if her unemployment had stemmed from a number 
of other nonreligious causes. Even though there was no proof 
of indigency in that case, Sherbert held that "the pressure upon 
her to forgo [her religious] practice [was] unmistakable," 374 
U. S., at 414, and therefore held the effect was the same as a 
fine imposed for Saturday worship. Here, though the burden 
is upon the right to privacy derived from the Due Process 
Clause and not upon freedom of religion under the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the governing prin-
ciple is the same, for Connecticut grants and withholds 
financial benefits in a manner that discourages significantly 
the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right. Indeed, 
the case for applica.tion of the principle actua.lly is stronger 
than in Verner since appellees are all indigents and therefore 
even more vulnerable to the financial pressures imposed by 
the Connecticut regulations. 
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976), held, and the 
Court today agrees, ante, at 8, that a state requirement is 
unconstitutional if it "unduly burdens the right to seek an 
abortion." Connecticut has "unduly" burdened the funda-
mental right of pregnant women to be free to choose to have 
an abortion because the State has advanced no compelling 
state interest to justify its interference in that choice. 
Although Connecticut does not argue it as justification, the 
Court concludes tha.t the State's interest "in protecting the 
potential life of the fetus" suffices, ante, at 13. * Since only the 
*The Court also suggests, ante, at 13 n. 10, that a "state may have legiti-
mate demographic concerns about the rate of population growth" which 
might ju tify a choice to favor live births over abortions. While it is 
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first trimester of pregnancy is involved in this case, that justi. 
fication is totally foreclosed if the Court is not overruling 
the holding of Roe v. Wade that "[w]ith respect to the State's 
important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'com~ 
pelling point is at viability.'' occurring at about the end of the 
second trimester. 410 U. S., at 163. The State also argues a 
further justification not relied upon by the Court, namely, 
that it needs "to control the amount of its limited public funds 
which will be allocated to its public welfare budget." Brief, 
p, 23. The District Court correctly held, however, that the 
asserted interest was "wholly chimerical" because the "state's 
assertion that it saves money when it declines to pay the cost 
of a welfare mother's abortion is simply contrary to indisputed 
facts." 408 F. Supp., at 664. 
Finally, the reasons that render the Connecticut regulation 
unconstitutional also render invalid in my view the require-
ment of a prior written certification by the woman's attending 
physician that the abortion is "medically necessary," and the 
requirement that the hospital submit a Request for Authori-
zation of Professional Services including a "statement indi-
cating the medical need for the abortion." Appellees Brief, 
p. 203. For the same reasons. I would also strike down the 
requirement for prior authorization of payment by the 
Connecticut Department of Social Services. 
conceivable that under some circumstances this might be an appropriate 
. factor to be considered as part of a Statf''s "compelling" interest, no one 
contends that this is the case here, or indeed that Connecticut has any 
demographic concerns at all about the rate of its population growth. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
I~ Beal v. Doe, ante, at -, we hold today thfl.t Title XIX 
of the Social Sepurity Act does not requ\re ~~~ fup~ing of 
nontheraputic abortions ~a ·condition of paryicipation in the 
joint federal-state mediQaid program established by tha~ 
statute. In this case, as "' result of our decision in Beal, we 
mm~t decide whether the Constitution requires ~ participating 
State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pa)'eJ for 
childbirth. 
I 
A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits 
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abor~ions 1 to .thoee 
that are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psy-
chiatric necessity. Connecticut .Welfare Department, Public 
Assistance ·Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275.2 Connecti-
1 Th& procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are net 
!Challenged here. 
2 Section 275 provides in relevant part: 
"The Department makes payment for abortion services under tlae 
Medical Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions 
are met: 
1
' 1. In the opinion of the attending physician the abortion is medi· · 
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cut enforces this limitation through a system of prior au-
thorization from its Department of Social Services. In 
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion, 
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed 
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the pa-
tient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medi-
cally necessary. 
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation 
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of 
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent 
women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of 
medical necessity.3 In a complaint filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged 
the regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements of 
oally necessary. The term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric 
necessity. 
"2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or 
licensed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy .... 
"3. The written request for tne abortion is submitted by the patient,. 
and in the case of a minor, from the parent or guardian. 
"4. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of 
Medical Services, Division of Health Services, Department of Social 
Services." 
See n. 4, infra. 
:! At the time this action was filed, Mary Poe, a 16-year-old high school 
junior, had already obtained an abortion at a Connecticut hospital. 
Apparently because of Poe"s inability to obtain a certificate of medical 
necessity, the hospital was denied reimbursement by the Department of 
Social Services. As a result, Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital 
bill of $244. Susan Roe, an unwed mother of three children, was unable 
to obtain an abortjon because of her physician's refusal to certify that the 
procedure was medically necessary. By consent, a temporary restraining 
order was entered by the Distrid Court enjoining the Connecticut officials 
from refusi ng to pay for Roe's abortion. After the remand from the Court 
of Appeals, the District Court issued temporary restraining orders covering 
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Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C: §' 1396 et seq., 
and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal 
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation 
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act pro-
hibited the funding of abortions that were not medically 
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain 
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation, 
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only 
allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also re-
quired it. Roe v. Norton, 380'F. Shpp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for · the Second Circuit read the 
Social Security Act to allow; but not to require, state funding 
of such abortions. 522 F. 2d' 928 (CA2 1975). Upon re-
mand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in 
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened. 
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F. 
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975). 
Although it found no independent constitutional right to 
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the 
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeu-
tic abortions from a state welfare program that generally sub-
sidizes the medical expenses incident to pregnancy and child-
birth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 
113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) , the view 
that "abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive 
moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are 
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with preg-. 
nancy . ... " 408 F. Supp., at 663 n. 3. Relying also on 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the court 
held that the Connecticut program "weights the choice of the 
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitu-
tionally protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion and 
tl.thus infringes upon a fundamental interest." 408 F. Supp., 
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at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this 
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be 
"wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive 
medical response to a pregnancy." !d., at 664 (footnote 
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed 
constitutionally irrelevant: 
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type 
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it 
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To 
sanction such a justification would be to permit dis-
crimination against those seeking to exercise a constitu-
tional right on the basis that the state simply does not 
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid. 
The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the 
certificate of medical necessity for medicaid-funded abortions.4 
The court also struck down the related requirements of prior 
written request by the pregnant woman and prior authoriza-
tion by the Department of Social Services, holding that the 
State could not impose any requirements on medicaid pay-
ments for abortions that are not "equally applicable to medic-
aid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or require-
4 The District Court's judgment and order, entered on January 16, 1976, 
were not stayed. On January 26, 1976, the Department of Socia.! Services 
revised § 275 to allow reimbursement for nontherapeutic abortions without 
prior authorization or consent. The fact that this revision was ma.de retro-
active to January 16, 1976, suggests that the revision was made only for 
the purpose of interim compliance with the District Court's judgment and 
order, which were entered the same date. No suggestion of mootness has 
been made by any of the parties, and this appeal was taken an,d submitted 
on the theory that Connecticut desires to reinstate the invalidated regula-
tion. Under these circumstances, the subsequent revision of the regulation 
does not, render the case moot. In any event, there would remain the 
denial of reimbursement to Mary Poe, and similarly situated members of 
the class, under the prerevision regulation. See 380 F. Supp., at 730 n. 3. 
The State has asserted no Eleventh Amendment defense to this relief 
sought by Poe and those whom she represents. 
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ments tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion 
or to delay the occurrence of an abortion that she has asked 
her physician to perform." !d., at 665. We noted probable 
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Connecticut 
regulation. 428 U. S. 908 (1976). 
II 
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to 
pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent wo-
mell, or indeed to pay any of the medical expellses of indi-
gents."' But when a State decides to alleviate some of the 
hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner 
in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limi-
tations. Appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord 
equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and may not 
evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical 
expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classi-
fications established by the Connecticut regulation presents a 
question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysis 
of such a claim is well-settled: 
"We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] oper-
6 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), cited by appellees, is 
not to the contrary. There the Court invalidated under the Due Process 
Clause "certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, in-
cluding requirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of 
process" restricting the ability of indigent persons to bring an action for 
divorce. Id., at 372. The Court held that : 
" [G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's 
hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the 
means for legally dissolving this relationship, due process does prohibit a 
State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts 
to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages." /d., at 374. 
Because Connecticut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for 
terminating pregnancies through abortion the present case is easily dis-
tinguished from Boddie. See also United States v. Kras, 409 U, S, 434 
(1973) ; Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656 (1973) , 
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ates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or im-
pinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly. 
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict 
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme 
must still be examined to determine whether it rationally 
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and 
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimina-
tion .... " San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 u. s. 1, 17 (1973). 
Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); Applying this analysis here, 
we think the District Court erred in holding that the Con-
necticut regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A 
This case involves no discrimination against a suspect class. 
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within 
the limited category of disadvantaged classes so recognized by 
our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of the regula-
tion falls upon those who cannot pay lead to a different con-
clusion. In a sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent 
creates a wealth classification a~ compared to nonindigents 
who are able to pay for the desired goods or services. But this 
Court has never he~d that financial need alone identifies a sus-
pect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rod-
riguez, supra, at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 
( 1970) .() Accordingly, the central question, in this case is 
()In cases such as Griffin v. !Uinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956) and Douglw v. 
California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), the Court held that the Equal Protec-· 
tion Clause requires States that allow appellate review of criminal convic-
tions to provide indigent defendants with trial transcripts and appellate· 
counsel. These cases are grounded in the criminal justice system, a gov-
ernmental monopoly in which participation is compelled. Cf. n. 5, supra. 
Our subsequent decisions have made it clear that the principles underlying 
Gril[tn and Doug,las dQ nQt exte.nd to legislati.ve classifications generally_ 
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whether the regulation "impinges upon a fundamental right 
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution." The 
District Court read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, s-upra, and 
the subsequent cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental 
right to abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less 
than a compelling state interest would justify Connecticut's 
different treatment of abortion and childbirth. We think the 
District Court misconceived the nature and scope of the 
fundamental right recognized in Roe. 
B 
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a Texas law 
making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abor-
tion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the 
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases 
restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and 
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that 
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty 
affords constitutional protection against state interference 
with certain aspects of an individual's personal "privacy," 
including a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.7 
410 U. S., at 153. 
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on 
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed 
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety 
of the desired service. As MR. JusTICE STEWART observed, 
"it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of a 
constitutional freedom .... " /d., at 170 (STEWART, J., con-
curring). We held that only a compelling state interest would 
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally pro-
1 A woman has at least an equal right to choose to ca,rry her fetus to 
term as to choose to abort it. Indeed, the right of procreation without 
state interferel?ce has long been recognized as "one of the basic civil rights 
of man . . . fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942). 
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tected interest, and we found no such state interest during 
the first trimester. Even when judged against . this demand-
ing standard, however, the State's dual interests in the health 
of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were 
deemed sufficient to justify substantial regulation of abor-
tions in the second and third' trimesters. "These interests 
are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as 
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, 
each becomes 'compelling.'" /d., at 162-163. In the second 
trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant 
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that 
concern. /d., at 163. At viability, usually in the third tri-
mester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus 
justifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the 
life or health of the mother is threatened. /d., at 163-164. 
The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible 
interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate 
her pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated 
other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in 
effect, on the woman's freedom of choice. Thus, in Planned 
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 70-71, 
n. 11 ( 1976), we held that Missouri's requirement of spousal 
consent was unconstitutional because it "granted [the hus-
band] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever 
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's de-
cision to terminate her pregnancy.'' Missouri had interposed 
an "absolute obstacle to a woman's decision that Roe held 
to be constitutionally protected from such interference." 
(Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need 
not be abwlute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra. 
Carey v. Population Services International, - U. S. -
( 1977) , we have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion 
"is not constitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek 
an abortion.' ' Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976). 
We recognized in Bellotti that "not all distihction between 
abortion and other procedures is forbidden" and that "[t]he 
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oonstitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its 
degree and the justification for it." Id., at 149-150. We 
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massa-
chusetts statute regulating a minor's access to an abortion 
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine 
whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the 
minor's decision or the less burdensome requirement of 
parental consultation. 
These cases recognize a constitutionally protected interest 
"in making certain kinds of important decisions" free from 
governmental compulsion. Whalen v. Roe, - U. S. --
-,and nn. 24 and 26 (1977). As Whalen makes clear, the 
,right in Roe v. Wade can be understood only by considering 
both the woman's interest and the nature of the State's inter-
ference with it. Ro~ did not declare an unqualified "constitu-
tional right to an abortion," as the District Court seemed to 
think. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly 
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether 
to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the 
authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring child-
birth over abortion , and to implement that judgment by the 
allocation of public funds. 
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind 
from the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions. 
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or 
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. 
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no dis-
advantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund 
childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private 
sources for the service she desires. The State may have 
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby in-
fluencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no re-
striction on access to abortions that was not already there. 
The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases, 
perhaps, impossible- for some women to have abortions is 
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neither created nor in any way affected , by the Connecticut 
regulation.. We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does 
not impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe.8 
c 
Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases 
applying it. There is a basic difference between direct state 
interference with a protected activity and·state encouragement 
a Appellees rely .on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and 
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974). In 
those cases durational residence requirements for the receipt of public 
benefits were found to be unconstitutional because they "penalized" the 
exercise of the constitutional right to travel'interstate. 
Appellees' reliance on the penalty analysis of Shapiro and Maricopa 
County is misplaced. In our view there is only a semantic difference 
between appellees' assertion that the Connecticut law unduly inter-
feres with a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy and their as-
asertion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most 
familiar to the criminal law, where criminal· sanctions are imposed as a 
consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recog-
nized that denial of welfare to one who had· recently exercised the right to 
travel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to 
justify strict judicial scrutiny. 
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to aU women who had 
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we 
would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny 
might be appropriate under either the penalty analysis or the analysis we 
have applied in our previous abortion decisions. But the claim here is 
that the State "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by 
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that 
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay 
the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no support in the right. 
to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a compelling inter-
est for its decision not to fund elective abortions. 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S, 398 (1963), similarly is inapplicable here, 
In addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of 
a constitutionally imposed "governmental obligation of neutrality" origi-
nating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment. Id.1 at 409 .. 
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of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.11 
Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts 
to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to en-
courage actions deemed to be in the public interest is neces-
sarily far broader. 
This distinction i8 implicit in two cases cited in Roe in sup-
pbrt of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), 
involved a Nebraska law ma:king it criminal to teach 
foreign languages to children who had not passed the 
eighth grade. ld., at 39&-397. Nebraska's imposition of 
a criminal sanction on the providers of desired services 
makes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the 
constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted under 
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to 
Wach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct 
11 In Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1 (1976), we drew this distinction in 
sustaining the public financing of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1~71. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to 
others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party 
of TexM v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on 
access to the electoral process: 
"These cases, however, dealt primarily with state laws requiring a 
candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear 
on the ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the 
candidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice 
preferences regarding represen~ative government and contemporary issues. 
In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates 
is not restrictive of voters' right and less restrictive of candidates'. 
Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot or 
any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice; the inability, 
if any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaigns will 
de'rive not from lack of public funding but from their inability to raise 
private contributions. Any disadvantages suffered by operation of the 
eligibility formulae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denial 
of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electorate 
,that the formulae afford eligible candidates." I d., at 94-95 (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted) . 
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cal in principle to those advanced here. We think it abundantly 
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest 
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more than 
a State must so justify its election to fund public but not 
private education/0 
D 
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation 
can be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality 
that applies in the absence of a suspect classification or the 
impingement of a fundamental right. This test requires that 
the distinction drawn between childbirth and nontherapeutic 
abortion by the regulation be "rationally related" to a "con-
stitutionally permissible" purpose. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 
U. S. 56, 74 (1972); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. 
Murgia, 427 U. S., at 314. We hold that the Connecticut 
funding scheme satisfies this standard. 
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong inter-
est in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest 
exists throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality 
10 In his dissenting opinion, MR. JusTICE BRENNAN rejects the distinction 
betwren direct state interference with a protected activity and state en-
couragement of an alternative activity and argues that our previous abor-
tion decisions are inconsistent with today's decision. But as stated above, 
all of those decisions involved laws that placed substantial state-created 
obstacles in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. Our recent deci-
sion in Carey v. Population Services International,- U.S.- (1977), 
differs only in that it involved state-created restrictions on access to con-
traceptives, rather than abortions. MR. JusTICE BRENNAN simply asserts 
that the Connecticut regulation "is an obvious impairment of the funda-
mental right established in Roe." Post, at -. The only suggested 
source for this purportedly "obvious" conclusion is a quotation from 
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976). Yet, as MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN 
was careful to note at the beginning of his opinion in Singleton, that case 
presented "issues [of standing] not going to the merits of this dispute." 
428 U. S., at 108. Significantly, MR. JusTICE BRENNAN makes no effort 
to distinguish or explain the much more analogous authority of Norwood v. 
Harrison, supra. · 
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as the woman approaches term." Roe, supra, at 162-163. Be-
cause the pregnant woman carries a potential human being, 
she "cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . . [Her] privacy 
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must 
be measured accordingly." /d., at 159. The State unques-
tionably has a "strong and legitimate interest in encouraging 
normfl,l childbirth," Beal v. Doe, ante, at -, an interest 
honored over the centuries.11 Nor can there be any question 
that the Connecticut regulation rationally furthers that in-
terest. The medical costs associated with childbirth are sub-
stantial, and have increased significantly in recent years. As 
recognized by the District Court in this case, such costs are 
significantly greater than those normally associated with elec-
tive abortions during the first trimester. The subsidizing of. 
costs incident to childbirth is a rational means of encouraging 
chiJdbirth. · 
We certainly are not unsympathetic to the plight of an 
indigent woman who desires an abortion, but "the Constitution 
does not provide judicial remedies for every social and eco-
nomic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S., at 74. Our cases 
uniformly have accorded the States a wider latitude in choos-
ing among competing demands for limited public funds.12 In 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970), despite recog-
nition that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds in-
volve "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human 
beings," we held that classifications survive equal protection 
cha.llenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is 
sh~wn. As the preceding discussion makes clear, the state 
11 In addition to the direct interest in protecting the fetus, a State may. 
have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth. 
Such concerns are basic to the future of the State and in some circum-
stances could constitute a substantial reason for departm:e from a position 
of neutraltiy between abortion and childbirth. 
12 See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection 
Clause, and The Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 
945, 998-1017 (1975). 
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interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this mini-
mal level. 
The decision whether to expend state funds for nonthera-
peutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value 
over which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that 
the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a · 
weighing of its wisdom or social desirability, for this Court 
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise, 
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of 
thought." Williamson v. Lee Op,tical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488 
(1955), quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 484. In-
deed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as 
those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abor-
tions, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democ-
racy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legisla-
tures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of 
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." Missouri, 
Kansas and Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 270 (1904) 
(Holmes, J.) .13 
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does not 
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It 
is open to Congress to require provision of medicaid benefits 
for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the 
medicaid program. Also, under Title XIX as construed in 
Beal v. Doe, ante, Connecticut is free-through normal demo-
cratic processes-to decide that such benefits should be 
provided. We hold only that the Constitution does not re-
quire a judicially imposed resolution of these difficult issues. 
IV 
The District Court also invalidated Connecticut's require-
ments of prior written request by the pregnant woman and 
1a Much of the rhetoric of the three dissenting opinions would be equally 
applicable if Connecticut had elected not to fund either abortions or child-
birth. Yet none of the dissents goes so far as to argue that the Constitu-
tion requires such asistance for all indigent pregnant women. 
. - -
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prior authorization by the Department of Social Service:s, 
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted 
invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not un-
reasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of 
medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only 
for authorized purposes. The simple answer to the argument 
that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical 
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termi-
nation of a potential human life. In Planned Parenthood of 
Missouri v. Danforth, supra, we held that the woman's 
written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible bur-
den under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the 
similar issue here. 
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Real v. Doe, ante, at-, we hold today that Title XIX 
of the Social Security Act does not · require the funding of 
nontheraputic abortions as a condition of participation in the 
joint federal-state medicaid program established by that 
statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in Real, we 
must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating 
State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for 
childbirth. 
I 
A regulation of the Connecti~ut Welfare Department limits 
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions l. to those 
that are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psy-
chiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare Department, Public 
Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275.2 Connecti-
1 The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not 
challenged here. 
:Section 275 provides in relevant part: 
"The Department makes payment for abortion services under the 
MC"dical Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions 
are met: 
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put enforces this limitation through a system of prior au-
thorization from its Department of Social Services. In. 
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion, 
I 
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed 
I 
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the pa-; 
tient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medi-: 
cally necessary. 
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation 
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of 
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigen~ 
women who were unable to obtain a~ physician's certificate of 
medical necessity.8 In a coinpl~.int filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged 
the regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements of 
!'ally necessary. The term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatrio 
necessity. . . 
"2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital o~ 
liecn~ed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy .... 
"3. The written request for tbe abortion is submitted by the patient1 
,1nd in the case of a minor, froii; the parent or guardian. 
"In the case of a committed child, a written consent for the abortion is 
secured from the. <:;ommissione~ of the Department of Children and Youth 
Services as guardian. 
' '4. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of 
Medical .. Services, Division of Health Se;vices, Department of Social 
;;\ervices." 
.I At the time_ t !Lis action . was filed, .Mary Po,~ , a~ lp.cyear-ol~ . high school I 
,1 nnior, had already obtained an abortion at a Connecticut hospital, 
Apparently because of Poe's inability .to obtain a certificate of medical 
necp,ssity, the hospital wa~ denied reimbursement by the Department of 
f3ocial Services. As a resul t, Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital 
bill of $244. .Susan Roe, an unwed mother of three children, was unable 
to obt!Jin an abort ion because of her physician's refusal to certify that the 
procedure was medically necessary . . BY consent, a temporary restraini~g 
order was entered by the Distric t Court enjoining the Connecticut officials 
from refusing to pay fo r Roe 's abortion. After the remand from the Cour~ 
of Appeals, the District Court issued temporary restraining orders coverin~ 
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Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1396 et seq., 
and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal 
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation 
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act pro-
hibited the funding of abortions that were not medically 
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain 
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation, 
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only 
allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also re-
quired it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the 
Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding 
of such abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 (CA2 1975). Upon re-
mand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in 
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened. 
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F . 
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975). 
Although it found no independent constitutional right to 
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the 
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeu-
tic abortions from a state welfare program that generally sub-
sidizes the medical expenses incident to pregnancy and child-
birth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 
113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the view 
that "abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive 
moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are 
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with preg-
nancy .... " 408 F. Supp., at 663 n. 3. Relying also on 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 lJ. S. 250 (1974), the court 
held that the Connecticut program "weights the choice of the 
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitu-
tionally protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion and 
t'thus. infringes upon a fundamental interest." 408 F. Supp., 
?5-1440-0PINION 
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at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify thi!! 
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be 
"wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive 
medical response to pregnancy." /d., at 664 (footnote 
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed 
constitutionally irrelevant: 
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type 
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it 
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To 
sanction such a justification would be to permit dis-
crimination against those seeking to exercise a constitu-
tional right on the basis that the state simply does not 
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid. 
The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the 
c-C'rtificate of medical necessity for medicaid-funded ·abortions.4 
The court also struck down the related requirements of prior 
written request by the pregnant woman and prior authoriza-
tion by the Department of Social Services, holding that the 
State could not impose any requirements on medicaid pay-
ments for abortions that are not "equally applicable to medic-
aid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or require-
4 The District Court 's judgmEmt and order, entered on January 16, 1976, 
were not. stayed. On January 26, 1976, the Department of Social Services 
revi,;rd § 275 to allow reimbursement for nontherapeutic abortions without. 
prior authorizat.ion or consent. The fact that this revision was made 
wtroactive to June 16, 1976, ,;uggests that the revision was made. only for 
the purpose of int,erim compliance with the District Court's judgment and 
nrdrr, which were entered the same date. No suggestion of mootness has 
hren made by any of the parties, and this appeal was taken an,d submitted 
on the theory that Connecticut desires to reinst.ate the invalidated regula-
tion. Under these circumstances, the subsequent revision of the regula.tion 
doe,; not. render thr ca:;e moot. In any event, there would remain the 
denial of rrimbur~ement to Mnry Poe, !Lnd similarly situated member,; of 
thr rlas~:;, under the prerevi:sion regulation. See 380 F. Supp., at 730 n. 3, 
'Thr State has as:serted no Eleventh Amendment defense to this rcli<lf 
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Plents tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortioQ 
that she has asked her physician to perform." Id., at 665, 
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider the constitutional .. 
ity of the Connecticut regulation. 428 U. S. 908 (1976) . 
II 
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to 
pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent wo-
inen, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indi-
gents. r. But when a State decides to alleviate some of the 
hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner 
in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limi-
tations. Appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord 
equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and may not 
evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical 
expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classi-
fications established by the Connecticut regulation presents a 
question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysis 
of such a claim is well-settled: 
"'Ve must decide, first, whether [state legislation] oper-
~ Boddie v. Connect1:cut. 401 U. S. 371 (19'71), cited by appellees, is 
.no't to the contrary. There the Court invalidated under the Due Process 
Clause "certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, in-
cluding rrquiremcnts for payment of court fees and costs for service of 
process" restricting the ability of indigent persons to bring an action for 
divorce. /d. , at 372. 
"Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage rela-
tionship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state 
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due 
process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of inability to 
pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of theit 
marriages." !d., at 374. 
Bcrausc Connect icut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for 
terminating pregnancies through abortion the present case is easily dis-
"t inguishcd from Boddie . See also United States v. Kras, 4t09 U. S. 434 
{1973) ; Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656 (1973) . 
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ates to the disadvantage of l!lome suspect class or im~ 
pinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly 
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict 
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme 
must still be examined to determine whether it rationally 
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and 
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimina-
tion .... " San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 u. s. 1, 17 (1973). 
Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); Applying this .analysis here, 
we think the District Court erred in holding that the Con-
necticut regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A 
This case involves no discrimination against a suspect class. 
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within 
the limited category of disadvantaged classes so recognized by 
our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of the regula-
tion falls upon those who cannot pay lead to a different con- ( 
elusion. In a sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent 
creates a wealth classification as compared to nonindigents 
who are able to pay for the desired goods or services. But this· 
Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a sus-
pect class for purposes of equal protection analy~is. See Rod-
riguez, supra, at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 
( 1970) .{' Accordingly, the central question in this case is· 
0 In cast'~ such a~ Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) and Douglas v. 
California. 372 U. S. 353 (1963), the Court held that the Equal Protec-
tion Claus!:' requires States that allow appellate review of criminal convic-
tions to provide indigent defendants with trial transcripts and appellate 
counsrl. These ca::lei:' arr grounded in the criminal justice system, a. gov-
ernmrntal monopoly in which participation is compelled. Cf. n. 4, supra. 
Our subsequent decisions have made it clear that the principles underlying 
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whether the regulation "impinges upon a fundamental right 
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution." The 
District Court read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, supra, and 
the subsequent cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental 
right to abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less 
than a compelling state interest would justify Connecticut's 
different treatment of abortion and childbirth. We think the 
District Court misconceived the nature and scope of the 
fundamental right recognized in Roe. 
B 
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a Texas law 
making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abor-
tion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving ·the 
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases 
restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and 
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that 
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty 
affords constitutional protection against state interference 
with certain aspects of an individual's personal "privacy," 
including a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy/ 
410 U. S., at 153 . . 
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on 
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed 
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety 
of the desired service. As ·Ma. ;JusTICE STEWART observed, 
"it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of -a 
constitutional freedom .... " Id., at 170 (STEWART, J., con-
curring) . We held ·that only a compelling state interest would 
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally pro:-
7 A woman has at least an equal right to choose to carry her fetus tO' 
term as to choose to abort it. Indeed, the right of procreation without 
state interference has long been recognized as "one of the basic civil rights 
of man ... fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."' 
Ski'IW£r 'V~ Oldflboma, 316. U. S ... 53.5~ S41 (1942}. 
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tected interest, and we found no such state interest during 
the first trimester. Even when judged against this demand-
ing standard, however, the State's dual interests in the health 
of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were 
deemed sufficient to justify substantial regulation of abor-
tions in the second a.nd third trimesters. "These interests 
are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as 
t he woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, 
each becomes 'compelling.'" !d., at 162-163. In the second 
trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant 
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that 
concern. !d., at 163. At viability, usually in the third tri-
mester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus 
Justifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the 
life or health of the mother is threatened. !d., at 164. 
The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible 
i11terference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate 
l1er pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated 
other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in 
effect, on the woman's freedom of choice. Thus, in Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 
70 n. 11 ( 1976), we held that Missouri's requirement of spousal 
consent was unconstitutional because it "granted [the hus-
band] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever 
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's de-
cision to terminate her pregnancy." Missouri had interposed 
fill "absolute obstacle to a woman's decision that Roe held 
to be constitutionally protected from such interference." 
(Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need 
not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra, 
we have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion "is 
not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek 
an abortion." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 ( 1976). 
We recognized in Bellotti that "not all distinction between 
~bortion and other procedures is forbidden" and that "[tlhe 
{ .' 
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constitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its 
degree and the justification for it." /d., at 149-150. We 
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massa-
chusetts statute regulating a minor's access to an abortion 
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine 
whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the 
minor's decision or the less burdensome requirement of 
parental consultation. 
These cases recognize a constitutionally protected interest 
1'in making certain kinds of important decisions" free from 
governmental compulsion. Whalen v. Roe, - U. S. --
-, and nn. 24 and 26 (1977). As Whalen makes clear, the 
right in Roe v. Wade can be understood only by considering 
both the woman's interest and the nature of the State's inter-
ference with it. Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitu· 
tional right to an abortion," as the District Court seemed to 
think. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly 
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether 
to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the 
authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring child-
birth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the 
allocation of public funds. 
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind 
from the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions. 
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or 
otherwise-in the pregnant woman,s path to an abortion. 
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no dis-
advantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund 
childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private 
funds for the service she desires. The State may have 
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby in-
fluencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no re-
striction on access to abortions that was not already there. 
The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases, 
perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abortions is 
75-1440-QPINION 
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neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut 
regula.tion. We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does 
not impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe.8 
c 
Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases 
applying it. There is a basic difference between direct state 
interference with a protected activity and state encouragement 
8 Appellees rely on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and 
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974). In 
t hose cases durational residence requirements for the receipt of public 
benefits were found to be unconstitutional because they "penalized" the 
exercise of the constitutional right to travel interstate. 
Appellees' reliance on the penalty analysis of Shapiro and Maricopa 
County is misplaced. In our view there is only a semantic difference 
between appellees' assertion that the Connecticut law unduly inter-
feres with a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy and their as-
asertion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most 
familiar to the criminal law, where criminal sanctions are imposed as a 
consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recog-
nized that denial of welfare to one who had recently exercised the right to 
travel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to 
justify strict judicial scrutiny. 
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women who had 
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we 
would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny 
might be appropria.te under either the ·penalty analysis or the analysis we 
have applied in our previous abortion decisions. :But the claim here is 
t hat the Smte "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by 
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that 
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing w pay 
the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no support in the right 
w travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a compelling inter-
est for its decision not to fund elective abortions. 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), similarly is inapplicable here. 
I n addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of 
a constitutionally imposed "governmental obligation of neutrality" origi-
nating in the Establishment and FreeQ..om of ]leli~ion Gla~J_Se§ o{ the Firlit 
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of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.9 
Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts 
to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to en-
courage actions deemed to be in the public interest is neces-
sarily far broader. 
This distinction is implicit in two cases cited in Roe in sup-
port of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), 
involved a Nebraska law making it criminal to teach 
foreign languages to children who had not passed the 
eighth grade. !d., at 396-397. Nebraska's imposition of 
a criminal sanction on the providers of desired services 
makes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the 
constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted under 
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to 
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct 
11 ln Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), we drew this distinction in 
sustaining the public financing of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to 
others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party 
of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on 
access to the electoral process: 
"These cases, however, dealt primarily with state laws requiring a 
candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear 
on the ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the 
candidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice 
preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues. 
In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates 
is not restrictive of voters' right and less restrictive of candidates'. 
Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot or 
any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice; the inability, 
if any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaigns will 
derive not from lack of public funding but from their inability to raise 
private contributions. Any disadvantages suffered by operation of the 
eligibility formulae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denial 
of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electorate 
that the formulae afford eligible candidates." I d.: at 94-95 ( emphasii 
dded) (footnote omitted) . 
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their children" were "within the liberty of the Amendment." 
ld., at 400. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 
(1925), the Court relied on Meyer to invalidate an Oregon 
criminal law requiring the parent or guardian of a child to 
send him to a public school, thus precluding the choice of a 
private school. Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment's 
concept of liberty "excludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction 
from public teachers only," the Court held that the law "un-
reasonably interfere[ d) with the liberty of parents and guard-
'ians to direct the upbringing and education of children under 
'their control." ld., at 534-535. 
Both cases inva]idated ·substantial restrictions on con-
stitutionally protected liberty interests: in Meyer, the parent's 
right to have his child taught a particular foreign ·language; 
in Pierce, 'the parent's right to choose private rather than 
public school education. 'But neither case denied to a State 
'the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action. 
lndeed, in 'Meyer the Court was careful to state that the 
power of the State "to prescribe a curriculum" in its free 
·public schools that included English and excluded German "is 
~ot questioned." 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts 
no shadow over a State's power to favor public education 
by funding it-a policy choice pursued in some States for 
more than a century. See Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U. S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954). Indeed, in Norwood v. Har-
rison, 413 U. S. 455, 462 ( 1973), we explicitly rejected the 
argument that Pierce established a "right of private or paro-
chial schools to share with public schools in state largesse," 
noting that " [ i] t is one thing to say that a State may not pro-
hibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to 
say that such schools must, as a matter of equal protection , 
receive state aid." Yet, were we to accept appellees' argu-
ment, an indigent parent could challenge the state policy of 
favoring public rather than private schools, or of preferring 
f ! 
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instruction in English rather than German, on grounds identi~ 
cal in principle to those advanced here. We think it abundantly 
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest 
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more than 
a State must so justify its election to fund public but not 
private education. 
D 
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation 
can be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality 
that applies in the absence of a suspect classification or the 
impingement of a fundamental right. This test requires that 
the distinction drawn between childbirth and nontherapeutic 
abortion by the regulation be "rationally related" to a "con-
stitutionally permissible" purpose. Lindsey v. Norrnet, 405 
U. S. 56, 74 (1972). We hold that the Connecticut funding 
scheme satisfies this standard. 
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong inter-
est in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest 
exists throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality 
as the woman approaches term." Roe, supra, at 162-163. Be-
cause the pregnant woman carries a potential human being, 
she "cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . . [Her] privacy 
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must 
be measured accordingly." !d., at 159. The State unques-
tionably has a strong and legitimate interest in encouraging 
normal childbirth , an interest honored over the centuries.10' 
Nor can there be any question that the Connecticut regula-
tion rationally furthers that interest. The medical costs as-
sociated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased 
significantly in recent years. As recognized by the District 
10 In addition to the direct interest in protecting the fetus, a State may 
have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth. 
Sueh concerns are basic to the future of the State and in some circum-
stances could constitute a substantial reason for departure from a position 
qf 1..\CtJ.tJ:alti.y betwew abort ion. and. chikibirth. 
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Court in this case, such costs are significantly greater than 
those normally associated with elective abortions during the 
first trimester. The subsidizing of costs incident to child-
birth is a rational means of encouraging childbirth. 
We certaiuly are not unsympathetic to the plight of an J 
indigent woman who desires an abortion , but "the Constitution 
·does not provide judicial remedies for every social and eco-
nomic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 74 (1972). Our 
eases uniformly have accorded the States a wider latitude in 
choosing among competing demands for limited public funds. 11 
In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), despite recog-
nition that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds in-
volve "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human 
beings," we held that classifications survive equal protection 
challenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is 
shown. As the preceding discussion makes clear, the state 
interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this mini-
mal level. 
The decision whether to expend state funds for nonthera-
peutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value 
over which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that 
the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a 
weighiPg of its wisdom or social desirability, for this Court 
docs net strike down state laws "because they may be unwise, 
impro\ [dent, or out of harmony with a particular school of 
thought." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 
(1955). CJ UOted in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 484. In-
deed , ·,. 'wn an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as 
those i 11)licated by public funding of nontherapeutic abor-
tions, f,' appropriate forum for their resolution in a democ-
racy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legisla-
1 1 SeC' grnerally Wilkinson, The SupremE> Court, The Equal Protection 
ClausC', and The Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev~ 
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tures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of 
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." Missouri, 
Kansas and Texas R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267-270 (1904) 
(Holmes, J.) . 
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does not 
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It 
is open to Congress to require provision of medicaid benefits 
for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the 
medicaid program. Also, under present federal law, Con-
hecticut is free-through normal democratic processes-to 
decide that such benefits should be provided. Beal v. Doe, 
ante, at -. We hold only that the Constitution does not 
require a judicially imposed resolution of these difficult issues. 
IV 
The District Court also invalidated Connecticut's require-
ments of prior written request by the pregnant woman and 
prior authorization by the Department of Social Services. 
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted 
invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not un-
reasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of 
medicfl.l necessity to insure that its money is being spent only 
for authorized purposes. The simple answer to the argument 
that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical 
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termi-
nation of a potential human life. In Planned Parenthood of' 
Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, we held that the woman's 
written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible bur-
den under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the 
similar issue here. 
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with thia 
opiniqn, 
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MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER, concurring in the judgment. 
I do not read any decision of this Court as requiring a State 
to finance a nontherapeutic abortion. The Court's holding'S 
in Roe and Doe, supra, simply require that a State not create 
an absolute barrier to a woman's decision to have an abortion. 
These precedents do 11ot require tha.t the State assist her in 
procuring it. 
From time to time, every state legislature determines that, 
as a matter of sound public policy, the government ought to 
provide certain health and social services to its citizens. 
Encouragement of childbirth and child care is not a novel 
undertaking in this regard. Various governments, both in this 
country and in others, have made such a determination for 
centuries. In recent times. they have similarly provided edu-
cational services. The decision to provide any one of these 
services-or not to provide them-is not required by the 
Federal Constitution. Nor does the providing of a particular 
service' require. as a matter of federal constitutional law, the 
provision of another. 
Here. the State of Connecticut has determined that it will 
finance certain childbirth expenses. That legislative deter-
mination places no state-created barrier to a woman's choice 
to procure an abortion, and it does not require the State tQI 
provide it. Accordingly, I co11cur in the judgment. 
1; 
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Edward W. Maher, Commissioner 
of Social Services of Connecticut, On Appeal from the 
United Sta.tes District 
Appellant, Court for the District 
v. of Connecticut. 
usan Roe et al. 
[May -, 1977] 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
c.f2. E' U .~. 1 ~/, /2-~ District Court held: 
~ "When Connecticut refuses to fund elective abortions 
while funding therapeutic abortions and prenatal and 
postnatal care, it weights the choice of the pregnant 
mother against choosing to exercise her constitutionally 
protected right to an elective abortion. . . . Her choice 
is affected not simply by the absence of payment for the 
abortion, but by the availability of public funds for child-
birth if she chooses not to have the abortion. When the 
state thus infringes upon a fundamental interest, it must 
assert a compelling state interest." 408 F. Supp. 660, 
663-664 (1975) . 
This Court reverses on the ground that "the District Court 
misconceived the nature and scope of the fundamental right 
recognized in Roe [ v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 ( 1973) ]," ante, at 7, 
and therefore that Connecticut was not required to meet the 
"compelling interest" test to justify its discrimination against 
elective abortion but only "the less demanding test of ration-
ality that applies in the absence of ... the infringement of a 
fundamental right," ante, at 13. This holding, the Court 
insists, "places no obstacles--absolute or otherwise-in the 
pregnant woman's path to an abortion"; she is still at liberty 
tn finance the abortion from "private funds." Ante, at 9. 
S' /'$//77 
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True, "the state may [by funding childbirth] have made 
. childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing 
the woman's decision , but it has i_mposed no restriction on 
access to abortions that was not already there." Ibid. True, 
also, indigency "may make it more difficult-and in some 
cases, perhaps impossible-for some women to have ·abor-
tions," but that regrettable consequence "is neither created 
nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation." 
Ante, at p - ........ ______ _ 
But a ·stressing insensitivity o the plight of im overished 
pregnant ~men =~ ee . t e ourt;s ~nalzyis. · T e 
·stark reahty for too many, not JUSt (tsome," md1gent pregnant 
women is that indigency makes access to competent licensed 
physicians not merely "difficult" but "impossible." As a 
practical matter, many indigent women will feel they have 
no choice but to carry their pregnancies to term because the 
State will pay for the associated medical services, even though 
they would have chosen to have abortions if the State had ? 
also provided funds for that procedure, or indeed if the State - ~ 
had provided funds for neither procedure. 'This disparity 
ln funding by the State clearly operates to coerce indigent 
pregnant women to bear children they would not otherwise 
choose to have, and just as clearly, this coercion can only 
operate upon the poor, who are uniquely the victims of this 
form of financial pressure. Accordingly, Mr. Justice Frank-
urter's words are apt : 
"To sanction such a ruthless consequence, inevitably 
resulting from a monel hurdle erected by the State, would 
j ustify a latter-day Anatole France to add one more item 
to his ironic comments on the 'majestic equality' of the 
law. 'The law. in its majestic equality, forbids the rich 
as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the 
streets, and to steal bread' .... " Griffin v. Illinois, 35t 
U. S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
41 one' ~an take seriously the Court's assurance that its "con· 
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elusion signals no retreat from Roe [v. Wade] or the cases 
p,pplying it," ante, at 10. That statement must occasion great· 
surprise among the Courts of Appeals and District Courts 
that, relying upon Roe and Doe v. Bolton,Jhave held that 
States are constitutionally required to fund efective abortions 
if they fund pregnancies carried to term. See Doe v. Rose, 
499 F. 2d 1112 (CAlO 1974); Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F. 2d 
1211 (CAS 1974) rev'd and rem. on other grounds sub nom. 
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 (1976); Doe v. Westby, 
383 F. Supp. 1143 (SD 1974) rem. in light of Hagans v. 
Lavine, sub nom. Westby v. Doe, 420 U. S. 968 (1975), dec. 
on rem. 402 F. Supp. 140 (SD 1975); Doe v. Wohlegmuth, 
376 F. Supp. 173 (WD Pa. 1973), aff'd on statutory grounds 
sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523 F. 2d 611 (CA3 1975), rev'd -
U. S. - (1977); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (Utah 
1973); Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 
496 (EDNY 1972); rem. in light of Wade and Bolton, 412 
U. S. 924 (19·73), dec. on rem., 409 F. Supp. 731 (EDNY 
1976). Indeed, cannot be amsa1 that today's decision 
seriously erodes the prmCip e oe v. Wade and its prog-
eny announced to guide the determination of what consti-
tutes an unconstitutional infringement of the fundamental 1 
right of pregnant women to be free to decide whether to have ( 
an abortion. 
The Court's premise is that only an equal protection claim is 
presented here. Claims of interference with enjoyment of 
fundamental rights have, however, occupied a rather protean 
position in our constitutional jurisprudence. Whether or not 
the Court's analysis may reasonably proceed under the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Court plainly errs in ignoring, as it 
does, the unanswerable argument of appelle~~hat tl'ie regu-
lation unconstitutionally impinges upon her c rum of Qnvacy 
derived from the Due ProCe'Ss Clause. 
Roe v. 1ifade and cases fo11o;ing it hold that an area of 
privacy invulnerable to the State's intrusion surrounds the 
4-111 () ·S. I "7f 
(1 .. 73) I 
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decision of a pregnant woman whether or not to carry her 
pregnancy to term. The Connecticut scheme clearly infringes 
upon that area of privacy by bringing financial pressures on 
indigent women that force tEem to hear children they-;,ould 
not otherwise have. That is an obvious impairment of the 
fundamental right established by Roe. Yet the Court con-
cludes that "the Connecticut regulation does not impinge 
upon [that] fundamental right." Ante, at 10. · This conclu-
sion is based on a perceived distinction, on the one hand, be-
tween the imposition of criminal penalties for the procure-
ment of an abortion present in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton 
and the absolute prohibition present in Planned Parenthood, 
and, on the other, the assertedly lesser inhibition imposed by 
the Connecticut scheme. Ante, at 8-10. 
The last time our Brother PowELL espoused the con-
cept that "there is a basic difference between direct State 
interference with a protected activity and State encourage-
ment of an alternative activity concurrent with legislative. 
policy," ante, at 10-11, the Court refused to adopt it. 
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 122 (1976). This 
was made explicit in Part II of our Brother BLACKMUN's 
opinion for four of us and is implicit in our Brother STEVENS' 
essential agreement with the analysis of Part II-B. ld., at 
121-122 (STEVENS, J. , concurring in part). Part·II-B stated, 
"MR. JusTICE PowELL would so limit Doe and the other 
cases cited, explaining them as cases in which the State 
'directly interfered with the abortion decision' and 
'directly interdicted the normal functioning of the 
physician-patient relationship by criminalizing certain 
procedures' [ 428 U. S.], at 128. · There is no support in 
the language of the cited cases for this distinction .... 
Moreover, a 'direct interference' or 'interdiction' test does 
not appear to be supported by precedent . . . . For a 
doctor who cannot afford to work for nothing, and a 
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to fund an abortion is as effective an 'interdiction' of it 
as would ever be necessary. Furthermore, since the 7 
right ... is not simply the right to have abortions non-
discriminatorily funded, the denial of such funding is as 
complete an 'interdiction' of the exercise of the right as 
could ever exist." !d., at 118 n. 7. 
Cases involving other fundamental rights also make clear 
that the Court's concept of what constitutes an impermissible 
infringement upon the fundamental right of a pregnant 
woman to choose to have an abortion makes new law. We 
have repeatedly found that infringements of fundamental 
rights are not limited to outright denials of those rights. 
First Amendment decisions have consistently held in a wide 
variety of contexts that the compelling state interest test is 
applicable not only to outright denials but also to restraints 
that make exercise of those rights more difficult. See, e. (!., 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963) (free exercise of 
religion), NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963) (freedom 
of expression and association), Linmark Associates v. Town-
ship of Willingboro,- U. S.- (1977) (freedom of expres-
sion) . The compelling state interest test has been applied 
in voting cases, even where only relatively small infringements 
upon voting power, such as dilution of voting strength caused 
by malapportionment, have been involved. See, e. g., Reyr~r 
olds v. Sims, supra, 562, 566 (1964), Chapman v. Meier, 420 
U. S. 1 (1975), Connor v. Finch,- U.S.- (197!)"':"" Sim-
ilarly , cases involving the right to travel have consistently held 
that statutes penalizing the fundamental right to travel must 
pass muster under the compelling state interest test, irrespec-
tive of whether the statutes act.ually deter travel. Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 257-258 (1974), 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-341 (1972), Shapiro v. 
Thompson, supra. And indigents asserting a fundamental 
right of access to the courts have been excused payment of 
entry costs without being required first to show that their in-
I': 
7 
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digency was an absolute bar to access. Griffin v. Illinois, 
supra, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971). Thus the fact that the 
Connecticut scheme may not operate as an absolute bar pre-
venting all indigent women from having abortions is not crit. 
ical; what is critical is that the State has inhibited their 
fundamental right to make that choice ... free from state 
interference. 
The Connecticut scheme cannot be distinguished from other 
withholdings of financial benefits that we have held un~ 
constitutionally burdened a fundamental right by making the 
e:xercise of that right unattractive. Sherbert v. Verner, supra, 
struck down a South Carolina statute denying unemployment 
compensa.tion to a woman who for religious reasons could not 
work on Saturday. Even though there was no proof of indi-
gency in that case, Sherbert held that "the pressure upon her 
to forgo [her religious] practice [was] unmistakable," 37 4 
U. S., at 414, and therefore held the effect was the same as a 
fine imposed for Saturday worship. Here, though the burden 
is upon the right to privacy derived from the Due Process 
Clause ana not upon freedom of religion under the Free 
~ise Clause of the First Amendment, the governing prin-
ciple is the same, for Connecticut grants and withholds 
financial benefits in a manner that discourages significantly 
the e:xercise of a fundamental constitutional right. Indeed, 
the case for applica.tion of the principle actually is stronger 
than in Verner since appellees are all indigents and therefore 
even more vulnerable to the financial pressures imposed by 
the Connecticut regulations. 
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 ( 1976), held, and the 
Court today agrees, ante, at 8, that a state requirement is 
unconstitutional if it "unduly burdens the right to seek an 
abortion." Connecticut has "unduly" burdened the funda-
mental right of pregnant women to be free to choose to have 
an abortion because the State has advanced no compelling 
r-;tat~" mterest to justify its interference in that choice. 
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Although Connecticut does not argue it as justification, the 
Court concludes that the State's interest "in protecting the 
potential life of the fetus" suffices, ante, at 13. * Since only the 
first trimester of pregnancy is involved in this case, that j"usti· 
fication is totally foreclosed if the Court is not overruling 
the holding of Roe v. Wade that "[w]ith respect to the State's 
important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'com· 
peUing' point is at ~i*slit~." occurring at about the end of the 
second trimester. 10 U. S., at 163. The State also argues a 
further justification not relied upon by the majority, namely, 
that it needs "to control the amount of its limited public funds 
which will be allocated to its public welfare budget." Brief, 
p, 23. The District Court correctly held, however, that the 
asserted interest was "wholly chimerical" because the "state's 
assertion that it saves money when it declines to pay the cost 
of a welfare mother 's abortion is simply contrary to indisputed 
facts." 408 F . Supp., at 664. 
Finally, the reasons that render the Connecticut regulation 
unconstitutional also render invalid in my view the require-
ment of a prior written certification by the woman's attending 
physician that the abortion is "medically necessary,'' and the 
requirement that the hospital submit a Request for Authori-
za.tion of Professional Services including a "statement indi-
cating the medical need for the abortion." Appellees Brief, 
p. 203. For the same reasons, I would also strike down the 
requirement for prior authorization of payment by the 
Connecticut Department of Social Services. 
*The Court also suggests, ante, at 13 n. 10, that. a "£tate may have legiti-
mate demographic con cern~ about the rate of population growth" which 
might ju~tify a choice to favor live births over abortions. While it is 
conctwabiP that under some circumstances this might be an appropriate 
factor to be considrred as part of a State's "compelling" interest, no one 
contends that this is the case here, or indeed that Connecticut has any 
drmo~raplue eoncern~;> at all about the rate of its population growth, 
No. 75-554 Beal v. Doe 
No. 75-1440 Maher v. Roe 
No. 75-442 Poelker v. Doe 
The Statutory Question: Beal 
whether 
CA 1/11/76 
The question is/Title XIX, which provides medical 
assistance to needy families and individuals whose incomes 
are insufficient to meet the costs of ·"necessary medical 
services", requin- s participating states to fund elective, 
non-therapeutic abortions. The best arguments for reading 
such a requirement into Title XIX are in Judge VanDusen's 
opinion (Beal Appendix at 143a-152a); the best arguments on 
the other side are in Petioners' Brief (7-22) and Reply Brief 
(4-5 & n. 8) and in the SG's Memo (4-9). -------
to decisions in CAs 2, 6, and 10 and to the positiDn of HEW, 
read the statute so as to avoid 
Constitutional problems. CA 3 said that Title XIX gives the 
states broad discretion in defining the conditions requiri ng 
treatment, but mandates that the states leave the manner of 
treatment to the judgment of physicians, except where the policies 
of Title XIX support regulating the physidan's judgment. CA 3 ---found no justification for restriction of the physician's 
---------~ -------------------------------~ - ---------judgment of when abortion is medically indicated, either in 
economy or in concern for the mother's health, and found such 
a restriction contrary to the congressional purpose of equal 
' 
provision of services. CA 3 concluded that Title XIX 
requires the states to finance non-therapeutic abortions, 
because "the decisions of the Supreme Court have forced the 
States to include elective abortions in the legal practice 
of medicine through the second trimester of pregnancy .••• " 
App. lSOa. 
The SG differs from this analys~s only on one 
~
\
point: he says that a non-therapeutic abortion is not a 
----~------~------------------------
"medically indicated" ab9rtion xxJixxk:aX by definixtion; therefore 
when Pennsylvania limits abortions to those which are therapeutic 
it has left the judgment to the physician just as Title 
In the SG's view, CA 3 erred in holding fT' ? ~ XIX requires. 
)~ on the basis of Roe -- that an elective abortion is invariably 
~~~ "medically nece ssary." 
vrn,p ~' - -
~~D),~ The Petitioners go somewhat beyond the SG: they argue 
·:.,~~· t~at ~ngre~s not only intended to permit states to decline 
1r~ ~ to finance anything non-therapeutic in general, but also intended 
-~ ~~ to permit states to exclude abortions as socially undesirable. 
~/They point to ~urJndicaf22'?-~ that Congress _dis!~pro-:.e.s of 
~A elective abortions: (1) when title XIX was enacted, abortion 
was prohibited in a majority of states; (2) when Congress 
in 1970 
passed the Family Planning Services Act/, it excluded abortion 
as a means of family planning; (3) when Congress established 
the Legal Serviced Corporation, Congress similarly excluded 




a d (&) cost recently, Congress has excluded the use of 
~ 
3. 
·~~~- Aftftpftftri t for non-therapeutic abortions 
t of 1976: 
•. •one of the funds contained in this Act 
shall be used to perform abortions except 
,.'hen the life of the mother '\YOuld be 
endangered if the fetus,ere carried to term." 
(See Petitioners' Reply Brief at 5 n.8 for an explanation of 
why this 1-year appropriations IBstriction does not moot the 
issues in Beal -- I think this is worth a question at argument. 
My view is thE there is no support for CA 3's 
result, apart from a concern for constitutional problems. 
'----="-"' 
Nothing in the statute or its history suggests that Congress 
intended to force states to fund a procedure that both 
or many 
Congress and most/of the states found and XER continue to find 
morally objectionable. Given that the Court has to reach 
the constitutional question anyway in Poelker, I see nothing 
to be gained from straining to uphold CA 3. 
The Constitutional Questfun: Maher and Poelker 
The question is whether it violates Equal Protection 
~ 
for a state to fund childb4rth but not elective abortions. 
The best arguments for finding a violation are in the DC 
-----~ 
opinion in Beal (Bei Appendix at 9la-10Sa) and in the Pool 
Memo in Poelker. The best arguments against finding a violation 
are in Justice White~ dissent in Poelker, Judge WkiXexxx Weis~s 
I ~~a, - 114- Q; 
dissent in the DC in Beal (Beal Appendix at 9le>l65a), and in 
'(. 
the SG's Memo in Beal (9-10). 
Under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a woman 
has a "fundamental" interest in deciding for herself, with 
a physician's concurrence, whether or not to have an abortion. ~ 
Whrre the state has legitimate interests in protecting the ~~~ 
health of the mother and the potential life of the fetus, ~-~ 
M~~ 
these interests do not: become "comp.elling" until after th~/?1~ --..'" 
·w-- I . fl. 
Therefore, a state is absolutely forbidden~~-
#f~ 
first trimester. 
by the Due Process Clause from prohibiting abortion in the ~ 
first trimester. 
In this case the same fundamental interest in autonomy 
is invoked against a refusal to fund elective abortions.iRxx 
xkexfixxx On the other side, the same state interest in 
protecting the potential human life is at stake. (Other 
state interests, such as those in economizing and protecting 
health, are discussed in the briefs but seem to me largely 
irrelevant because of the undisputable facts that (1) abortion 
costs less than childberth and (2) abortion is less risky in 
the first trimester than childberth at term.) The crucial 
\ 
my view is whether the autonomy right is so 
the refusal to fund the choice to abort while 
<::-.--
funding the choice not to abort as to require invocation of 
------------~--------
the compelling interest test. That test will, as Roe demonstrates, 
defeat the state's intaest in protecting the life of the fetus; 
any lesser test probably will not. 
--- -----
Roe involved an absolute bar to the exercise of 
' free choice by the pregnant woman. This case involves a 
significant burden on the exercise of free choice. Here 
the statute is concerned only with indigent women, who, by 
definition, are unable to purchase medical services in the 
private market. The refuaal of the state to pay for 
the abortions of these women means that in a significant 
number of cases they will be unable to exercise the right 
of free choice and will have to forego a desired abortion. 
The situation is not, however, as desp§rate as in Roe, becau~ 
fsx in many other cases private resources will be made ~ 
available, as for example through charitable organizations~ 
like Planned Parenthood. The crucial question in this case 
is whether the precise burden that is involved here is sufficient 
as the absolute bar involved in Roe. The answer must depend 
on an inquiry into four considerations~~fh~~atu~~· ~f ~~~~t 
es;:~h~~-::~-::-Rr-::::=-macy -: t~e state's interest 
J1 (uiJ 
in promoting the potential life in the womb, the degree of 
'\ (IV) 
interference with the right that is involved, and~the claim 
of the group affected to special judicial solicitude. 
1. The Nature of the Right Because the right .eo , "' ~~ 
~t o/~Jv 
 
is essentially a rlght to privacy, one might expect it to be 
or intrusion 
subject to reasonable regulation/in the same manner as oth~ 
such rights, as for example the right not to be arrested 
or the right to live together as a family. But the language 
of Roe, as well as the result, i~dicate __ t~~~- the right to 
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an abortion is more absolute than the rights from which 
it evolved. It is "fundamental," subject to deprivation - Cat 
least) only on the basis of "compelling" interests. The 
extent 'to which the Court adheres to this preferred position 
for abortion will contribute to the result in this case, 
but not necessarily control it. 
2. The State's Interest In my view the only 
state interest worthy of discussion in this case is the 
interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus. 
Roe held that before the third trimester this intere~ is not 
compelling enough to outweigh the fundamental right to an 4-x. _. 
abortion. But~ did not deny, as some of the opinions --
in these cases suggest, that the interest is legitimate 
or that it is well served by limiting abortions. Gunther 
------~------~ 
suggests that the difficulty in defining when life begins, 
acknowlegged by the Court in Roe, militates in favor of 
deference to the state legislatures. The Court took the 
opposite view, determining on the basis of medical evidence 
~. 
that life begins only at viability . and rej ecting state "theories" 
to the contrary. Nonetheless, it recognized tmt: the 
state has a legitimate interest in promoting "potential 
life." Again, how close the Court considers the balance 
to be between that interest and the mother's r i ght of 
free choice will affect the result here. If the balance 
was close in Roe, the different kind of interference with 
the result that is involved here may be enough to tip the 
scales. 
3. The Degree of Intrusion The Courts below 
relied on the "penalty" analysis .of cases like €Lap i rJ) v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, and Memorial Hospital v. ~~ico~ 
1. 
County, 415 U.S. 250. Both cases involve residence requirements 
for receipt of governmental benefits, and in both cases the 
Court held that denial of benifits to those who have recently 
moved into the community penalizes the fundamental right to 
travel and cannot be sustained absent compelling state 
interests. The analogy is a fair one, since the Court has 
referred to the right to travel in terrris reminiscent of Roe 
as an "unconditional rigkx personal right, a right whose 
exercise EXHHRX rna:§~ not be conditioned." Dunn v. Blumstein, 
405 u.s. 330, 339-40. And the cases do support the result 
below XHXXXHXHXEXXHX~xx±REH here, since they hold that any 
penalization of the right can be justified only by a compelling 
state interest. But I don't think the r ight to travel cases 
can aarry the day. 
:ior OI:Hil thing- the "penalty" analysis of these 
:::: 
cases . was ,largely abandoned by the Court in Sosna v. Iowa, 
419 U.S. 393, where the Court upheld a one-year residency 
requirement for divorce despite the burden on both the 
right to travel and the right of access to the courts, see 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371. Justice Rehnouist read 
the earlier cases as involving only budgetary or recordkeeping 
·, 
justifications. As Justice Marshall pointed xke out, the 
opinion manifests a "distaste for the mode of analysis we 
have applied to this corner of equal protection law. In 
its stead, the Court has employed what appears to be an 
as hoc balancing test . . " Id. at 419. 
I have already discussed the possiblity that 
many indigent women will be unable to obtain abortions 
as a result of the restriction tbt ls involved in this 
case. Against this are two competing considerations that ......_____ 
may diminish the extent of the burden on the right. First, 
as the SG points out, the Court in Roe and Doe recognized 
the need for inteeposition of medical judgment, and the 
requirement of "therapeutic" reasons for an abortion may 
be read as consistent with that recognition. The SG would 
define "therapeutic" to include psychological and long-term 
considerations that one would normally associate with "elective" 
abortions. This approach may kxe~ help a to shift the 
balance towards the state in Maher, but it may not be a 
feasible approach in Poelker (disuussed below). Second, 
Evansville Airport v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 
(because an airport user charge ~'aids rather than hinders 
the right to travel" it is not "a burden in the constitut:io nal 
sense") 
4. The Class Affected: To me this consideration 
provides the strongest impetus towards extending Roe in this 
case. To recognize a right to abortions but to eeny it 
in many cases to indigent women seems anomolous. The 
/( . 
pol1cy considerations that justify the exercise of judicial 
power, despite questionable support in the constitutional -text, structmua and history in Roe apply a fortiori in this 
case. The only trouble is that this consideration, as Jay 
has pointed out in his Three Faces of Equality, is the least 
legitimate as a basis for judicial invalidation of legislation. 
-----~ -------------
1. 
Additional Problems in Poelker 
Poelker raises four additional problems that 
are not involved in Maher: 
1. Mootness The plaintiff in Poelker was 
pregnant when she filed her complaint in the DC, but had 
a private abortion five days later, before any action by the 
DC. The DC said that the claim "became moot and should 
be dismissed for lack of standing."· . CA 8 reversed. 
The problem is not one of standing. At the time 
she filed the complaint, the plaintiff was pregnant, had been 
injured in fact by the municipal policy of which she was 
complaining, and was seeking relief that was both necessary 
and sufficient to remedy the injury. The right she was 
asserting was her own right to an abortion under the Due Process 
Clause. Standing is a threshold determination made on the 
face of tre complaint. The plaintiff in this case satisfies 
the requirements of standing under any test. 
~------~ ---~--~~~--------~ 
The question is whether her claim became moot 
when she had her abortion, or whether the case is "capable 
of repetition, yet evading review." In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 124-25, the Court found that that case was not moot 
despite RR~xixEk the lack of any evidence tha~he plaintiff 
was still pregnant at the time of the DC hearing. But the 
Court did note that the plaintiff was pregnant on the day 
before the hearing in the DC. Petitioners argue from this 
that Roe's mootness holding is distinguishable. 
I see no basis for distinction. Even if one can 
infer that in Roe the case was still live during the DC 
hearing, the crucial fact is that it was no longer live 
on review. Article III applies equally to appellate and 
trial tribunals, and there is no basis in the decisions 
for concluding that a case must survive trial before the 
"capable of repetition, etc" analysis comes into play. 
This is implicit in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.l1, 
where you found a prisoner's complaint about pretrial 
detention without probable cause to be within the "capable 
of repetition" exception despite t?e absence of any evidence 
that the plaintiffs were still in custody when the DC 
first acted on their complaints. 
In this case the complaint focuses on the right 
to an abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy. The 
period between discovery of pregnancy and the end of the 
and 
trimester will ordinarily be brief, / for reasons made clear 
in Roe, an expeditious decision is important . regardless of 
how soon the discovery is made. Women in the plaintiff's 
position cannot wait for trial in the DC, or even for class 
certification in most cases. The case provides "a classic 
justification for a conclusion of nonmootness." Roe, 410 U.S. 
at 125~ The burden on the right to an abortion, of which 
T( 
the plaintiff complained, is in its application to an individual 
"too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or 
e~tpiration " Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147. * . . 
* Petitioners do not contend that the problem is 
not "capable of repetition". Roe found this element satisfied 
H«X because "[p]regnancy often comes more than once to the 
same woman •••• " 410 U.S. at 125. While there is no 
"demonstrated probability" of recurrence of unwanted pregnancies 
under Weinstein's more recent formulation, I think Roe must 
control on this point as w~ll. 
IZ. 
2. Attorneys' Fees: Justice White's p.c., which 
you joined last year, fully and correctly addre,sses this 
issue. 
3. State Action and Private Scruples CA 8 identified 
two kinds of state action which it held unsonstitutiona~ 
city policy limiting the conditions under which abortions 
could be performed in city hospitals, and~ity policy by 
. 
which the ob-gyn clinic at one of the two hospitals was 
staffed by Jesuits who opposed abortion. The court 
directed the DC to order the city (1) to change its anti-
abo r tion hospital policy so as to make abortions available 
on an equal basis with- -other pregnancy care; and (2) "to 
~tain the services of responsible physicians and other 
necessary personnel whose personal views on abortion 
do not prohibit them from providing an abortion." (Xeroxed 
op. at 10). The reliance oq and ordered remedy for, the -
"staffing policy" raises two problems. 
--- The first problem is the petitioners' argument 
that the injury suffered by this plaintiff in 
failing to get a free abortion from the city was not the 
result of city action at all, but the result of private scruples. 
The answer is that the evidence clearly shows that but for 
the city policy abortions would have been available in at 
least one of the hospitals to which plaintiff went for 
help. The city's hospital director, a defendant, testified 
that '~ad it not been for the policy promulgated by the mayor 
he would have proceeded to implement the providing of abortions 
at the city's public hospitals". (Op at 6). The staffing 
~--
~ .. /f;vr 
r""" 
of the hospitals by doctors opposing abortion was not 
a fact found by the DC and was only an additional problem 
found by CA 8, which affirme d the DC's finding of a 
city anti-abortion policy unrelated to staffing. There 
is no question that the anti-abortion policy -- quite 
apart from any employment policy "caused" the injury of 
which plaintiff complains. 
But that leaves the question of what 
to do with CA 8's finding of an unconstitutional staffing 
policy that would have to be remedied by some sort of 
I' ff" • • '\ a lrmatlve actlon. I don't think there is anything un-
constitutional about a hospital being staffed by obstetricians 
----------------------------------------------
who uniformly oppose abortion, at least in the absense of 
evidence that their hiring was the product of discrimination 
on the basis of beliefs. And absent such evidence of 
discrimination, the remedy itself raises serious constitutional 
problems, since it intrudes on the doctors' First Amendment 
rights. Here, there was no evidence on the staffing of one -
of the city's two hospitals (Op. at n.S), and as to the other 
the evidence was only that it was staffed by faculty and students 
it 
from a Catholic insuUtion which regarded non-therapeutic abortions 
as immoral. The DC made no findings as to whether the faculty 
was made up solely of Catholics ( at least one of the faculty 
affiliated doctors was not a Catholic), what the faculty's 
views were on abortion (CA 8 found uniform opposition to 
abortion basea on the testimony of one Jesuit professor), 
what arrangement the City had with the University, if any, 
w~her ' non-university-affiliated doctors had been hired in 
non-obstetric capacities or had applied to the ob-gyn clinic, 
etc. In the absence of such findings, CAS's appellate 
finding of a "staffing procedure" motivated by opposition 
to abortion is unwarranted. 
If the Court holas in Maher that there is no 
constitutional right to a state-funded or state-performed 
abortion, it will be unnecessary to deal with this staffing 
question. See Justice White's opinion. If the Court 
holds that there is such a right under the Equal Protection 
Clause, then I think the appropriate dispostion will be 
to redefine the duties of a municipal hospital with respect 
to staffing -- discrimination on the basis of attitudes 
towards abortion is unconstitutional~ and remand for findings 
on wheeher there is such discrimination in St. Louis. 
5. Content of the St. Louis Policy Again the DC 
and theCA diverge on the facts. The DC found a policy 
J'f 
only against non-therapeutic or elective abortions, relying on 
the hospital by-laws and the testimony on one of the doctors 
who examined the plaintiff. This policy is indistinguishable 
from the one involved in Maher. But the CA, finding the 
facts de novo . , found a policy "prohibiting the performance 
of abortions in the city;owned public hospitals for reasons 
other than to sav.e the mother from grave psychological injury 
or death." (Op at 4). (CA 8 doesn't believe in the 
clearly erroneous standard of review!) By working a 
greater restraint on the physician's judgment of medical 
necessity, the policy found by the CA works a greater interference 
with the right of privacy established in Roe. I'm not sure 
would 
this difference wiii affect the result, arrlin any event I 
would be inclined to state the facts.as found by the DC. 
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Federal/Civil 
Timely 
+ ~e4.. 1. The primary issue in this case is whether the 
C?>'f"~ --Constitution bars a State from refusing to reimburse welfare 
recipients for abortions absent a prior showing ~hat the abortion 
- - - L / '-=' 
is necessary to preserve the physicial or psychiatric health of 
( the woman. ~ 
2. 
2. Facts and Decisions: Connecticut Welfare 
Department, Public Assistance Program Manual, § 27 5 requires ·, 
prior to the performance of a first-trimester abortion for which 
welfare assistance is sought, that a certificate be submitted 




brought this § 1983 class action - contending, 
Appellees 
inter alia, 
§ 275 is invalid because it denies them equal protection. 
The State originally defended its policy on the ground that Title 
XIX (Medicaid) of the Federal Social Security Act prohibited 
payment for elective abortions. CA 2 eventually held that 
II " h the Social Security Act was neutral as to abortion services,n~\~e~ 
¥"'\"'~.,.,~ f\Or forbidding the states oW> · reimburse. welfare 
recipients for the expense of an elective abortion. The case 
was remanded for consideration of the constitutional issues by 
the three-judge court in this case, in the event -which occurred-
the state chose to continue its policy once reliance on Title 
XIX was removed. 
* Section 275 provides in relevant part: 
Therapeutic abortion services within the State are 
covered under Title XIX when all the following condit ions are met: 
1. The abortion is recommended as medically 
necessary by the attending physician in an accredited hospital 
or licensed clinic . • . • 
2. The written consent for the abortion is secured from 
the patient . . . . 
3. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from 
the Chief of Medical Services, Division of Health Services, Dept. of 
Social Services. 
. . ** Every plaintiff i n th~s lawsuit.is a potential medicai ~ 
rec~p~ent whose pregn~ ncy was terrn~nated dur~ng the first trimester 
of pregnancy and who elected to undergo an abortion for reasons 





The three-judge court emphasized that although 
the Constitution does not require a state to pay for any 
medical services, once a state chooses to establish a program 
for reimbursing the medical expenses of the indigent, and adopts 
as part of that program a provision that requires state f unding 
for medical expenses arising from pregnancy, a serious equal 
protection issue arises if the state refuses to reimburse 
expenses incurred in procuring an abortion. It further noted 
that the pregnant woman's choice is not simply affected by 
the absence of payment for the abortion but also by the 
availability of public funds for childbirth if she chooses 
not to have an abortion. When the state thus infinges upon a 
"fundamental interest", it must assert a compelling state 
interest that justifies the incursion. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
u.s. 330, 338-42 (1972). 
Analyzing the State's asserted financial interest 
in not providing money for elective abortions the court 
_..,. concluded "[t]h'is interest is wholly chimerical because abortion 
-{~ is the least expensive response to a pregnancy." 
* This case was decided on a pre-trial motion for 
summary judgment. 
4. 
The only other potential ground of objection -morality-- was held 
insufficient under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), at least 




in not financing elective abortions, the court I 
§ 275 flunked ~the "compelling interest" and 
---relationship" equal protection tests. 
The court also invalidated § 275's prior approval 
requirement, noting that the state had asserted no interest in 
prior approval other than the fact it required prior authorization 
before certain other claims would be honored and that it does 
not require prior approval for reimbursement of medical 
expenses arising out of childbirth.* Affidavits had been 
submitted by physicians indicating that any delay in procuding 
an abortion increases the danger to the pregnant woman. 
* ~o state regulation of medicaid payments for 
abortions performed in the first trimester of pregnancy can impose 
conditions or requirements that are not equally applicable to 
medicaid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or require-
ments tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion or to 
delay the occurrence of an abortion that she has asked her 
physician to perform. Accordingly, those provisions of § 275 
that require certification that an abortion is medically 
necessary are unconstitutional, and the defendants are hereby 
enjoined from enforcing them.'.' 
5. 
3. Contentions: Appellants essential contention is 
that since Connecticut has limited all coverage under its 
Title XIX Medicaid program to providing payment thereunder for 
services which are medically necessary for the patient's health 
the limitation here is rational. The State is not required to 
fund the exercise of an indigent's right to an abortion. See, 
~·~·' Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 193-194 (Weis, J., 
dissenting). Finally, as to the prior approval requirement, 
it is reasonable since all that is necessary in a'critical 
situatiorr'is a telephone call from the physician, to be followed 
later by the necessary paper work. 
Appellees add nothing. 
4. Discussion: This case represents another variation 
of the issues presented in Poelker v. Doe, No. 75-442, Beal v. 
Franklin, No. 75-709, etc., all being held for the current 
abortion cases. The issue here is rather cleanly presented ~~d ~ 
I 
c~s\t is a strong candidate to fill out next Term's potential 
troika of abortion cases. 
There is a motion to affirm. 
May 19, 1976 Palm Op in Appx. to Jur. St. 
CHAMBERS OF 
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'Jl'r~utlrhuJhm, gl. <.q. 20c?JI-~ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Holds for the Abortion Cases 
June 26, 1976 
With the avalanche of paper the print shop has been compelled 
to process this last week in cases earmarked for announcernent, the 
shop was delayed until this past weekend in getting out the revisions in 
Planned Parenthood. I had intended to hold any memorandum on abo r-
tion holds until there was some indication of the ultimate decision on 
the revision. With Bill Brennan's departure now imminent, and even 
though the Chief's vote remains outstanding , I feel I should no longer 
withl-10ld this memorandum. 
TI1ere are five cases concerning the exclusion of " elective" 
abortions from the category of medical services provided to indigents. 
Four of these, No. 75-554, Beal v. Doe; No. 75-709, Beal v. Franklin; 
No. 75-813, Westby v. Doe; and No. 75-1440, Maher v. Doe, concern 
denials of Medicaid payment s for elective abortions . So does No. 75-
6721, Doe v. Stewart, whicJ a ppears on Summer List 2, Sheet l. In 
addition, No. 7 5-442, Poelk £ v. Doe, concerns a city policy agains t 
the use of municipal hospitals for elective abortions . 
Beal v. Franklin also has an issue concerning restrictions on 
advertising of abortion services; this issue has nothing to do with state 
subsidies and is not treated in Planned Parenthood. In addition, Beal 
v. Franklin and No. 75-772, Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, and No. 75-713, 
Gerstein v. Coe, concern issues resolved in Planned Parenthood. 
· - ... ?~~ 
l. No. 75-442, Poelker v. Doe.~is one , ~/:f~~'ur~J~..P~ . 
familiar to all of us. The CA 8 held unconstitutional a poliff'oi 'fhe~ -
"ty of Saint Louis against the use of municipal hospitals for the per-
formance of elective abortions . Byron's ~ curiam well describes 
the case, including the is~e as to attorneys' fees. There may or may 
I not be a standing problem, depending on the resolution of Singleton v. Wulff. . 
~55!,.~v. Doe~~~~~n~ 
CA 3, w1th two dissents, declaring Pennsylvania's restrictions on 
Medicaid payments for elective abortions to be in conflict With Title XIX 
on the Social Security Act. It is a class action; the plaintiffs are ~g::~ 
nant participants in Medicaid and a physician. They challenge the Penn-
sylvania system on~. and constitution~! _ar~unds . The case 
was heard originally by a 3-judge ~~hlchl1'e1d that the regula-
tions were not inconsistent with the Act but that they did vio late equal 
protection. That court, however, declined to enter injunctive relief and 
lin1ited itself to a declaratory judgment. On appea l to the CA 3, the 
plaintiffs abandoned their request for an inj unction. After a pane l deci-
sion the case went en bane. T11e CA 3 rnajority reasoned that since the 
State had determined that pregnancy was a condition for which medical 
services were "necessary,'' there was no ju stification for preventing a n 
attending physician fro1n choosing nontherapeutic abortion as a rnethod 
of treatrnent. It held that the Stat e was required to fund abortions through 
the end of the second trimester. The court found it unnecessary to reach 
the constitutional issue. The dissent argued tbat the regulations are per-
missible under both the statute and the C onstitution. The State seeks 
certiorari. 
The SG has fi l ed a memorandum arguing that both the statute and 
the Constitution allow the State to refuse Medicaid coverage when an 
abortion is not " medically indicated." His definition of the quoted term, 
however, arguably ma y be said to be synonymous with "the physician's 
bes t judgment." The SG suggests that No. 75-813, Westby v. Doe, is Ll~ 
a better candidate for certiorari . _l_ wonde r. ,? V: t~-R. t:"" P~~ 
~ ~V.A..~~~~. __.;::j ~~-~--A~ 
3 a No. 7 5-709, Beal v. Franklin;~ No. 7 5-77'2, FranKfin 
v. Fitzpat These cases are a_ppeal~ from a multi -facete d 3 - judge 
court deCl n Pennsyl vania ' s Abortion Control Act. The plaintiffs 
were a physician (Franklin ), the Obstetrical Society of Philade lphia (on 
behalf of its men1bers ), and various abortion referral societies (appa r-
ently in their capacities as such and not on behalf of their clients). The 
District Court held that the societi es were not sufficiently threatened to 
create a case or controvers y, but tl1at the physicians l1ad standing both 
on their own behalf and ~n behalf of their patients . Although the i ssue 
docs no t appear to be raised by the State, there may be a problem with 
standing, in connection with the subsidization issue, depending upon the 
resolution of Singleton v. Wulff. 
In No. 75-772, the plaintiffs appeal from the District Court's 
ruling upholding a provision requiring "informed, written consent" from 
the mother . This provision is much the same as the one being uph~ld 
in Planned Parenthood, except that the Missouri statute did not specify 
the content of the consent form, whereas the Pennsylvania statute· r ·e-
quires that it affirmatively appear : 
"(i ) that she has been advised that there may be 
detrimental physical and psychological effects which 
are not foreseeable, (ii ) of possible alternatives t o 
abortion, including childbirth and adoption, and (iii ) 
of the medical procedures to be used. 11 
The sta ternent also nmst be signed by the physician or a counselor 
authorized by him. Although the requirement that the patient be in-
fanned of possible unforeseeable effects may be questionable, there 
seems to be no bar to a requirement that the physician explain how 
likely or unlikely such unforeseen events are . It is also worth noting 
that failure to obtain written consent is crinlinal in the abortion con-
text, but not for other procedures . Nevertheless, I am inclined t o 
conclude that this provision of the Pennsylvania statute is not imper -
missible under the rule announced in Planned Parenthood. This "in-
fanned consent" is sue is the only one raised in No . 7 5-772 . 
In No . 7 5-709, the State appeals from the following rulings of 
the District Court : 
(a ). Striking a definition of "viability" as. "the capability of a 
fetus to live outside the mother's womb albeit with artificial aid. 11 A 
definition of this kind is upheld in Planned Parenthood. On the basis 
I 
of the invalidation of the definition, the District Court also struck a 
~ provision prohibiting abortions after viability except to preserve the 
life or health of the mother . 
(b) . Striking a provision to the effect that one who performs 
an abortion shall have made a decision that in his professional judgment 
the fetus is not viable , and if his deternlination is that the fetus is or 
11 1nay be viable , 11 shall exercise that degree of care to preserve its life 
as he would be. required to exercise with respect to any fetus _ intended 
to be born, etc . The District Court found that the statute in its applica-
tion spilled over into the second trimester and was violative of Roe . I 
am uncertain as to whether a linliting construction of this statute is 
possible . 
(c). Striking a provision requiring the consent of one parent 
in the case of an unrnarried pregnant r:ninor. The Pennsylvania statute 
explicitly forbids any court order waiving consent requirements. Under 
Planned Parenthood, this ruling is correct. 
(d). Striking a requirement of spousal consent. Again, under 
Planned Parenthood, this is correct. 
(e). Striking a provision forbidding public subsidization of an 
abortion unless a physician certifies that it is necessary to preserve 
the life or health of the 1nother. The District Court struck this pro-
vision insofar as it related to Medicaid payments, relying on Beal v. 
Doe. It recognized, however, that the statute affects n:wre than Medi-
caid payments and proceeded to the constitutional challenge . The court 
concluded that the only basis for the statute's distinction was social 
policy, and that this interest was insufficient, ruling that so long as 
the state provides subsidy for childbirth and non-abortion costs of 
pregnancy, it cannot deny indigents subsidization for nontherapeutic 
abortions. 
(f). Striking a provision to the effect that no physician or clinic 
shall engage in advertising having the purpose of attracting the public 
to come to the advertiser to have abortions or to purchase abortifacients. 
The District Court noted that the plaintiff physician sought only a yellow 
pages listing with referral services, which one of the defendants (the 
District Attorney of Philadelphia) conceded was not in violation of local 
medical canons. Relying on Bigelow v. Vi~ginia, the District Court 
held that the statute was overbroad. I suspect that this particular holding 
is consistent with Bigelow and with the more recent Virginia State Board 
of Pharm~. I cannot judge, however , the extent to which this case 
presents the concerns expressed by Lewis and the Chief in Virginia State 
Board. 
It perhaps should be recalled that we have noted l2.£_Q};2..~b~ 
j~isdiction in No. 75-443, Carey v. Population Services, where the 
lower court struck a statute prohibiting the sale of non-prescription 
contraceptives to persons under the age of 16, the sale of non-
prescription contraceptives by other than licensed pharmacists , and 
advertise1nent of non-prescription contraceptives. I doubt that Carey 
will shed much light on the provisions under attack here. 
We could , of course , affirm in No . 75-772. I ihink, however, 
that , on balance, subj ect to what the Conference discussion may bring 
forth, I would vacate and rernand both 75-709 and 75-772 for recon- · 
sideration in the light of Planned Parenthood , Singleton v. Wulff, and 
Virginia State Board. This arguably would put to rest a nurnber of 
issues and , if and when the case cornes here again , as it probably y.ril~11 .• 
it should be in a much cleaner posture. ~ ~ 1~
/CL W;,Ji'~ . ~~ ? 
5. No . 75-813, Westby v . Doe . Here a 't1'1feei:'}Udge court 
struck a South Dakota regulation fe_rbidding payr:nentof1viediC<ila!~mds 
fo ·non-therapeutic abortions . The plaintiff was a pregnant wornan 
eligible for Medica1d . T e challenge was on both statutory and consti-
tutional grounds . Initially, the three- j udge court declared the regulation 
unconstitutional and did not reach the sta tutory is sue . We vacated and 
re1nanded for reconsideration in the light of Hagans v. Lavine . On the 
re1nand, the District Court held the regulation invalid as being in con-
flict with the Social Security Act , adopting the reasoning in Beal v. Doe 
by reference . It also held the regulation violative of equal protection. 
The case is not a class action s o there might be some question about 
( 
m~s; the findings include one to the effect that the plaintiff is 11 still 
i~d~bt~~lher physician, 
11 
so presurnably ;~~~~e~. 
'~· No. 75-1440, Maher v. Roe . Here a three- judge..Jl!!ft~ 
Court struck as unconstitutional a Connecticut reguiahon denying Medi-
caid for an abortion unless it is necessary to preserve the physical or 
psychiatric health of the rn.othe r. The plaintiffs in this class action are 
pregnant women. At an earlier stage of the case the CA 2 reversed a 
single - j udge District Court decision to the effect that the regulation con-
flicted with the Social Security Act; the CA 2 held that the Act neithe r 
requires nor forbids payments for non-therapeutic abortions . 522 F. 2d 
928 . Apparently, the CA 6 in a decision not now before us has a lso 
taken this view. On re1nand for consideration of the constitutional is sue , 
a three- judge District Court held that the State 1 s interest was conser -
vation of resources but that n o resources were saved by denying re-
ilnbursement for elective abortions while granting it for childbirth and 
related costs . The District Court als o struck provisions requiring 
prior State approval and prior sub1ni ssion to the State of a signed con-
sent form. 
7. No. 75-713, Gerstein v. Coe.f'He~ struck down 
Florida 1 s requirement s of spousal consent and , in the case of an un-
married woman unde r 18 years of age , of parental consent. The only 
., 
~~ 
exception is in the spousal consent requirement, ere such consent 
need not be obtained if the husband is voluntaril~ 1vmg away from 
the wife . The CA 5's disapproval of these stat tes is supported by 
Planned Parenthood, and I shall vote to affir f{it~ 
8. No . 75-6721, Doe v . Stewart . This appears on Sununer 
List 2, Sheet 1. No motion to affirrn has yet been filed. The plaintiffs 
in this class action were an unmarried pregnant rninor and her mother . 
The District Cou;t held that the Louisiana regulation denying Medicaid 
for non-therapeutic abortions violated neither the Social Security Act 
nor the Constitution. It was said that there is no constitutional right 
to receive welfare and that a rational relationship test is appropriate . 
The court then held that the exclusion is rationally related to a legiti-
mate govenunental interest which preswnably was the conservation of 
funds through restricting rein'lbursen:1ent to 11 rnedically necessary' ' 
expenditures . 
Plenary consideration see1ns warranted in regard to both the 
constitutional challenge to a refusal to subsidize non-therapeutic abor-
tions, and the claim that the Social Security Act forbids such discrimi -
nation in the Medicaid programs. As of the mo1nent, and with this hasty 
review, I suspect No. 75-1440, Maher v. Roe, is the best vehicle or, 
as a second choice , No. 75-554, Beal v . Doe. The underlying papers 
in these c·ases seem to be more illurninating than those in No . 75-813, 
Westby v. Doe . 
I reg ret the haste with which this was prepared. 
Court 
UOU\...1 u. \...Vllll• 
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File in No. 75-442 Poelker v. Doe 
75-554 Beal v. Doe 
75-1440 Maaer v. Roe 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM; Phil Jordan DATE: June 29, 1976 
Holds for Abortion Cases 
Two of the eight cases discussed in HAB's hold 
memo can be disposed of easily. No. 75-713, Gerstein v. Coe, 
should be affi~ed on the basis of Planned Parenthood, as it 
involves only spousal consent and parental consent. The other, 
No. 75-772, Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, also can be affirmed on 
the basis of Planned Parenthood, as it involves only "informed 
consent." (Fitzpatrick is one of two appeals growing out of 
a single three-judge court decision, the other being No. 75-709, 
Beal v. Franklin, discussed below.) 
This leaves six cases. As I understand the desires 
of the Conference,you want the best case presenting the issue 
of whether exclusion of elective abortions from Medicaid violates 
either the Social Security Act or the Constitution, and the 
best case presenting the issue of whether a state's selective 
refusal to subsidize elective abortions violates the Constitution. 
Fully five of these six cases involve the Medicaid/ 
SSA/Constitution issue. A holding in any case that the selective 
exclusion violates the SSA would make it unnecessary to reach 
2. 
the issue of whether such selective exclusion violates the 
Constitution. Thus, the Conference should take only one of 
these five cases in order to decide the Medicaid question. 
In addition to a case on the Medicaid question, 
the Conference will have to take a case not involving 
Medicaid if you want to be sure of reaching the constitutionality 
of a selective refusal to fund or otherwise subsidize elective 
abortions. This is because the Medicaid question may be 
resolved solely on the ground of the SSA, with the Constitutional 
issue not reached. 
There are two cases that can assure the Court's 
reaching the constitutionality of selective refusals to fund 
or subsidize. One of these, No. 75-709, Beal v. Franklin 
("Franklin"), involves the Medicaid issue but in addition 
involves a straight issue of selective refusals and the 
constitution. I shall discuss Franklin last in this memo. 
The other case clearly presenting the constitutional 
issue is No. 75-442, Poelker v. Doe, which involves St. Louis' 
policy against the use of municipal hospitals for elective 
abortions. This case has been around since the November 7, 
1975 conference, and has occasioned writing from Justice 
White and some switching of votes over the course of the Term. 
It appears from your notes on the April 16 Conference sheet 
for this case that you are now inclined to grant. In terms 
of the primary issue in the case, a vote to grant is in order. 
3. 
Before the Conference takes the case, however, the Justices 
should refresh their memories about a couple of lurking 
"hookers," both of which show up in Chris' excellent cert. 
pool memo~ 
(1) The question of plaintiff's standing --
HAB's hold memo for some reason states that there could be 
a standing issue in this case depending on how Singleton comes out. 
That is flatly incorrect (as HAB's clerk now admits), for the . ......__ 
plaintiff in this case is a woman instead of a doctor. There 
is, however, a standing issue of another sort. The woman was 
pregnant when she filed suit, but obtained an abortion five 
days later, before the case was certified as a class action. 
The DC or~ginally dismissed the case as moot, on the ground 
that a woman had to be pregnant at the time of a DC hearing. 
CA 8 reversed this and the case has proceeded since then on the 
assumption that the woman had and retains standing. Probably the 
Court ultimately would conclude that she does have standing, 
but it is an issue that must be addressed and that is not 
squarely controlled by Roe. In Roe, the woman was pregnant 
in the DC but not so by the time the case reached the appellate 
court; the Court held that the case remained alive even absent 
a class action, on the "capable of repetition yet evading review" 
theory. That particular theory technically does not fit here, 
since there's no reason to think that in another case a woman 
4. 
would be unable to get a DC hearing while still pregnant. 
(2) The question of the doctors' religious -
beliefs - The City of St. Louis has a pmlicy against 
allowing elective abortions in the two public hospitals. 
Apparently the only evidence presented in the DC went 
to one of those hospitals, which is staffed with Jesuits 
from St. Louis University. These doctors have moral 
scruples against abortions - which Roe and Doe give doctors 
the right to exercise, and thus to refuse to perform 
abortions. Almost surely the Court would be able to say that 
the city policy is brought into question by this case, as 
CA 8 said, but there is the problem that the DC held 
plaintiff's failure to obtain an abortion to have been due 
to the doctors' personal beliefs rather than to the city 
-policy. (For descriptions of the two courts' opinions, see -
Chris' memo at 3-4.) Again; this is a question the Cburt will 
have to face in this case. 
Assuming that the standing and the "doctors' 
beliefs" issues can be surmounted and the merits of the 




This leaves the five cases involving Medicaid. 
I shall immediately reduce the number to four for purposes of 
discussion, since one of the five appears on a summer list 
and there has been no motion to affirm. The Court probably 
should not consider taking this case unless none of the other 
four is / satisfactory. This summer list case is No. 75-6721, 
Doe v. Stewart. 
Of the four remaining cases, three of them are pretty 
much the same: No. 75-554, Beal v. Doe ("Beal"); No. 75-813, 
Westby v. Doe (''Westby"); No. 75-1440, Maher v. Roe ("Maher"). 
There seems to be a pregnant woman with clear standing in ach 
case, so there's no threat of a wash-out because of Singleton. -
Granting Westby appears out of the question, since Chris noted 
the poor briefing and conclusory opinions in that case. 
As between Beal and Maher it may be a toss-up. HAB -- , 
recommends Maher over Beal, albeit for undisclosed reasons. 
If the Court takes Maher it probably will have to ask the parties -
to brief the Social Security Act question in addition to the --- .---....._ -
Constitutional one - as the case arrived in this Court, the 
parties may be focusing exclusively on the Equal Protection 
issue (since CA 2 held, at an earlier stage of the litigation, 
that the SSA was "neutral" as to funding of elective abortions, 
and sent the case back to a three-judge court for consideration 
~-
6 . 
of the constitutional issue alone). It does appear, to me 
at least, that both the SSA and the constitutional issues are 
in the case. 
Beal seems like a perfect grant. It is an en bane 
decision, with dissents, reversing a DC opinion all facets 
of the SSA and constitutional issues are spread on the record. 
The CA 3 majority held the exclusion violative of the SSA and 
thus did not reach the constitutional issue, but both issues 
are still in the case since respondents can seek to support 
the CA 3 judgment on the constitutional ground. (The only 
possible snag in this case is a procedural nicety. As noted 
in the pool memo, at 6, the statutory claim could have been 
adjudicated by a single judge instead of a three-judge court -
but there is no reason to think it was improper for the three-
judge court to consider the statutory issue, since there was a 
constitutional issue in the case.) 
I just have a "feel" that Beal is the better case, 
without being able to put my finger on why. Perhaps it is the 
fact that the CA 3 opinion presents the issues in the proper 
order and very cleanly - whether the exclusion violates the 
statute and, if not, whether it violates the Constitution. 
The three-judge court opinion in Maher dealt with the constitutional 
issue alone, after CA 2 had held that the SSA was neutral. As 
noted in Greg's pool memo in Maher, the State had relied on the 
J 
7 . 
SSA as a defense, arguing that it prohibited payment for 
elective abortions. That is an odd twist on the SSA facet 
of these cases, since normally the argument is that the SSA 
requires payment for elective abortions. I am afraid this 
twist somehow could foul up this case, although I cannot explain 
how. 
Finally, there is No. 75-709, Beal v. Franklin ("Franklin") 
mentioned earlier. This is the other appeal arising from the 
same three-judge court decision as No. 75-772, Franklin v. 
Fitzpatrick, discussed at the beginning of the memo. This 
Franklin appeal contains many issues, some of which - parental 
c.. --
consent, spousal consent - were settled by Planned Parenthood~ 
The case also contains an issue about the definition of 
"viability." The court in this case held the definition -
essentially the same as in Planned Parenthood - void for vagueness. 
Some Justices probably consider this definition issue settled 
in favor of the State by Planned Parenthood, but you and· I know 
better! And this time, unlike Planned Parenthood, the 
definition appears to have operative significance. See pool 
memo at 3-4. If you could get anyone in Conference interested in 
considering "viability" anew in this context, it might be worth 
taking Franklin because it contains this issue. Aside from 
"viability," the case also contains an issue about permissible 
advertising by abortionists - presenting probably tough issues under 
~. 
Virginia State Board. The presence of this issue is another 
reason to want to take this case. And finally, the case also 
presents the issue found in Beal, Maher and Westby - selective 
exclusion of elective abortions from State subsidies. Franklin, 
however, necessarily presents both aspects of the question -
statutory and constitutional. This is because the state 
statute in Franklin broadly prohibits the use of all public 
funds for elective abortions. Thus, it includes but also goes 
beyond Medicaid, and even if the exclusion from Medicaid falls 
strictly on SSA grounds the exclusion from other public funds 
still must be considered under the Constitution. 
Franklin thus seems to provide an opportunity to consider 
SSA and constitutional issuffiat once, thus doing away with the need 
to grant Poelker in order to be sure of reaching the constitutional 
issue involved in exclusion of elective abortions from public funds. 
There is a momunental "hooker" in Franklin, however, which is the 
,. - ~ ._..,_,~_..,....., -:? 
reason I have saved it for last. If S1ngleton goes our way, 
Franklin appears to fall by the wayside insofar as the public 
funding issues are concerned - the only plaintiff who has 
appealed is a doctor suing on his own behalf and on behalf of \,_...... ...... ..-..._..,..._ =-- ~ .... _________ _ 
other doctors, and there never was a pregnant woman in the case. .......... ... 
See pool memo at 2. Thus, to be assured of getting a case that 
will stay here, regardless what happens to Singleton, it will 
be necessary to take Poelker on the constitutional question, and 







No. 75-1440 Maher v. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I circulate herewith a first draft of a proposed opinion 
for the Court in the above case. ~ 
;• 
\'1 )' '"' .'1>. 
This case addresses the constitutional issue. I also 
am writing Beal v. Doe that involves the statutory question. 
Normally, I would circulate both opinions at the same time, 
but it will be perhaps another week before .' I have a first 
printed draft of .!!!!!· r., 
ss 
' ' . 
'i'l,_,,t;f 
~"' 
~u;trttnt Q}mtrl cf tltt ~tt~ ~btftg 
'~lh•Jrittghtn. ~. <!}. 2.ll.;t~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 18, 1977 
Re: 75-1440 - Maher v. Roe 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Jh-
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
... 
Supreme Oourt of the United States 
Memorandum 
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,j.u:prtm:t Qf01tri of tJrt ~tb ,jtaf.tg 
jila:s!p:ttgton. ~. <lJ. 2ll&f~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
April 28, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1440 - Maher v. Roe 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
v 
CHAMBERS OF" 
~.u:prtutt <!}o-url d tlft 'Jhrittb ~hdtg 
jilasfringhm. ~. <If. 2ll&f~~ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
April 28, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1440 - Maher v. Roe 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely,/ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
.inprtntt <!fourlof tlrt ~b Jtatts 
Jlaelfingbm. ~. <!f. 2llgt)l.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
April 29, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1440 - Maher v. Roe 
Dear Lewis: 
I think I shall wait for the 
dissent in this case before finally 
coming to rest. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
) 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
,jttpTtntt C!}ltlttt of t.Irt ~a .ihdts 
~uJri:tt:ghm. ~. <!f. 2ll,?J!.$ 
April 28, 1977 
75-1440, Maher v. Roe 
Dear Lewis, 
Upon the understanding that you are will-
ing to make the minor verbal change on page 6 
that we discussed, I am glad to join your opinion 
for the Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
To: Justice Powell Date: 5/4/77 
From: Tyler Baker 
Re: Maher (whether the regulation has been amended) 
The Library has answered Judy Miller's request concerning 
the present status of the Conn. regulation. Although one cannot 
really be sure, it seems that the ~~XMRKXK relevant regulation 
(§275) was revised on 1/16/76 to that very short form that I 
showed you which addresses only second and third trimester 
abortions. 
I have been thinking about this issue since you were gone, 
and I think that we may be able to salvage the opinion with only 
an addition to a footnote. If you recall, one of the name plaintiffs 
had had an MX abortion and was complaining that it had not been 
reimbursed with the effect that she was being pursued by the 
hospital to pay the bill herself. The complaint also requested 
that the court ~MJMX«XKkKX order the defendants to notify all persons 
denied reimbursement &QQ tie notify theRL that they are eligible now. 
As to XMX~ these claims involving MX reimbursements denied in the 
past, the case is not moot. I have checked the KM~XXIMXX Answer 
and the state did not raise any Eleventh Amendment objection to 
these claims. No mention was made of the (potential) problem in 
the 3JC or in the H» briefs to this Court. Short of an express 
statement, it is hard to imagine a better argument for a waiver 
than this. If we mention this problem at all, and I am inclined to 
think that we should, this would be the way would handle it. 
~u.preme ~(ltt.rt of tire ~nittlt ,jtafcg 
'IDaslrbt¢41lt. tD. <.~. 20,?J~.;J 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL May 31, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1440, Maher v. Roe 
Dear Bill: .1 





Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.ittpTtmt aJ~urt ~f tqt 1!ttittb .Jtattg 
~agqmgbm. ~. aj:. 2ll&f){.~ 
June 1, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1440 --Edward W. Maher, Commissioner 
of Social Services of ConnectLcut v. 
Susan Roe, ~ al. 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your circulation of 
May 6, 1977. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
Dear Bill: 
.hprnm ~ottri nf tlr.t ~b ~htttg 
._uJri:nghn4 ~. ~· 2llgt'!~ 
June 1, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1440 - Maher v. Roe 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 




In view of your extensive changes circulating 
today, and other opinions that are now engaging my full u 
attention, it may be a couple of days before I decide 
whether to makE> . any response. "··'' "'· 
... -·~~· .. ~ 
I, therefore, see littJe possibility of 
bringing these cases down on Thursday. 
Justice 





Powell~ Jr. " 
Beal, Maher and Poelker 
,;<.;,- . ,. 
13, 
am rather · atrongly inclined to add a footnote to 
generally along the linea of the 'attached draft. 
It is becoming a bit tiresome to be berated by Brothers.~/ 
whose arguments, it now seems to me, should be addressed to 
the Congress and the state legislatures. 
1':\,In~.~a more pragmatic sense, perhaps a footnote along these 
"l'~( :q 
lin~~ would make our decisions more readily .underatood by lay 
As we should make this addition - if 
promptly, I would appreciate your reaction MOnday morning. 
sa 
In Beal v. Doe, the preceeding case, we held that the 
Social Security Act does not require the funding of 
nontherapeutic abortions. This case presents the c9nstitutional 
I ~~ 
question: whether a state medicaid program ~~deny funding 
for such abortions/ while providing it for childbirth. 
A Connecticut regulation limits medicaid benefits~for 
first trimester abortions/to those that are "medically 
necessary," a term defined to include psychiatric necessity, 
but not elective abortions. 
Respondents in this case,~two indigent women unable 
to obtain a physician's certificate of medical necessity, 
challenged the regulation. Relying on our decisions in 
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, a three-judge District Court 
held that the regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
We noted probable jurisdiction, and we now reverse. 
In our view, the Connecticut regulation does not 
discriminate against a suspect class. Nor does it . impinge 
upon a fundamental right protected by the Constitution// Our 
cases recognize a basic differencejbetween direct state 
interference with a protected activity, and state encourage-




Unlike the laws s &~\ielt i18wn in our previous abortion 
decisions, the Connecticut regulation does not interfere -
with the protected right to choose abortion. The pregnant 
woman remains free of legal restraints. 
Nor does the regulation violate the equal· protection 
clause. We have noted in prior decisions~that a state has 
a strong and legitimate interest/ in encouraging normal 
childbirth. Connecticut, j as a matter of polic1'and in 
furtherance of this interest,j has chosen to fund childbirth 
expensef' but not those for nontherapeutic abortions. We 
cannot say that the Constitution~orbids a state to make 
this policy choice. 
It is important to the understand;'the nature and scop~ 
of our decision. 
We do ~ hold;fthat the funding of such abortions is 
unlawful. Congress is quite fre,'to require provision of 
medicaid benefits for abortion~s a condition of state 
participation in the medicaid program. Also, under the 
Social Security Act - as we have construed it today in 
Beal v. Doe - Connecticut is equally freeJ'to provide such 
benefits. 
3. 
We hold onl;ft hat the Constitution does not require~ 
a judicially imposed resolution of this issue. It is 
an issue involving the weighing of public interests, the 
type of issue that/ - under the Constitution/ - should be 
resolved by representatives of the peopl~rather than by 
federal judges. 
* * * 
Mr. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in 
which Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Blackmun 
joined. ~ Justice Marshall also filed a dissenting 
opinionh Mr. Justice Blackmun also filed a dissenting 
opinion in which Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice 
Marshall joined. 
·- -~~-------
'COURT RULES STATES 
MAY DENY MEDICAID 
FOR SOME ABORTIONS 
ELECTIVE OPERATIONS ARE ISSUE 
I l Justices Also Hold, 6-3, That Public 
Hospitals Are Not Required to 
Give or Permit Such Surgery 
By LESLEY OELSNER 
SP<CIS:I to The New York Times 
WASHINGTON, June 20-The Supreme 
Court ruled today, 6 to 3, that neither 
the Constitution nor current Federal law 
requires states to spend Medicaid funds 
for elective abortions. 
The Court ruled by the same vote that 
cities and towns that had public hospitals 
were not required under the Constitution 
to provide or even permit elective abor· 
tions in those hospitals. 
The rulings do not mean that states 
must bar funds for abortions. They do 
mean, however, that all states and local-
ities are free, if they wish and if their 
state laws and constitutions permit, to 
bar the use of public funds and facilities 
for so-called "nontherapeutic" abortions. 
The rulings may alsG mean that the 
Federal Government is free to bar the 
use of Federal funds and resources for 
such abortions. 
Reaction in New York 
In New York, Joseph T. Lynaugh, tbe 
president of the New York City Health 
and Hospitals Corporation, said that mu· 
nicipal hospitals there would continue to 
perform abortions with Medicaid funds 
while the legal implications of the Court's 
decisions were being studied. 
Spokesmen for Governor Carey and 
Governor Byrne of New Jersey said that 
these would be no comment until a legal 
study of the decision had been completed. 
The rulings came in three cases from 
Connecticut, Pennsylvanilt and Missouri 
that involved only state and local, rather 
than Federal, efforts to limit public sup· 
~o!t for a~ortions. Undoubtedly, more 
htJgahon wtll be needed to clarify the 
full reach of the decisions. 
The logic that the Court followed seems 
as applicable to the Federal Government 
as to state and local bodies. The point 
is critical, because Congress is currently 
considering proposals that would bar· the 
use of Federal funds for many and. per-
haps alrl abortions. 
Total Ban May Be Invalid 
Today's rulings suggest that a ban on 
all abortions, even those that are medical-
ly necessary, might be invalid. They ap-
pear to clear the way, however, for a 
ban on funds for "abortions which are 
elective," or not medically necessary. 
The rulings are a major victory for an· 
Continued on Page 20, Column I 
···' 
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COURT BACKS ST.~_TES 
ON AN ABORTION CURB 
Continued F~ Page I 
tiabortion forces, the biggest so far in 
the effort to limit the reach of the su-
preme Court's landmark 1973 decisions 
striking down state laws that made it 
a crime to perform an abortion. 
The rulings are a severe setback for 
the proabortion forces and for the wom-
en's movement generally. 
The decisions seem sUre to have practi· 
cal consequen~ for tens of thousands 
of women. Medicaid funds have paid for 
abortions for as many as 300,000 women 
in a year, at a cost of $50 million. 
Indigent women will find it increas-
ingly difficolt to get abortions and some, 
as the Court conCeded, may find it im· 
possible. Consequently, abortion advo-
cates contend, more unwanted children 
may be born, and the number of illegiti· 
mate births may rise. 
The rulings also appear to have socio-
logical significance, because they affect 
only the poor-well-to-do and ~piddle· 
class women are not dependent on Medi· 
caid funds. 
Legally, the rulings seem to change a 
trend in the law started by the 1973 Su-
preme Court abortion decisions. Various 
lower courts that have ruled on the issues 
presented by today's cases reached a con-
trary result to the one the high court 
reached today. Those lower courts had 
generally based their rulings on what 
they thought the Supreme Court's 1973 
decisions required. 
The majority today insisted that the 
Court was standi~ by its 1973 abortion 
tulings. The decision, Justice Lewis F. 
Powell Jr. wrote for the majority in the 
Connecticut case, "sign·ats no retreat" 
, from its earlier rulings. 
The dissenters-William J. Bren·nan Jr., 
Thurgood Musha:ll and Harry A. Black· 
mun-disputed th:a.t 
"None can take seriously the Cout't's 
assurance," Justice BreMan said in a dis· 
sent joined by his two colleagues. 
An antiabortion leader, Msgr. James T. 
McHugh, director of 1Jhe Committee for 
Pro-Life Activities of the National Coun·cil 
of Catholic Bishops, welcomed the deci· 
sion, caUing it heJ.pful to th_e famly unit. 
Many groups and persons on the oppos-
ing side of the question, Including tftte 
American Civil Uberties Union, the 
Plan'ned Parenthood Federation of Ameri· 
ca, Americans for Democratic Action and 
Della S. Abzug, the New York mayoral 
contender, issued statements deCrying the 
rulings. 
The tone of tlhe SJtaJtement.c; ra11~·An f,.l\m 
.-
gry 1 er to sad. 
"The Supreme Court antiabortion deci-
sion this morning was a national tragedy, 
forcing poor women into back ai'Ieys for 
their abortions," Joseph L. Raub Jr., 
president of the A.D.A., said. 
"What today's decisions do is re-estab-
lish pregnancy termination as a second-
class medical service, unequll'l to preg· 
nancy continuation, and the poor as 
second-clas·s patients, unequal to the more 
affluent in their opportunities for serv-
ice," said a statement from Planned Par-
enthood. 
The Medicaid system was set up in 
accord with provisions of the Social Se-
curity Act. The states set up their own 
programs wLthin t:M guidelines and rules 
set out by the act. The Federal Govern-
ment provides financial ald. 
Last year, Congress enacted an amend· 
ment to the Social Security Act known 
as the Hyde Amend!Dent, after its spon· 
sor, Representative Henry J. Hyde of Illi· 
nois, that barred the payment of Medicaid 
funds for abortions unless the abortion 
was necessary to save the life of the 
mother. 
However, that amendment has not been 
enforced. Last fal:l, responding to two 
lawsuits challenging the law, including 
one suit by New York City's Health and 
Hospitals Corporation, a Federal District 
Court held the statute unconstitutional. 
Its enforcement has been enjoined pend· 
1 ing appeal. · 
Last week, the House passed a new 
amendment barring the use at Medicaid 
funds for all abortions, including those 
to save the life of the mother. 
What was b~ore the Supreme Court , 
today was not the Hyde amendment, but -e=!!~!:!!!:=========~===--1 the Medicaid system as rurrently in ef-
fect, under the statute without ' this Social Security Act. requiring states to 
amendment. establish "reasonable standards" for 
Various states under this system have detennining the extent of medica:! assist· 
on their own limited the use of funds ance the state will give, permitted states 
for abortion. In the case from Pennsylva- to bar funding for elective abortions. It 
nia, the issue was whether the Social Se- said in part that states had a "valid and 
curity Act permitted states to bar Medl- important interest In encouraging child-
caid funds for nontherapeutic abortions. birth," and that there was nothing in the 
In the case from Connecticut, the ques· words of the statwte to show that it was 
tion was whether the Constitution permit- "unreason~ble'~ for a state to further this 
ted states to do this. Interest. 
The third caae involved a public hospl· Second, the Court found that the Con· 
tal in St. Louis. Because of a policy dlrec· stitutional guarantee of equal protection 
tive from the mayor, and also the long· of the laws was not violated by state 
time practice of staffing the hospital's Medicaid plans that bar funding of elec-
obstetrlcs-gy.necology clinic with faculty tive abortions, even while providing fund-
and students from a local Jesuit-operated ing for women who chose to bear their 1 
institution, women could not get elective children. 
abortions there. The theory of lower courts that have ' 
The Court decided the first two cases reached the opposite conclusion, and the 
with separate majority opinions, both by theory of the dissenters, is that paying 
Justice Powell. It decided the third case for childbirth but not for abortion is an 
with a brief unsigned opinion, resting on undue interference with a woman's con-
the opinion in the Pennsylvania case. stitutiona:l right, established in the 1973 
The Court made two basic findings. decisions, to decide whether to bear the 
First, it found that the words of the child. · 
61 
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i: AbOrtion and 'povertY 
'I >- I • - · ,_,. -
. ..... ' ' . \ ' . 
In recent years, we have sometimes lost,sight Justice Marshall, .. brutally coerce poor women 
·.::of the . distinction between .two very different ·to bear -children whom society will lJC;:orri fof' 
,· 
\ 
' "'\kinds. of personal liberty.- One is thtt familiar · every day "Of their.lives.'~(Perlulps itis distas~· ·. : 
-..... ~libezttJroin·government constraint or,coercion: · .~ :' ful to ask;-.though· the question -suggests:Jtlelf,:. · 7 • 
~:;'the~ ~nd o'r-jtiberiy tKUaratiteed ·in ·the ' Bill• of whether 1lnyone is ·~brutally.,..~oerc~'~ to .. })e.! .~:· · 
-~- Rights. :The other .is lib:erty viewed ~sa kind_of, . !.:1_ c9mepregnantin the 'f'U'S~.·place.) :'·' .. ' , : .. ·:· 
· !!.· :entitlement .or; expectation, often ~:equiring ~ , • - . . f In ~nY revent, ~rgue . the.~dis~nters,Jf state ·~ · 
:~ n~li'Eentg~veninien!al int,ervention. ' . ~-", . -:. : ,-. ,I. .. le~~·B;tures refuse .. to acknow~~dge the, li~rty- : ' 
.. , 'Both :ldnds ::Of 'liberty haye i:beir ·place ·in a .. ·~~ ·SS~ntif:Iement, 1~tbis. Court · '--· .. must no( shirk 1ts/~ .' .' .. 
~ moderjf ~em~ racy; but whiie ~~first is fund a- ·:~ · • duty to e~orce 1the Consti~.tion f~r ·~e ·benefit ·, 
mental, and protected, the-other ~ually resUlts of the poor .and the powerless.~· . , - 1 
f~m~iety's exercise _of .an option- a,l~gisla- - : :;To' l;>e Yair about it, the ·~~~ten .offer a. sub- . , j 
ttve cho1ce among conflicting values. . · .. · 1 , ·~ tler.Mgument than.mere.Judicml force m8)eure, 
_ . ·~,It ~a~ .oveJ:' these :co~i>eting risions'of ii~rty, .1 ~;::: ~nning a~ ;follo~s ;' ,Eve~" though electiv~ 'abo~- .· 
it seems to ~~ that . the Supreme, Court battled '"'"'>.:tio~ ·Wa~ ill~gal :m mos~ st~t~s when. the M«:cb-
., .this week, _in .a bitterly contested set of deci- · .... ;cmdleg~slap~n was .P~ssed,~ ye!l!'B ~o,.J'ustice 
c .siomi, ·whenlt Reid that states have no obligation·-,. . ~ ~ren~n sees a~~se :f_o~ · cons~g ~e act as . 
1 ~ under the 1965 Medicaid .Act to pay for "elec- . reqwnng th~ fun~. of that. pr~~e. Not only · ·· 
:•ave" abortions~ -· · · · ~. · ' . • . does ,what 1s medtcaUy penmss1ble change, 
,. . •r: .~ ... . · ···-"";. '-~"· .-·· : .. _. · . ::: also, ·asalowe? federal .courtput.it,/ 'aportion, _ 
• At a;;sue, b_aslcally,: ~as the, mea~ng ·of the and chil~irth, when stripped ·.of .the ..sensiti~e -; ... 
• :Co~~ s pr-:vrous dec1s1ons, on. aboi"!ion: Th?se .. · moral argymen~s surrounding the a!><>rtiC?n ":onl. 
' dec1~10ns plc~re a ":oman S diS(:ret19n 1D ~bild- troversy, ate Simply two alternattve medt~ .~ 
•· .. beanng-as a!l-:xte~s1onof he~ personal p~vac~, . methods of dealing with pregnancy." · .~ - ~ .-, 
"' .::..... ~ m~tter1 wh1cb IS! at least .pl the .early stages . . ' In one sense, that'is undeniable:·· In ',a morally · · · 
;:·.~f, p~e~y~ <entirely ~tween · h~t an.d . her ';~ · neutral W~pld there_ WOl,lld .indeed be ~0 differ: · 
physiCian and not even subJ,ect to ~e veto of her ' ·""'· enee betWeen abortion· and childbirth . . But it is 
. ~ spouse . . ,.., :·~- . r . . ·r·:- . .· . . . . . . precisely because abortion andchildbi~h ::...like 
I •• Justice Le~s Poweil and.those 'of the major-· . -~- most ~tissues - ·carinotbe':"stripped of ..•.• 
:~ lty . .who· share his view, see this established r. ,._sensitive·mor8.1 arguments" ~at Wise judges do · ·( 
:· ~ .'right" to an abOI'tioii as, in other words,,. ~ · · not J?re-empt those .. p6licy choices" of which 
,. another right ... to be let alone." But whet~er or · · Justice Powell speaks: Try an· alternati~e ver-· 
not elective:or "non-therapeutic" abortion must sion of the lower court's words: "Forced steri-
. be routinely paid for by a state or federal treas- ·· lizatioil and the use of mechanical ·contrace~1 
· ury they see as another question altogether: tives, stripped of the sensitive moral\arguments 
..:_7!ow a woman exerci~es ~he choice ~-in other · surrounding human liber;ty, .are simply two ·' 
:words, independent 'Of her basic right to choose.' · · · alternative methods of dealing_ .with unwanted · ., 
.:·n is an jssue which ~s,.-in : ~.u~tice Powell ' s pregnancy."lsitlogicallyilifferent? . - . . · 
words, "fraught with judgments; •of policy and In fact, as we· see it, .the COurt's. dissenters 
·value over which opinions are sharply divided." · would seize upon tht! Fourteenth Amendment as 
' It is the second sort qf liberty described .above. a device for bootlegging personal conceptions of 
· Taxpayers, the Court holds, ~ay but need not . :.. .~ocial arid economic justice ~ conceptions 
subsidize the exercise of the basic right 'by ~di- '· . which incidentally' bav~ a great deal to be said 
" 
. gent women. In 'such policy questiqns, "the m 'their favor- into the statutory law, pre-
' appropriate forum· -· . ·in a democracy is the' emptinglegislativejudgment. ,: · I 
_ legislature." · · ' . ..' . ·' : .· . - . . But :we -already know -what ; the legislative -
This .was the tinexceptioiiable view that -:- judgment is. It was embodied ·last year in the - ' . . 1 
- fortunately- prevailed this week at the Court: Hyde· Amendment, forbidding the use of Medi-., l 
.··.· 'But why, if unexceptionable, did it. prevail only -caid funds for elective abortion: You may re- ·I 
· at the cost of acrimonious dissents .from Justices gard that prohibition as unjust, unfair, unkind 
Brennan, Marshall ·and Blackmun? For various and discriminatory against the indigent. But the 1 
.. reasoris, the three dissenters merge one·order of question, as Justice Poweil noted, ·quoting ·a · . 1 
, : personal libet:tY into another. They argue ··that . previous dictum of the Court, is whether t~e j 
·',. the ftindamerital "right" to choose .abortion is .. ~ , .. Constitution '/ pf9vide(s) judicial remedies for · . 'I 
:.. meaningles$ for poor women if the money isn't · every social and economic ill." It does not. Sucb ' 1 
· · there. Hence; state r~gulations that bar the use ,...'remedies, when they ·are provided, should be 
. · ·· of Medicaid funds for elective abortion, -wrote legislatively provided, with public consent. -
'· . .. ... -, .... I' .. 
I ' -
( '. ., 
~ .JI. ft ·--... 1.. ::......~ ,. • • : ..... 
- . •• ,: \-J - ' • • ~ • 
, -- ~ t' A , . Ao . · _. · · 
;~;:·~;;;. 'y ; ; • . . . . . . . . . . ' '' • . . . . ,. ?' ~:;;~ ~~'-~ ~;:~;:·.:' 
1!2ft.:'~~ ;:(:·:. rr'l Ab •. . ' 0 'T '' ·· ~ • -, '· ... !'>J 
, · - ~;.~·!*_~ : :: . -.;~- , : 11le : ·aJ;.tzon·· .- J..ssue~·_, ?~. :~:~;~-:~~;·~y;~.~: .... · I . ::- .. ~-=~:· .... J ··l··· .. . ~- ... ;,.. .. .- . .; :- ·. . ..... ; - ., .... _ ~ .. ·• . . . · .. ll ' :~~!.< ·; -- ··: -,r. -.. , ... • :.', ., · ,,_~\<~-~~-f.~ -. •,. ' . ~ - .· ·,· :-.- ' •· - ~ · .. ·,: .. :.i\;:~·~:·. ··.~~ , TJ HE SUPREME COURT'S decisions this week 'put . press s_o that you can · exerCise freedom o.f the 
.. . the aborti~n issue squarely back into the public : press-:-: : .. . , . . -~ -~ -~~ ·-<.: : • .· 
- a~ena-wbich is to say; the U.S. Congress a:nd state :·. -'But we are stunne9, nonetheless; qy the. c~ualness r . 
-legislatures.- That may be.the best place tOresolve.it , -:with which the Court ~sed this principle to.justily'its 
.-in a· democracy, .for it is an issue· in which religion d~cision that a city or state mliy' close its public bospi-
--~~d .. emotion and deep personal convjction count for . tals to nont~erapeu~c abortions. The Court did so in 
more than a literal and arbitrary reading of the law: · ·an unsigned opinion of -less than' three pages; which 
Tttie, th¢ solution is not much ia6'er to legislate than . provided precious little explanation ofits ruling and 
if~ tp_ adjudicate. But we have some sympathy. witk .·gave no consideration at all to'its implications. What 
th'e ~ourt's decision to· hand . back to the legislative . it · has done . in those . communities where pUblicly 
pr.C?_cess a problem that legislators, out of their own owned hospitals are the only ones readily available is 
~- deSperation, ·bad tried to pass off to the courts. ·· · to put the ability of all women to exercise their right 
:Elected officials, ,in our view, have acquired ·a bad . to an abortion up to the decision of a government of-
• habit in recent decades ofbucking to the judges the ficial or ·to a popular.vote. It is rare in American judi-
ni'ore divisive questions of the day. · diu history for the Court to subject the exerCise of an 
: ~ The Court has left the ·abortion issue in a relatively· acknowledged.right to such vagaries .. 
. straightforward position with respect to th.!'! ' law. · There is a solution. It is for Congress to face-the abor-
. What the court is saying is that 1) women have a tion issue squarely-to accept it as a problem that, for 
~1~ . constitutional right t~ - terminate :Pr.egancy by better ~r V.•orse, is not going to be entirely resolved in a 
abortion, a~ ·least through the first three months; 2) · ·raii and effective manner by the courts. Once that's ac-
go.vernment cannot st~p th~m from having abortions cepted, the Congress baS no choice, in ·our vie·~:' but to · 
- for any reason that may appeal to them; but .3) the direct that Medicaid funds be made available to pay for 
· government 'is -not required . to ·provide either . the· abortions, rather than trying to ,put limitations and 
funds or ~he facilities that make abortions ·financially restrictions · on such operations~: Any. other aCtion will 
poss.ible for many women. Left somewbat ambiguous create a class distinction based solely on wealth. · 
l!Y the Court's decisions are whether a government . . The law is now clear: The decision on whether to 
can-deny funds and facilities for abortions .that a doc- . have an abortion during .. the first ihree montlis of 
l!Jr c~rtifies. are medicaily necessary or whether gov- . pregnancy ·reSts. w_ith the women concern.ed. Soine · 
, ernment can define "medically necessary',' so nar- women have the means to make that decision freely, · 
rowly as to eliminate almost all abortio:ns. . . ' . insofar "as .the cost of the necessary medical care and 
· ·There is much logic and history -to support the .. . facilities .. is . a factor. But those without' the means-
: . Court;s central determination that the equal-protec- ~'·.· those dependent on government programs. for their 
t .tion ~lause is not abridged .by the refusal of gov_ern- :. medical ne~nnot choose 'freely unless the gov-1- "ment to fund abortions for the poor, although this iS ernment or someone else makes the funds and facili-
1 
a retreat from some of the language in past decisions. · ties for abortions available. A decision by Congress to 
The ruling does, however, create a fundamental- . restrict abortions would write mto American law the 
1 
and, ill our view, unacceptable-inequity. It'Ieaves· a· ·~majestic equality" about which Anatole France wrote 
1 state of affairs i.n, which poor women may be unable so bitterly. It would state, as the policy of the U.S. gov-
to exercise their ·right to 'an abortion while I:ich ernment, thaCwomen in this country have a constitu-
women can. Justice Powell's opinion does present a · tional .right, upheld by tl,le Supreme Court, to chobse 
convincing argument that the Constitution does not ·. 'for themselves to have an abortion if they want one, 
require government to support fi~anciall5' the exer~ , but only if they have the money-:-{lr can beg, ·borro'V 
cise of all rights even though it is barred from inter- . or Steal enough to pay for it SuCh a policy would not 
fering with their· exercise. Government, f9r example, do credit to a natiop that prides itself on tbe iridivid-
is not required to provide a forum from which you ual right of its citizens to live freely and to determine, 
ca_n exerci~e the right of free speech or a printing ... to the utmost extent possible, their own destinies . 
.c. ·' : .. - • . - · 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Tyler Baker DATE: March 7, 1977 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. . 
Maher 
I continue to have difficulty with the structure of 
our opinion. '~ Possibly, this is because of a lack of familiarity 
comparable to yours. Yet, as a comparatively "fresh reader", . 
the present structure does not seem to "hang together" in 
logical sequence. 
At Conferemce, those who agreed with the framework in c\ 
which I discussed the case (and I remember particularly Stewar~ 
and Stevens), .viewed it as follows: 
Although, as you emphasize, both the District Court and 
appellees seem to homogenize substantive due process and , ' , 
equal protection, they find a burdening of ,·a constitutional · 
' 
right requiring application of the compelling . stat~ · interests' 
' ~ ;fj") } 
standard. If one agrees with this test, it would perhaps be 
difficult to support the vote of the Conference. This would 
:i 
be true whether the case be viewed as implicatirig .,~substantive 
due process rights or as violating equal protection. We 
· ' ··' concluded that there is no substance to the due process claim, 
that the case does present an equal protection claim, and 
this must be analyzed under the rational basis test. 
I now come to your draft, having the foregoing ~er~ 
approach in mind. 
Part I: 
2. 
Except for editorial changes - mostly matters of taste -
this is fine. 
Part II: 
This is divided into three subparts - A, B and C. The 
first of these states that the "threshold question" is the 
standard of review. After stating that this is the initial 
question whether che case be viewed as due process or equal 
protection, you move immediately to ~ v. Wade. Under either 
due process or equal protection analysis, you say - correctly -
that understanding of the "nature and scope of the right 
recognized in Roe is critical". 
The draft then discusses~ (pp. 8 and 9). 
Subpart B distinguishes, quite effectively, the Texas 
law in ~ from the Connecticut regulation. The draft also 
points out that other cas~ (Danforth) also are different. 
On page 13, the draft makes the important point that 
there is a basic difference between state interference with 
a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative 
activity, citing Meyer. The last paragraph on page 15 concludes, 
apparently with respect to substantive du e process, that the 








compelling state interest test is not appropriate. '~'· 
Part C commences with the view that "it is equally clear 
that strict scrutiny would be inappropriate under equal 
protection principles" citing Rodriguez. You conclude (p. 17) 
that the fundamental right analysis of Rodriguez is inapplicable 
here. l': 
I would have thought that Part II having commenced (p. 7) 
with the question as to the standard of review, would have come 
to an end upon concluding that the compelling interest test is 
not applicable. 1.< .~ return to this point below. . But before doing 
so, I make these comments about my initial impression of Part 
II. I find it a little bit confusing to start out by saying 
' t.J 
the threshold inquiry is the standard of review. I think I · 
would have commenced by confronting Roe, as the case relied . -
upon by the DC and appellees as establishing the "right to an 
&bo~t:ian", characterizing it as fundamental and ' thereby 
·i' 
establishing the standard of revie":'l~ ·L Your analysis of th~ '·"· 
nature and scope of the right recognized in Roe is excellent. 
~-
' ;• w:J, ~·. 
When this is shown not to have been enlarged by Danforth and 
~ I· ~·,: '· 
then distinguished- as you do admirably' :. from the Connecticut 
regulation, we can then conclude that the review standard of 
~ is ~napplicable whether the case be viewed as due process 
of equal protection. ' 
' ~-
f:~ 
In light of these conunents, do ~10U think Part II might 
be refocused just a bit to place the initial emphasis directly 
4. 
on ~ and its contrast with the Connecticut statute before 
concluding that the ~ standard is inapplicable? 
Returning now to page 17, as indicated above, I would have 
expected you at this point to commence a new part (Part III) 
in which we apply the rational basis test to an equal protection 
issue. Before commencing the application of the. test, should ~ 
we not make clear that we view this as an equal protection case? 
'i '-\ ~ A majority of us at Conference thought the substantive due ! "'-.,i' ',_. 
);.rl 
process contention is almost frivolous. The nonfrivolous is 
~~ 
whether classifying women who wish to terminate pregnancy by 
abortion differently from women who wish to terminate it by 
childbirth meets the rational basis test? The answer depends, ' 
in conventional equal protection terminology, upon whether 
the classification is rationally related to one or more 
legitimate state interests. No one knows better than you ~,·: .,, 
r~~.l ' 
#_ " '. '' 4~"' J 
'' the terminology of equal protection, and ~(?w ' it ls applied. ,,,', 
c~ Y- -.-1 
... •'i" 
Yet, I must say that the present draft does not come through'~·:~ ... 
>.'i<~· .·~ 
1;1,'" ··~ 
very clearly in this respect. 
Without any clear indication that we view this as an equal 
protection case ,Z'(or that we are moving to apply the rational 
~ 1. ~· 
basis standard, the draft (p. 18) moves first into a discussion 
of Dandridge; then (a second subhead C, p. 19), into distinguishing 
Shapiro and Maricopa (p. 19-21). All three of these are equal 
protection cases, and yet I find it confusing to discuss them 
'. 
back to back. Dandridge was straight "rational basis", and 
is highly relevant to this case because it involved welfare 
provisions 'as you say. But Shapiro and Maricopa are, in a 
sense, equal protection "sports". Classifications were 
involved, and the Court found that the classification of 
those who had moved into the state recently constituted an 
invidious discrimination against their fundamental right to 
travel. Or, as you correctly put it, the classification 
penalized that right. I am not sure that these two cases 
5. ' 
fft in at this particular point in the opinion as well as they 
would somewhere else. 
.. · 
After a rather abrupt ending of the discussion of the 
three cases above mentioned, the draft moves to Part III 
which addresses the District Court's contention that a state 
must ,adopt a position of neutrality between abortion and 
childbirth. It seems to me that the "neutrality" point is 
one to be mentioned in a section applying the rational basis 
~ 
test to the classification. If the state interests are 
" legitimate and sufficiently furthered by the means selected, 
the state need not remain neutral. The argument that the 
state should remain neutral is simply another way of saying 
that pregnant should not be divided into two classes for the 
purpose of disposing of the fetus. 
I have the impression that the draft does not sufficiently 
emphasize, anywhere, the affirmative interest of the state in 
,, 
' ,, 
protecting the fetus and encouraging mothers to carry it to 
term. You do argue this on page 23, but in the framework of 
a neutrality discussion rather than in a section applying the 
rational basis test to the classification. I may say here, ,; 
6. 
.~ l 
''~·. that I like your use of ~ in emphasizing that even that 
',. l' .•. .f 
opinion recognized the legitimate state interest in the fetus. 
Also, in ,. this portion of the opinion, I would repeat that a 
• 'L ,, 
state c~assification properly may further a policy or value' 
choice by the state, so long as it does notRfringe on a 
constitutional right~ , , r -, ;: 
The final two or three pages speak to the point that 
funding abortions is a policy decision for the legislature! . 
This should be a separate part, and perhaps you and I both 
need to do some further work on 
l' 'I ~ 
4'" ~ 
Having worked as", hard as you have on this difficult case, 
I.,r"i·>, •A· "' ·<\ 
,,,.]~ 
I know it ~~s a bit discouraging , to .: have t::hese sort of comments 
~( 
that will require some revision. I emphasize that I do not : 
have a ' negative feeling about the content, and i t may well" ' 
be that my own perception as to the organization'· of the opinion 
is not as good as yours. I am inclined, however, to thin~ I 
am right and to believe at least some revisions are worth 
attempting. Possibly a fairly detailed outline might afford 
a guide, but I leave this entirely to you. 
sss 
L.F.P., r 
~ /l :•' ~ 1 ,, 
lfp/ss 3/7/77 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Tyler Baker DATE: March 7, 1977 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Maher 
I continue to have difficulty with the structure of 
our opinion. Possibly, this is because of a lack of familiarity 
comparable to yours. Yet, as a comparatively "fresh reader", 
the present structure does not seem to "hang together" in a 
logical sequence. 
At Conference, those who agreed with the framework in 
which I discussed the case (and I remember particularly Stewart 
and Stevens), viewed it as follows: 
Although, as you emphasize, both the District Court and 
appellees seem to homogenize substantive due process and 
equal protection, they find a burdening of a constitutional 
right requiring application of the compelling state interest 
standard. If one agrees with this test, it would perhaps be 
difficult to support the vote of the Conference. This would 
be true whether the case be viewed as implicating substantive 
due process rights or as violating equal protection. We 
concluded that there is no substance to the due process claim, 
that the case does present an equal protection claim, and 
this must be analyzed under the rational basis test. 
I now come to your draft, having the foregoing general 
approach in mind. 
Part I: 
2. ' 
Except for editorial changes - mostly matters of taste -
this is fine. 
Part II: 
This is divided into three subparts - A, B and C. The 
first of these states that the "threshold question" is the 
standard of review. After stating that this is the initial 
question whether t he case be viewed as due process or equal 
protection, you move immediately to Roe v. Wade. Under either 
due process or equal protection analysis, you say - correctly -
that understanding of the "nature and scope of the right 
recognized in Roe is critical". 
The draft then discusses Roe (pp. 8 and 9). 
Subpart B distinguishes, quite effectively, the Texas 
law in Roe from the Connecticut regulation. The draft also 
points out that other cas~ (Danforth) ~ are different. 
On page 13, the draft makes the important point that 
there is a basic difference between state interference with 
a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative 
activity, c iting Meyer. The last paragraph on page 15 concludes, 
apparently with respect to substantive due process, that the 
3. 
compelling state interest test is not appropriate. 
Part C commences with the view that "it is equally clear 
that strict scrutiny would be inappropriate under equal 
protection principles" citing Rodriguez. You conclude (p. 17) 
that the fundamental right analysis of Rodriguez is inapplicable 
here. 
I would have thought that Part II having commenced (p. 7) 
with the question as to the standard of review, would have come 
to an end upon concluding that the compelling interest test is 
not applicable. I return to this point below. But before doing 
so, I make these comments about my initial impression of Part 
II. I find it a little bit confusing to start out by saying 
the threshold inquiry is the standard of review. I think I 
would have commenced by confronting Roe, as the case relied 
upon by the DC and appellees as establishing the "right to an 
abortion", characterizing it as fundamental and thereby 
establishing the standard of review. Your analysis of the 
nature and scope of the right recognized in Roe is excellent. 
When this is shown not to have been enlarged by Danforth and 
then distinguished - as you do admirably - from the Connecticut 
regulation, we can then conclude that the review standard of 
Roe is inapplicable whether the case be viewed as due process 
of equal protection. 
In light of these comments, do you think Part II might 
be refocused just a bit to place the initial emphasis directly 
4. 
on Roe and its contrast with the Connecticut statute before 
concluding that the Roe standard is inapplicable? 
Returning now to page 17, as indicated above, I would have 
expected you at this point to commence a new part (Part III) 
in which we apply the rational basis test to an equal protection 
issue. Before commencing the application of the test, should 
we not make clear that we view this as an equal protection case? 
A majority of us at Conference thought the substantive due 
~t~ 
process contention is almost frivolous. The nonfrivolousAis 
whether classifying women who wish to terminate pregnancy by 
abortion differently from women who wish to terminate it by 
childbirth meets the rational basis test? The answer depends, 
in conventional equal protection terminology, upon whether 
the classification is rationally related to one or more 
legitimate state interests. No one knows better than you 
the terminology of equal protection, and how it is applied. 
Yet, I must say that the present draft does not come through 
very clearly in this respect. 
Without any clear indication that we view this as an equal 
protection case, or that we are moving to apply the rational 
basis standard, the draft (p. 18) moves first into a discussion 
of Dandridge; then (a second subhead C, p. 19), into distinguishing 
Shapiro and Maricopa (p. 19-21). All three of these are equal 
protection cases, and yet I find it confusing to discuss them 
back to back. Dandridge was straight "rational basis", and 
is highly relevant to this case because it involved welfare 
provisions as you say. But Shapiro and Maricopa are, in a 
sense, equal protection "sports". Classifications were 
involved, and the Court found that the classification of 
those who had moved into the state recently constituted an 
invidious discrimination against their fundamental right to 
travel. Or, as you correctly put it, the classification 
penalized that right. I am not sure that these two cases 
5. 
fit in at this particular point in the opinion as well as they 
would somewhere else. 
After a rather abrupt ending of the discussion of the 
three cases above mentioned, the draft moves to Part III 
which addresses the District Court's contention that a state 
must adopt a position of neutrality between abortion and 
childbirth. It seems to me that the "neutrality" point is 
one to be mentioned in a section applying the rational basis 
test to the classification. If the state interests are 
legitimate and sufficiently furthered by the means selected, 
the state need not remain neutral. The argument that the 
state should remain neutral is simply another way of saying 
~
that pregnantl\should not be divided into two classes for the 
purpose of disposing of the fetus. 
I have the impression that the draft does not sufficiently 
' 
emphasize, anywhere, the affirmative interest of the state in 
6. 
protecting the fetus and encouraging mothers to carry it to 
term. You do argue this on page 23, but in the framework of 
a neutrality discussion rather than in a section applying the 
rational basis test to the classification. I may say here, 
that I like your use of Roe in emphasizing that even that 
opinion recognized the legitimate state interest in the fetus. 
Also, in this portion of the opinion, I would repeat that a 
state classification properly may further a policy or value 
choice by the state, so long as it does notiocringe on a 
constitutional right. 
The final two or three pages speak to the point that 
funding abortions is a policy decision for the legislature. 
This should be a separate part, and perhaps you and I both 
need to do some further work on it. 
Having worked as hard as you have on this difficult case, 
I know it is a bit discouraging to have ~Q we:t of comments 
that will require some revision. I emphasize that I do not 
have a negative feeling about the content, and it may well 
be that my own. perception as to the organization of the opinion 
is not as good as yours. I am inclined, however, to think I 
am right and to believe at least some revisions are worth 
attempting. Possibly a fairly detailed outline might afford 
a guide, but I leave this entirely to you. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Tyler Baker DATE: March 11, 1977 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Maher 
I have reviewed with some care your draft of 3/10/77 of 
Part IIJ the most critical section of our opinion. I think 
we are making genuine progress with this sensitive opinion, in 
which almost every word must be used with care. 
I have, as usual, made some personal editorial changes. 
These include Rider A, on page 4, which is essentially a 
personal choice as to words and phrases. 
s· 
My reactio~to pages 7-18 of the draft are somewhat more 
substantive. My primary concern is that perhaps we are 
"laboring" the threshold issue of the appropriate standard 
of analysis. With this thought in mind, I have attempted to 
condense pages 7-12. See my Rider A, page 7. I do not think 
I have omitted anything essential to our analysis, but - of 
course - would like your checking me on this. 
think 
I am inclined to/tha t subpart (4) (p. 12-14) is unnecessary, 
certainly as a part of the opinion identifying the appropriate 
standard. I assume you will rely on Dandridge in part III when 
discussing the rational basis standard. In that part, perhaps 
a note could dispose of the "wealth classification" issue in 
a sentence or two. 
2. 
For different reasons, I am inclined to think that part 
C (p. 14-18) is inappropriate to a discussion of the relevant 
it me to 
standard of analysis. At least,/seems to/be misplaced. Possibly it 
may be included more appropriately in Part II-A where Roe is 
discussed and distinguished. You have an excellent point 
in using Meyer. At the moment, I am simply uncertain as to 
where it best fits into our opinion. My present thinking is 
that Part II ends appropriately and strongly with the disposition 
of Shapiro and Maricopa County, and the conclusion that the 
compelling state interest test is not applicable. 
In any event, I think you have Part II, as I have edited 
it, substantially on target. Perhaps you could reserve final 




TO: Tyler Baker DATE: March 16, 1977 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Maher 
I have taken a fresh look at the SG's memorandum in 
Beal, 75-554. Although that memo deals with the Pennsylvania 
Medicaid program, I believe in relevant respects it is 
analogous. 
In addition to arguing that there was no incompatibility 
with the federal statute, the SG stated: 
"A state's determination to offer Medicaid coverage 
for abortions only when such treatment is medically 
indicated is reasonable and is neither inconsistent 
with the objectives of Title 19 nor in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment." 
In addressing the "compelling state interest argument", the 
SG said: 
"Respondents contend, however, that the limita-
tion invidiously discriminates between 'those who 
continue their pregnancies to birth and those who 
seek to terminate their pregnancies by abortion,' 
(Br. in Opp. 6) and thus can be justified, if at 
all, only if it promotes 'a compelling state interest' 
(ibid.). But the distinction Pennsylvania draws 
between abortion and childbirth, by requiring a 
certification by the attending physician in the former 
case and not in the latter, is not invidious; it merely 
reflects the fact that whereas medical treatment at 
childbirth is generally considered to be necessary, 
in some circumstances a physician might determine 
that an abortion would not be an appropriate medical 
treatment. 
"Presumably it was for this reason that this 
Court, in recognizing a qualified right to abortion, 
emphasized the critical importance of the attending 
physician's role by holding that during the first 
trimester 'the abortion decision and its effectuation 
must be left to the medical ~udgment of the pregnant 
woman's attending physician. Roe v. Wade, supra, 
410 U.S., at 164. See also Doe v. Bol t on, suara, 
410 U.S. at 192. Thus, Pennsylvania has acte 
responsibly as well as constitutionally by inter-
posing a physician between the medicaid patient and 
the decision to abort. 
"Moreover, the fact that a woman has a qualified 
right to an abortion does not imply a correlative con-
stitutional right to free treatment. Individuals 
presumably have a 'right' to undergo many recognized 
medical procedures by a licensed physician, but the 
Equal Protection Clause does not affirmatively require 
a state to cover the costs incurred by indigents in 
undergoing such procedures." 
While I would not rely, in any primary sense, on the 
difference between what is medically necessary and what is 
2. 
not so necessary, there is merit to the point that "medical 
treatment at childbirth is generally considered to be 
necessary". This is at least an argument in support of the 
rationality of the state's distinction. We should make clear, 
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t;·: I have taken a fresh look at the SG 1 s memorandum in 
Beal, 75-554. Although that memo deals with the Pennsylvania 
Medicaid program, I believe in relevant respects it is 
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In addition to arguing that there was no incompatibility 
with the federal statute, the SG stated: ·.1 \ .r.', 
"A state's determination to offer Medicaid coverage 
for abortions only when such treatment is medically 
indicated is reasonable and is neither inconsistent 
with the objectives of Title 19 nor in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment." 
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In addressing the "compelling state interest argument", the 
SG said: 
"Respondents contend, however, that the limita-
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continue their pregnancies to birth and those who 
seek to terminate their pregnancies by abortion,' , 
(Br. in Opp. 6.) and thus can be justified, if at 
all, only if it promotes 'a compelling state interest' 
(ibid.). But the distinction Pennsylvania draws 
between abortion and childbirth, by requiring a 
certification by the attending physician in the former 
case and not in the latter, is not inviuious; it merely 
reflects the fact that whereas medical treatment at 
childbirth is generally considered to be necessary, 
in some circumstances a physician might determine 
that ~ abortion would not be an appropriate medical 
treatment. 
~ f: • 








~~, -'-· ~~ 
~ 
"Presumably it was for this reason that this 
Court, in recognizing a qualified right to abortion, 
emphasized the critical importance of the attending 
physician's role by holding that during the first 
trimester 'the abortion decision and its effectuation 
must be left to the medical ~udgment of the pregnant 
woman's attending physician. Roe v. Wade, supra, 
410 U.S., at 164. See also Doe-v7 BoltOn; suara, ' 
410 U.S. at 192. Thus, Pennsylvania has acte ~ 
responsibly as well as constitutionally by inter-
posing a physician between the medicaid patient and 
the decision to abort. 
·- :..... ~ ,, 
· "Moreover, the fact that a woman has a qualified ' , ' 
right to an abortion does not imply a correlative con- ~,. 
stitutional right to free treatment. Individuals 
presumably have a 'right' to undergo many recognized 
medical procedures by a licensed physician, but the 
Equal Protection Clause does not affirmatively require 
a state to cover the costs incurred by indigents in 
undergoing such procedures." 
' ~. ,, 
~ . 
r ,.! 
While :,r would not rely, in any primary sense, on the 
difference between what is medically necessary and what is 
not so necessary, there is merit to the point that "medical 
treatment at childbirth is generally considered to be 
necessary". ·This is at least an argument in support of the 
I. 
rationality of the state's distinction. We should make clear, 







TO: Tyler Baker DATE: March 16, 1977 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
/ 
Maher 
Let me try on you, Tyler, some "hornbook" type of 
simplistic analysis. 
In the context of this case, a pregnant woman has two 
fundamental rights: (i) to abort during the first trimester, 
or (ii) to carry the fetus to term and childbirth. But the 
fact that these are fundamental rights does not mean that the 
state must pay for either or both. Indeed, a pregnant woman 
has no right - fundamental or otherwise - to have the state pay 
for an abortion or for childbirth. Thus, the only ultimate 
question in this case is whether if the state elects to pay 
for one it also must pay for the other. 
Putting this in more conventional equal protection terms, 
we have here a classification - solely for the purpose of 
receiving welfare benefits - of pregnant women who wish to 
abort as contrasted with pregnant women who wish to bear children. 
Neither of these classes is "suspect" within the meaning of that 
term in any prior decision. But the fundamental right issue 
still lingers, and here we reach the problem that has attracted 
so much of our attention to date - as to precisely the nature 
of the right recognized in Roe. 
2. 
Is it really necessary to engage, as we have, in what 1~ 
v\vO, ~\tl .r 
,...0.dJ\:.bJJ '. many will think is semantic analysis for the purpose of 
~ ().;' !,..;. identifying the "right"? What would be the effect if we 
~ "V-""l , .,.. ~~~ r 
accept the shorthand terminology of ''constitutional right to 
have an abortion"? Since even appellees have conceded that 
there is no constitutional right to free abortions, all we are 
really talking about is whether the classification - by 
reflecting a state preference for childbirth - invalidly burdens 
the right to an abortion. Since, as we point out, the state 
imposes no burden whatever on that right, why do we worry about 
the state's decision to encourage normal childbirth by Medicaid 
benefits. 
If the state had elected to provide no Medicaid benefits 
'*' for abortion ~ childbirth, it could be argued- as it was, 
in effect, in Rodriguez and other "wealth classification" -
that the state burdens the constitutional right of indigent 
women to abort. Their right would be no less burdened, as 
contrasted with non-indigent women, than it is in this case. 
In sum, if this analysis makes sense, we would end up 
with a simple social security or welfare type case in which 
the question is whether a state had legitimate interests for 
favoring one class of beneficiaries over another. In this 
connection, can . we not make greater use of Skinner v. Oklahoma? 
I have in mind the quote (your footnote 1-E) as the importance 
of- procreation "for the very existence and survival of the race." 
' 
3. 
It is difficult to think of a more compelling state interest, 
even i f that test were applicable.* 
t__q-f 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
*Tyler, there was a news story within the past two or three 
days pointing out the slackening of the birth rate, indicating 
that less than two children per marriage are now being born -
an obvious threat, if sustained ) to "survival of the race." 
Ask the librarr to locate this story for us. It could have 
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fundamental rights: (i) to abort during the first trimester, , t ' 
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or (ii) to the fetus to term and childbirth. But the .\ carry ,, 
fact that these are fundamental rights does not mean that the 
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receiving welfare benefits - of pregnant women who wish to 
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Neither of these classes is "suspect" within the meaning of that 
term in any prior decision. But the fundamental right issue 
still lingers, and here we reach the problem that has attracted 
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so much of our attention to date - as to precisely the nature 
of the right recognized in ~· 
, .. 
2. 
Is it really necessary to engage, as we have, in what 
' \. I ,."' many will think is semantic analysis for the purpose of 
identifying the "right"? What would be the effect if we 
accept the shorthand terminology of "constitutional right to 
have an abortion"? Since iven appellees have conceded that 
there is no constitutional right to free abortions, all we are 
really talking about is whether the classification - by 
reflecting a state preference for childbirth - invalidly burdens 
the righ~ to an abortion. Since, as we point out, the state 
imposes no burden whatever on that right, why do we worry about 
the state's decision to encourage normal childbirth by Medicaid 
benefits. "' X 1-.- 'f,;., 
:w 'li'l:l!' 
If the state had elected to provide no Medicaid benefits ~, 
.l>i'l ~· 
for abortion of childbirth, it could be argued - as it was, ' 
in effect,! in Rodriguez and other "wealth classification" -
that the state burdens the comtitutional right of indigent 
"(!jj 
' " women to abort. 
~.: ;> Their right would be no less burdened, as ,, , 
contrasted with non-indigent women, than it is in this case. , 
In sum, if this analysis makes sense, we would end up <.:• 
with a simple social security or welfare type case in which 
the question is whether a state had legitimate interests for 
",;~ 
favoring one class of beneficiaries over another. In this 
connection, can we not make greater use of &kinner v. Oklahoma? 
, •. , I have in mind the quote (your footnote 1-E) as the importance 
' ~-
'! 
~ or procreation "for the very existence and survival of the race." 
3. 
It is difficult to think of a more compelling state interest, 
eveniff that test were applicable.* 
L.F.P., Jr. 
*Tyler, there was a news story within the past two or three 
days pointing out the slackening of the birth rate, indicating 
that less than two children per marriage are now being born -
an obvious threat, if sustained to "survival of the race." 
Ask the librar~ to locate this story for us. It could have 
been in Sunday s Washington Post. 
- IJ' 
Betty: 
Would you please request the Library of Congress to 
, prepare a memorandum showing, year-by-year for the last 
ten years, the fertility rate (defined, I believe, as the 
total number of children borne by each woman aged 15 to · 
44) for the United States and for the state of Qonnecticut • . 
. 
'' 
See attached story from the Post of February 
Sincerely, 
Betty Clowers 
' i 
